



## **Tsunami Evaluation Coalition**

Joint evaluation of the  
international response  
to the Indian Ocean  
tsunami:

# Synthesis Report

**July 2006**

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition





The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies and TEC staff are hosted by the ALNAP Secretariat. The CMG provides general oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Since February 2005 CMG members have included representatives from: *Donors*: Danida (Denmark), SDC (Switzerland) and Sida (Sweden); *UN agencies*: FAO, OCHA (Chair), UNDP, UNICEF and WHO; *NGOs/Red Cross*: Care International UK, AIDMI, the ITFC and World Vision International; *Networks/research institutes*: the ALNAP Secretariat and Groupe URD.

### **The TEC has three main aims:**

1. To improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development.
2. To provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations on the overall tsunami response (from the point of view of TEC member agencies)
3. To test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation.

More information on the TEC can be found on the TEC's website:  
[www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org)

### **TEC Evaluations**

This Synthesis Report is based primarily on five thematic evaluations undertaken by TEC member agencies during 2005/06. These focus on: coordination of the international humanitarian response; the role of needs assessment in the tsunami response; the impact of the response on local and national capacities; links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRAD); and the funding response to the tsunami. This Synthesis draws together learning and recommendations contained in these TEC studies as well as over 170 additional reports. It is published alongside these five studies, making a set of six.



# Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report

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### **Management of the Synthesis Report**

Overall management of this Synthesis Report was provided by the TEC's CMG. CMG members mostly come from the evaluation departments of the agencies involved. *Donors:* Danida (Denmark), SDC (Switzerland) and Sida (Sweden). *UN agencies:* FAO, OCHA (Chair), UNDP, UNICEF and WHO. *NGOs/Red Cross:* CARE International UK, AIDMI, the IFRC and World Vision International. *Networks/research institutes:* the ALNAP Secretariat and Groupe URD.

Day-to-day management of the Synthesis Report team was provided by the ALNAP Secretariat.

### **Financial contributions to the Synthesis Report**

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### **Funders of the TEC's five thematic evaluations**

This Synthesis Report is based primarily on five thematic evaluations undertaken by TEC members. In addition to those agencies listed above, some of whom also funded these thematic studies, the following agencies also provided support to one or more of the thematic evaluations: *Donors:* AusAid (Australia), BMZ (Germany), JICA/MoFA/JBIC (Japan) and SDC (Switzerland). *UN agencies:* FAO, UNFPA and WHO. *NGOs/Red Cross:* ActionAid International, Cordaid and World Vision Canada.

A full list of donors for each of the five thematic evaluations can be found in Table A5, Annex A.

# Foreword

## Foreword by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery

In the immediate weeks following the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004, many of us pledged that this operation would set new standards of accountability and transparency. We also pledged that out of the rubble of the Indian Ocean's coastlines, and the suffering of its inhabitants, we would 'build back better': placing coastal communities on a better development path; leaving survivors safer from future disasters; using the lessons learned today to ensure better responses in the future. A disaster of this scale and a response of such sweeping breadth and generosity deserve nothing less.

Therefore, I was greatly encouraged to see, in the early months of 2005, over 40 key aid agencies – including the United Nations, donor governments and non-government organisations – join hands to form the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), an historic, collaborative process to evaluate key elements of the relief and recovery effort. The TEC represents an extraordinary effort at reflection, self-criticism and transparency. The studies it has sponsored, and this Synthesis Report, provide an invaluable, independent account of how the tsunami response has proceeded so far.

As reflected in the pages that follow, our efforts to respond to the tsunami have placed in sharp relief both strengths and weaknesses in the way we organize ourselves when faced with such massive challenges. Indeed, the report includes both praise and uncomfortable reading, but the honesty of the analysis does us all a great service.

This report and the companion thematic studies identify important lessons and an agenda for reform that deserve careful analysis and an appropriate response. They help us to see how we can and must do better in responding to ongoing and future disaster relief and recovery challenges.

To my mind, the overriding messages of this report are three-fold:

First, we must do better at utilizing and working alongside local structures. With nothing but good intentions, the international community descends into crisis situations in enormous numbers and its activities too often leave the very communities we are there to help on the sidelines. Local structures are already in place and more often than not the 'first responders' to a crisis. The way the international community goes about providing relief and recovery assistance must actively strengthen, not undermine, these local actors.

Second, we must find the will and the resources to invest much more in risk reduction and preparedness measures. Local structures and local measures – whether part of national or provincial government efforts or embedded in the communities – need to be strengthened to reduce vulnerabilities to tomorrow’s disasters. And international and local actors need to forge solid partnerships between and among themselves, well in advance of their being tested in crisis.

Third, we must translate good intentions into meaningful reform. The report identifies critical systemic challenges for the humanitarian community, many of which were analyzed at length in the aftermath of the Rwanda crisis and have already been included in a range of standards and codes of conduct. But the fact that we continue to struggle to turn these principles into practice, as this report highlights, demands that we set about on our shared agenda for reform with the courage and commitment necessary to see the process through to full implementation.

The final story of the tsunami recovery process has yet to be written. This is a multi-year effort, which makes it even more important that we pay close heed to the analysis and recommendations in this report. I ask you to commit to helping us multiply our successes, realign our efforts where necessary, and retain the spirit of openness and self-criticism that this report so ably embodies.

**William Jefferson Clinton**

# Preface

This Synthesis Report is the outcome of an international collaborative process involving over 40 humanitarian and development cooperation agencies. Individuals involved have come primarily from the evaluation departments of UN agencies, multi- and bilateral donors, as well as non-governmental organisations, the Red Cross Movement and a number of research groups.

A week after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a number of members of ALNAP – the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action – began to discuss how to coordinate evaluations of the tsunami response. A consultative interagency and donor meeting was subsequently convened in Geneva on 23 February 2005. Those present were interested in maximising learning from the tsunami response through thematic joint evaluation. They identified five key areas for investigation: coordination; needs assessment; the impact of the international response on local and national capacities, links between relief, rehabilitation and longer term development (LRRD); and the funding response. Most of the agencies present at that meeting subsequently formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), and management of each thematic area was set up with the evaluation departments of interested TEC agencies forming a series of Steering Committees that provided the necessary oversight for each of the studies.

This synthesis is based on these five thematic studies, each undertaken by one or more independent evaluation team/s. The evaluations involved in-depth country case-studies, beneficiary surveys and extensive consultations with stakeholders. The report also benefits from a wealth of secondary sources produced on the tsunami response.

In drawing on such an extensive array of evaluative studies, this Synthesis Report provides a higher level, more system-wide analysis than any single agency evaluation could attain. It also represents the most comprehensive and intensive examination of humanitarian response since the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda in 1996, and provides a solid foundation from which to reflect on and appraise the capacity of the current international humanitarian response system.

The overall TEC strategy and process has been managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) made up of representatives mostly from the evaluation departments of 14 member agencies. The CMG is chaired by OCHA's evaluation department. The CMG is aware that its composition and strategy has been weakened by lack of representation from the South Asia region, but it is committed to a programme of dissemination in the region so that national, regional and local leaders and organisations, as well as the affected populations, can fully participate in the discussion about the evaluation's findings and recommendations. Prior to

publishing this Synthesis Report the TEC presented a series of initial findings, based on the studies' field work, in December 2005.

The Synthesis Report has been written by a team of three independent consultants recruited and managed by the ALNAP Secretariat and the CMG. The report has been subject to extensive scrutiny and earlier drafts have been shared with all members of the TEC and beyond. Subsequently the team gave full and fair consideration to an extremely large set of substantive comments. The Synthesis Report has also benefited from comments provided by a distinguished panel of experts, comprising individuals with extensive knowledge of the South Asia region, expert knowledge of disaster preparedness, mitigation and response, as well as higher level policy issues.

We believe that the thematic reports and this Synthesis Report produced by the TEC are a clear indication of the collective desire of the humanitarian community to work together to share and learn from their experiences in order to continue to improve future performance. The process has also demonstrated a shared commitment to be both transparent and accountable. The findings and recommendations from the Synthesis Report point clearly to some of the systemic deficiencies in our collective response capacity. We now urge all stakeholders in the humanitarian enterprise to seriously consider the findings and recommendations contained in this report, and to move toward a more effective and appropriate humanitarian response system.

Finally, the CMG would like to acknowledge and thank all informants who gave generously of their time as well as the thematic evaluation teams who have shown patience, dedication and hard work in preparing the reports on which this synthesis is based.



**Susanne Frueh**

Chief, Evaluation and Studies Unit, OCHA, and Chair, TEC CMG

**On behalf of all CMG members, past and present:**

Mihir Bhatt, Honorary Director, AIDMI; Tijana Bojanic, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, IFRC; Amy Cavender,\* Tsunami Response Programmes, World Vision UK; Niels Dabelstein, Head, Evaluation Department, Danida; Stefan Dahlgren, Senior Evaluator, Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, Sida; Andre Griekspoor,\* Technical Officer (responsible for evaluation), Health Action in Crises, WHO; François Grünewald, Chair, Groupe URD; Jamo Huddle, Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, World Vision International; Christoph Jakob, Evaluation and Controlling, SDC; Simon Lawry White, Senior Programme Officer, Evaluation Office, UNICEF; J Wayne MacDonald, Senior Project Officer, Evaluation Office, UNICEF; John Mitchell, Head, ALNAP Secretariat; Miles Murray,\* Emergency Programme Officer, CARE International UK; Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan, Evaluation Advisor, Evaluation Office, UNDP; Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin, Senior Evaluation Officer, Office of Programme, Budget and Evaluation, FAO; Margaret Stansberry, Senior Officer, Monitoring and Evaluation Department, IFRC. (\* Positions held when involved in the CMG.)



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- The TEC **thematic evaluation teams, steering committees and working groups**, whose incisive work forms the basis of this report (please see Annex A for details). We particularly appreciated the hard work of the evaluation team members who often worked in difficult conditions facing illness or accidents. The painstaking work of the Funding Response Report teams in trying to quantify funding flows from different sources was also appreciated.
- The **interviewees and affected people** who patiently informed the TEC and other reports by sharing their experiences and insights (please see the individual TEC thematic reports for details).
- The **peer reviewers** for their time, depth of experience and willingness to take on the onerous task of commenting on drafts of this report (please see Annex C for biographies of the peer reviewers).
- The **authors of numerous secondary and tertiary materials** drawn upon for this Synthesis (please see Bibliography in Annex I).
- **Ms Patricia Bianchi**, who assisted throughout the process with time-consuming research.

Finally, other actors contributed generously through, for example, informal consultations. In particular, many thanks are offered to members of the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

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# Acronyms and abbreviations



<b>ADB</b>	Asian Development Bank
<b>ADPC</b>	Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Thailand
<b>AIDMI</b>	All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (formerly DMI)
<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action
<b>BAKORNAS</b>	National Disaster Management Board, Indonesia
<b>BAPPENAS</b>	<i>Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (Ministry of Planning), Indonesia
<b>BPDE</b>	<i>Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik</i> Electronic Data Management Body
<b>BPS</b>	<i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i> BPS-Statistics Indonesia (Central Statistics Board)
<b>BRIMOB</b>	Indonesian paramilitary police
<b>BRR</b>	Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
<b>CARE</b>	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
<b>CBO</b>	community based organisation
<b>CDC</b>	Centres for Disease Control
<b>CERF</b>	Until 2006, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, now the Central Emergency Response Fund
<b>CIDA</b>	Canadian International Development Agency
<b>GIESIN</b>	Centre for International Earth Science Information Network
<b>CM-COORD</b>	Civil–military Coordination
<b>CMG</b>	Core Management Group of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
<b>CRC</b>	Canadian Red Cross
<b>CREG</b>	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DAD</b>	Development Assistance Database
<b>Danida</b>	Danish International Development Assistance
<b>DDPM</b>	Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Thailand
<b>DEC</b>	Disasters Emergency Committee, UK
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department For International Development

<b>DIPECHO</b>	disaster preparedness ECHO
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Refugee Council
<b>DRR</b>	disaster risk reduction
<b>EAC</b>	Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission's Humanitarian Office
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)
<b>FTS</b>	Financial Tracking System
<b>GAM</b>	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Free Aceh Movement)
<b>GBP</b>	British pounds sterling
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GHD</b>	Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>HIC</b>	Humanitarian Information Centre
<b>HPG</b>	Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute
<b>HRR</b>	Humanitarian Response Review
<b>IASC</b>	Interagency Standing Committee
<b>IAWG</b>	Interagency Working Group
<b>ICMH</b>	International Centre for Migration and Health
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>ICVA</b>	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>IDRL</b>	international disaster response law
<b>IFI</b>	international financial institution
<b>IFRC</b>	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>INGO</b>	international non-governmental organisation
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IRCS</b>	Iranian Red Crescent Society
<b>ISDR</b>	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
<b>JBIC</b>	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>LRRD</b>	linking relief, rehabilitation and development
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MDTFANS</b>	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Northern Sumatra
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MSF</b>	Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
<b>NDMC</b>	National Disaster Management Centre
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organisation
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODA</b>	official development assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PTWC</b>	Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
<b>RC</b>	Red Cross and Red Crescent (Movement)
<b>RC</b>	(UN) Resident Coordinator
<b>RC/HC</b>	(UN) Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>RDC</b>	Researcher and Deputy Coordinator
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Development Corporation

<b>Sida</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SME</b>	small and medium-sized enterprise
<b>TAFREN</b>	Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka)
<b>TEC</b>	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
<b>TICA</b>	Thai International Cooperation Agency
<b>TLC</b>	temporary living centre
<b>TNI</b>	Indonesian military ( <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> )
<b>ToR</b>	terms of reference
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCT</b>	UN Country Team
<b>UNDAC</b>	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
<b>UNDGO</b>	UN Development Group Office
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNHAS</b>	UN Humanitarian Air Services
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNIFEM</b>	UN Development Fund for Women
<b>UNJLC</b>	United National Joint Logistics Centre
<b>UNORC</b>	United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation



**Map 1. Countries affected by the tsunami**



# Executive summary

## 1 The report

This report synthesises the five Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) thematic evaluation reports, their sub-studies and other materials relating to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004. These five studies are published alongside this Synthesis Report as a set,<sup>1</sup> and their titles are:

- Coordination of the international response to tsunami-affected countries
- The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response
- Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities
- Links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the tsunami response
- The funding response to the tsunami.

The report consists of three main parts: an introduction; sections on the disaster and response; and conclusions and

recommendations. It addresses primarily the initial phase of the international response, up to the first 14 months after the disaster. The report has two main aims: to improve the quality of natural disaster response policy and practice, and to account to both donor and affected-country populations.<sup>2</sup> Information on content, methods and constraints are contained in the Introduction.

### Background

On 26 December 2004, a massive earthquake off the west coast of Northern Sumatra led to movement along a 1,200km section of the sea floor. This generated a series of tsunamis that killed people in 14 countries around the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India and Thailand were the hardest hit. Entire coastal zones were destroyed, with the tsunamis causing damage up to 3km inland in some cases. Over 227,000 people lost their lives and some 1.7 million were displaced. A massive media-fuelled, global response resulted, producing an estimated US\$13.5bn in international aid. The total

<sup>1</sup> All reports are also available on the TEC website, [www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org), as well as on an accompanying CD Rom.

<sup>2</sup> This aim will be addressed largely through other outputs based on this Synthesis Report, such as a condensed version of the report written for a public audience, as well as a series of feedback workshops in the affected region to validate and create ownership of TEC findings.

economic cost of the damage and the consequent losses were estimated at US\$9.9bn across the affected region, with Indonesia accounting for almost half of the total. In the Maldives, economic damage and losses accounted for over four-fifths of GDP and in Aceh, Indonesia, damage and losses were equivalent to almost the entire GDP of the province.

Pre-existing vulnerabilities, whether socio-economic, environmental, political, psychological, age- or gender-based, resulted in multiple impacts. Chronic poverty, environmental degradation (such as over-fishing and deforestation), displacement, inequalities, weak respect for human rights, and long-running armed conflict compounded the impact of the disaster.

While parts of Indonesia were struck within 20 minutes, it took up to several hours for the waves to hit many of the other affected countries. Wider knowledge of the nature of tsunamis, an alert media, and/or systems for communicating warnings could have saved many lives, as would have disaster-resistant construction. It is notable that disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness, though demonstrably cost-efficient and effective if correctly undertaken, receive only a small portion of international aid.

## 2 Constraints and achievements

The tasks, complexity of situations and scale of the constraints facing locals, nationals and internationals alike in their efforts to respond were enormous. These are explained in The Response section of this report. In the affected region, pre-existing weaknesses in disaster-affected national and local capacities were a major constraint. Other constraints included: the ongoing armed conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia; ill-advised, confusing and sometimes bureaucratic official policies and procedures; politicised and centralised decision making, including in beneficiary

targeting; and concerns about corruption and distrust of local leaders.

Vacillating and restrictive national and regional leadership constrained international response activities in all of the affected countries to a greater or lesser degree. The 'buffer zones', in which residential reconstruction was initially forbidden and later permitted within a particular distance of the shoreline, are a case in point. Shelter reconstruction, poverty alleviation, risk reduction and livelihood recovery are slow, highly complex undertakings that frequently involve factors outside the control (and competence) of international humanitarian relief agencies. These factors can include issues of land rights and availability, national poverty trajectories and environmental considerations.

Constraints are also rooted within international agencies themselves, and include: the quantity and quality of international personnel; inappropriate programme methods and tools; and weak engagement in or management of coordination. The lack of significant, predictable, non-earmarked, multi-year funding for developing appropriate international capacities is also a major drawback and negatively affected the tsunami response in the way that agencies struggled to scale up. A fragmented approach was due in part to the proliferation of international agencies and their insistence on distinct programmes. This limited the effectiveness of international assessments and of recovery activities, as did an evident shortage of relevant expertise, high turnover of international staff, and a general lack of appropriate language skills. The TEC evaluation reports suggest that UN security rules and finance procedures may also have inhibited rapid deployment to remote areas. Slow, overlapping, poorly shared, and imprecise assessments were a constraint for donors in meeting their Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)

commitment to fund 'in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments'.

Despite these impediments, generous relief provided affected populations with the security they needed to begin planning what to do next. Large amounts of funding allowed rapid initial recovery activities and some innovative practices, including a wider use of cash grants than has been the case in other emergencies. The gap between relief and recovery<sup>3</sup> that commonly appears in disaster response was avoided. Within a few months there was palpable evidence of recovery. In all countries, children were back in school quickly and health facilities and services were partly restored and, in some cases, much improved. By month six in Aceh, some 500,000 people had a solid roof over their heads (albeit mostly in host families and although some 70,000 were still living in tents). In Sri Lanka, more than 80 per cent of damaged fish markets, boats and fishing equipment was rapidly restored. Tourist numbers are on the rebound in Thailand and in the Maldives. In Sri Lanka, over 70 per cent of affected households are reported to have regained a steady income.

Disaster preparedness, while limited, was carried out by some international agencies, especially in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. Good practices illustrate how local and national ownership of aid programmes can be supported through patient, discerning and context-sensitive approaches. These include: the judicious use of cash grants; participatory complaints and polling mechanisms; joint projects, capacity building and staff secondments between national and international agencies; respect for national reconstruction standards; training of agencies' national staff; and detailed reporting to authorities. Weaknesses in

international operations must be seen against this background of both major constraints and important achievements.

### **3 Accountability, ownership and recovery**

Disaster response was mostly conducted by the affected people themselves. Practically all immediate life-saving actions and initial emergency support in the first few days (and weeks in some cases) was provided by local people, often assisted by the wider national public and institutions, including the national militaries. The role of host families is an under-valued and often overlooked example. The international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting these actors, and when accountable to them. Overall, international relief personnel were less successful in their recovery and risk reduction activities than they were in the relief phase. More sustainable, context-specific approaches, through and with local and national capacities, are required.

In industrialised countries, natural disaster response is managed ('owned') by the affected states and communities. Supporting national and local ownership is a core principle of international development and humanitarian aid.<sup>4</sup> Exceptional international funding provided the opportunity for an exceptional international response. However, the pressure to spend money quickly and visibly worked against making the best use of local and national capacities. TEC studies do not find that many international agencies lived up to their own standards with regard to respect and support for local and national ownership: where local and national capacities were recognised, they were often applied in strengthening

3 In contrast with linkages between recovery and development, which have so far not been particularly successful.

4 As expressed in various codes of practice for humanitarian response including the GHD initiative.

international agencies more than local responses. '[L]ocal ownership... was undermined and some local capacities were rendered more vulnerable' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p9). Many efforts and capacities of locals and nationals were marginalised by an overwhelming flood of well-funded international agencies (as well as hundreds of private individuals and organisations), which controlled immense resources. Treating affected countries as 'failed states' was a common error (TEC Needs Assessment Study, 2006).

Information is power. Access to high quality information enables affected people to define and demand accountability, based on their own expectations and standards. It also allows them to plan their own recovery. Yet international agencies frequently failed in the modest objective of informing affected people in an accurate, timely, and comprehensive manner. The TEC LRRD Report (2006) notes: 'A tragic combination of arrogance and ignorance has characterised how much of the aid community... misled people[.]' (p83); 'Poor information flow is undoubtedly the biggest source of dissatisfaction, anger and frustration among affected people' (p73); '[S]ome... interventions may actually undermine future development[.] A lack of information to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects' (p10).

Other identified weaknesses include rarely coordinated or shared assessments; 'supply-driven', unsolicited and inappropriate aid; inappropriate housing designs and livelihoods solutions; poor understanding of the development role of income and tax generation; and stereotyping of options for women, small-farmers and small entrepreneurs. Such shortcomings led to greater inequities,

gender- and conflict-insensitive programming, cultural offence and waste. Moreover, aid resources are rarely tracked accurately by the international system. The myth that any kind of international assistance is needed, and now, is fuelled through lack of understanding among the mass media and donor public.

Other problems identified in the TEC thematic evaluations and their sub-studies include: brushing aside or misleading authorities, communities and local organisations; inadequate support to host families; displacement of able local staff by poorly prepared internationals; dominance of English as the working language; 'misrecognition' of local capacities resulting in inefficient implementation; applying more demanding conditions to national and local 'partners' than those accepted by international agencies; 'poaching' of staff from national and local entities; and limited participation of the affected-population.

'Recovery' is context- and location-specific, rather than time-bound. It can also occur alongside relief efforts. Recovery and support to preparedness are embedded in the objectives of humanitarian actors, for example, in the GHD principles, the Sphere standards and the Red Cross Code of Conduct. While it is too early to judge the ultimate success of tsunami recovery efforts – a follow-up TEC LRRD study will be conducted in 2007 which will provide further information on the progress of the recovery effort – indications of initial performance are available. Affected people were appreciative of achievements and good practices, notable in, for example, addressing transient poverty and the rapid move from relief to recovery.<sup>5</sup> Recurrent weaknesses, however, included unduly short-term approaches; a shortage of appropriate agency 'recovery' skills; and poor understanding of local contexts,

5 There was no fixed chronology for this, as the duration of the relief phase varied by sector and location. While relief approaches remained appropriate in some sectors, others moved quickly to recovery.

including ongoing recovery processes and the dynamics of armed conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Re-building communities and livelihoods is more complex and takes longer than building houses or distributing goods. The concentration on distribution of assets, especially boats, demonstrated a failure to understand and support diversified and sustainable livelihoods and communities.

Affected people have frequently complained that NGOs deal only with village officials and that poorer people are marginalised. At best, the international response restored the 'status quo ante'. At worst, it strengthened those who were better off and/or more articulate, such as fishermen who possessed boats, while marginalising those who had few assets, notably women and the most poor.

The impact of the international presence on the peace and governance situation in Aceh is deemed to have been positive, albeit not explicitly planned nor commensurate with the scale of funding. This has not been the case in Sri Lanka.

Despite advances in early warning systems, the tsunami response has rarely enhanced local preparedness or significantly reduced longer term vulnerability. How people conceptualise and respond to risk in organising their own recovery has been, so far, inadequately addressed. LRRD is a transition whereby recovery comes to be led by the affected people themselves. Such a shift away from dominance by the international community has been slow to take hold. It would be reasonable to ask 'Whose emergency was it?'

## 4 Funding

This was the most rapidly and generously funded disaster response in history: US\$13.5 billion has been pledged or donated internationally for emergency relief and reconstruction, including more than US\$5.5 billion from the general public in developed countries. Private donations<sup>6</sup> broke many records. Governments were flexible and quite rapid in their funding. Reporting of pledges and commitments and the timeliness of official donations has been better than in other crises. In some cases, funds were reallocated due to the wealth of tsunami response resources. Audits and evaluations were often commissioned exceptionally early by implementing agencies.

Most private funding went to a dozen of the main actors. NGOs and the Red Cross Movement often had more funding than did donor administrations or multilateral organisations. The budgetary constraints normally associated with humanitarian action did not exist. 'Good donorship' responsibilities were not, therefore, restricted to official donors. Few international agencies tried to halt fundraising when limits were reached. The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p17) sums up the impact of generous funding on implementing agencies as follows:

Generous funding not only exceeded the absorption capacity of an overstretched humanitarian industry and deprived it of its customary excuse for built-in systemic shortcomings, but also led to the proliferation of new actors with insufficient experience (and therefore competence), as well as to established actors venturing into activities outside their normal area of expertise. Finally, the relative excess of

<sup>6</sup> The term 'private' covers both the general public and private entities such as companies, religious groups or associations – ie, all non-institutional donors. The bulk of these donations came from private individuals.



funding was a disincentive to assess, to coordinate and to apply the results of the few collective assessments.

Both governments and international agencies failed to ensure that funding was needs-based. Imbalances, non-needs-driven motivations (including supporting NGOs based in a donor's own country, regardless of whether they had any comparative advantage over other NGOs), poor 'end-user' traceability and inadequate monitoring were evident among official donor responses. 'Allocation and programming, particularly in the first weeks and months of 2005, were driven by politics and funds not by assessment and need' (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006, p38). Slow, overlapping, poorly shared and imprecise assessments were a constraint. Some major donors by-passed UN mechanisms, such as the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, by deploying their own assessments. Also, the allocation of funds was fairly evenly split between relief and recovery. This did not reflect the reality that recovery needs are by far the most important.<sup>7</sup>

Most private funding appeared to be based on media reports. Nor was official funding based on systematic measurement of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of agencies and their programmes. The limited number of agencies with the capacity to absorb the scale of funding available was a constraint, as was the lack of system-wide definitions and standards for reporting of funds. Cascading layers of contracts among international, national and local organisations compounded these problems:

...the standards of financial reporting among UN agencies, the RC Movement, and international NGOs leave the humanitarian system vulnerable to criticism. (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006, p36)

The flow of financial information locally to affected populations in their own languages was also weak. Additionally, each donor has unique proposal and reporting formats, which makes donor reporting costly, complicates tracking and adds little value. Funding databases such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Development Assistance Database (DAD) were welcome but insufficient tools.

While tsunami funding may not have reduced funding for other emergencies, if more of it had been reallocated it would have increased funding for other emergencies. In the tsunami, total funding was over US\$7,100 for every affected person which contrasts starkly, for example, with funding of only US\$3 per head actually spent on someone affected by floods in Bangladesh in 2004. The current international appeals system delivers variable amounts of funding bearing little correlation with real needs on a global level.

For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) in the Sudan finds itself forced to cut rations by half in the face of increasing malnutrition, while donors generously fund programmes in Iraq or Afghanistan. This lack of adherence to core funding principles almost three years after the adoption of the GHD principles is striking. There is an urgent need for external monitoring and control of donor accountability and performance. Self-regulation is clearly not working.

## 5 International relief capacity and quality

The quality and capacity of the international relief system is inadequate given the scale and frequency of modern emergencies. Greater and more consistent investment in personnel, coordination,

<sup>7</sup> It should be recognised, however, that some donors strongly favoured recovery or reconstruction over emergency relief activities.

assessment and quality control, including agency certification/accreditation, is necessary.

The capacity of the international disaster response system to respond to sudden increases in demand (the 'surge capacity') is very limited. The lack of a career structure in general encourages high turnover and recruitment of inexperienced personnel. Despite initiatives within the sector to address some of these issues, relatively few people are adequately trained and few of them are from developing countries. The tsunami response highlighted major weaknesses in international staff profiles, staff quality and continuity. 'Poaching' of staff from national or local organisations can have mixed results: debilitating the contributions of those local organisations to recovery, while perhaps strengthening international agency capacity and developing the 'poached' individuals. Yet international capacity is most effective when combined appropriately with local capacity: 'The engagement of international actors with local capacities was most effective and efficient when it was built on sustained partnerships with the local actors that existed before the disaster' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p35).

The appointment of a high profile UN Special Envoy for the tsunami response was seen as a positive step. Also, coordination (of both UN/international actors and internally to the RC Movement) showed a marked improvement in late 2005. Nonetheless, the TEC reports show numerous examples of poor coordination. Three issues stand out: the proliferation of agencies made coordination more expensive and less effective; generous funding (especially private) reduced agencies' need to coordinate; and the perceived need for quick, tangible, agency-specific results fuelled competition for visibility, 'beneficiaries' and projects. The absence of agreed field representation mechanisms for (well-funded) NGOs and poor coordination skills among some

managers complicated coordination. These were compounded by lack of clarity between coordination at the operational level (who does what) and coordination at the policy level (including joint advocacy).

The military played a key role in the disaster response. They will most likely, despite their high cost, continue to do so globally. There is, however, little joint planning and training between the military and traditional humanitarian actors and field coordination between them remains weak.

Just as there was a profusion of agencies, there was a profusion of assessments. Most were conducted by agencies for their own needs and did not influence collective decision takers. Media reports had a large influence on donor policy, thus taking the place of more formal assessments. Almost all international assessments relied on data culled from national and local sources. Better national and local preparedness would have made a big difference. A single, authoritative joint-assessment, at least between the UN, the RC Movement and the authorities, was sorely missing.

Humanitarian agencies have much to learn from the successful approach adopted by the IFIs: expedient cooperation among all partners (above all, the national governments), significant influx of expertise and visibility, and use of teams of analysts to reconcile and compile the various sources of information. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p12)

Quality and capacity are closely linked, and all major relief responses have raised questions about the quality of the response. Several quality initiatives have emerged in the last decade, mostly in response to the Rwanda evaluation of the mid-1990s. Despite important steps, the lack of quality enforcement mechanisms means that the same problems keep reappearing in emergency responses (the Rwanda, Kosovo or Mitch responses, for instance). There is general agreement, for



example, that there were far too many agencies of all types in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, be they NGOs, bilateral, multilateral or RC Movement agencies. Actors whose primary institutional motivation is not humanitarian also proliferated, such as the military and commercial enterprises. One reason for this is the ease of entry of inexperienced and incompetent actors into humanitarian operations.

The recurrence of many of the problems seen in the Rwanda response as well as other emergency responses, and the failure of agencies to meet their formal commitments to, for example, Sphere or the GHD principles, suggest that the various quality initiatives are not having a sufficient impact. The quality delivered by a normal business is driven by its customers. The same model of quality control does not operate in the aid sector. The biggest potential driver for quality should be feedback to the donor public on the quality of an agency's operations. Public knowledge is often limited, however, to the materials produced by agencies' communications departments and/or media that concentrate either on these agency sources or on single dramatic issues rather than presenting a comprehensive analysis of the situation. This lack of information flow from the affected people to the donor population on the quality of the response means that there is little *external* pressure for improvement in the humanitarian sector.

If there were significant external pressure for change, many of the problems within the sector would not have been left unresolved for so long. The limited impact of the existing, voluntary quality initiatives suggests that we are unlikely to see any major improvement in the quality of humanitarian response. A regulatory system is needed to oblige agencies to put the affected population at the centre of

measures of agency effectiveness, and to provide detailed and accurate information to the donor public and taxpayers on the outcomes of assistance, including the affected populations' views of that assistance.

## 6 Summary recommendations

Four main recommendations emerge from this Synthesis Report. In line with the TEC reports, they are aimed primarily at international actors. Section 5 of the Synthesis Report presents these recommendations in more detail, explaining the rationale behind them and analysing their implications. Annex E further presents a list of 'enablers' for the recommendations, broken down by international actor. The recommendations are:

- 1** The international humanitarian community needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities' own relief and recovery priorities.
- 2** All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response system, including those from the affected countries themselves.
- 3** The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector.
- 4** All actors need to make the current funding system impartial, and more efficient, flexible, transparent and better aligned with principles of good donorship.



# 1

## Chapter one

# Introduction

## 1.1 The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

### 1.1.1 Background

In February 2005, eight weeks after the devastating earthquake and tsunamis of December 2004, a group of predominantly humanitarian agencies met in Geneva.<sup>E1</sup> The agencies were interested in maximising learning from the tsunami response through joint evaluation, with a focus on topics which would benefit from a sector-wide approach rather than an individual agency one. It was hoped that this collaboration would reduce the need for individual agency evaluations and duplication of effort. Another significant intention was to focus collaborative efforts on recurring systemic problems in humanitarian action, with analysis concentrated more at the level of policy rather than programming.

In the wake of this meeting many of the participating agencies formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). This independent initiative on learning and accountability represents the most intensive study of a humanitarian response since the multi-donor evaluation of the response to the Rwanda crisis in the mid-1990s. It is also the first time since then that the sector has sought to scrutinise itself as a whole. The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies, and the ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action) Secretariat is the facilitating platform for the TEC.<sup>8</sup> Please see Annex A for more information on the CMG.

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<sup>8</sup> See [www.alnap.org](http://www.alnap.org) for more information.

The primary aim of the TEC is to improve the quality of humanitarian action – including the linkages to recovery and longer term development – by learning lessons from the international response to the tsunami. To optimise this learning, TEC member agencies have worked together by sponsoring five joint thematic evaluations on selected aspects of the response. It is the reports from these five studies that form the basis of this Synthesis Report (see 1.1.2 below).

In addition to its primary aim, the TEC has the two further aims of providing accountability and testing a collaborative model. To provide accountability to both donor and affected-country populations for the overall response, the TEC is producing a number of different reports in addition to this Synthesis Report that are suitable for a wider readership, and is holding evaluation feedback workshops in the affected region to validate and create ownership of TEC findings. In order to test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation, the TEC has held two learning reviews.<sup>9</sup> Further reviews will be undertaken over the lifetime of the TEC.

### **1.1.2 The TEC's thematic focus**

Even before the February 2005 meeting, it was evident that aspects of the international tsunami response were unusual. These included the speed and scale of funding as well as the large number of actors involved. As the response gained momentum, these factors served to exacerbate many of the pre-existing weaknesses in the international system of disaster response, such as poor coordination and needs assessment.

These and other perennial difficulties, including lack of genuine consultation with affected populations, unsustainable programming and concerns regarding funding mechanisms, have been highlighted annually over the past five years by ALNAP's *Review of Humanitarian Action*. They have also been brought to the humanitarian community's attention by independent evaluations of disaster response, including the response of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) to the earthquake in Gujarat in 2004, as well as by a number of ProVention Consortium studies on learning lessons from disaster recovery.<sup>10</sup>

Aided by this collective knowledge, participants at the first TEC meeting selected five themes that represented recurrent weaknesses in humanitarian action. In retrospect, the selection of topics was done in a somewhat ad-hoc way without a detailed analysis.<sup>11</sup> The topics chosen by the meeting participants were: coordination; the role of needs assessment in humanitarian response; the impact of international action on local and national capacities;<sup>12</sup> linkages between relief,

9 The reports from both of these reviews are available on the TEC website: [www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org).

10 See <http://www.proventionconsortium.org>.

11 One of the TEC's learning reviews (undertaken in February 2006; see Footnote 2) makes a number of observations about topic selection, including the need to involve affected-country nationals in the choice of themes to be studied.

12 The term capacities used in this report refers to a complex of social, political, cultural and economic processes. For a comprehensive definition of this term see the TEC Capacities Report (2006).

rehabilitation and development (LRRD); and funding mechanisms. Selection of these themes, from an initial list of over 10,<sup>13</sup> was also driven by pragmatism – that is, the ability and willingness of agencies to lead a particular study area.<sup>14</sup> It was initially planned that a further topic, that of the overall impact of the response, would be covered by a planned International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) study, but this has yet to get under way.<sup>15</sup> It was intended that studying and evaluating the tsunami response at the thematic level would provide an opportunity to identify solutions and improvements in these five areas of international disaster response.

The TEC's five thematic evaluations are published alongside this Synthesis Report as a set. They assess the performance of humanitarian actors at both policy and 'ground' level.<sup>16</sup> Most of the studies employed, indirectly, the various standards and criteria that exist for humanitarian interventions rather than any specifically formulated objectives for tsunami interventions. This is for a number of reasons, including the greater policy focus of some of the studies and also because, like the response itself, the evaluations required a nuanced, context-sensitive approach that recognised both the common elements and the diverse, country-specific aspects of the response. It is also because in some instances 'causality and impact... depend on a set of indicators not yet developed' (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p19).

### 1.1.3 Methodology and management of the thematic evaluations

The thematic evaluations varied in both management and research structure – for example, three of the five evaluations were managed by multi-agency Steering Committees while two employed multiple research teams. It is anticipated that the variety of models used will increase the learning potential when it comes to assessing the relevance of the TEC approach for future joint evaluation processes.

Annex A provides a series of tables on the thematic evaluations with regard to cost, timeframe of the response evaluated, interviewees, geographical coverage, methods employed and the limitations and constraints experienced by each study. While each of the TEC evaluations faced its own limitations, some constraints were common to all studies, for example:

- shortage of time for document review prior to fieldwork and for the fieldwork itself;

13 Other suggested themes included: an evaluation of the impact at field level of the various accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector; the role of the military (subsequently subsumed into the coordination study); the impact of the media; gender; and environmental impact.

14 TEC members decided that each thematic evaluation should be individually commissioned rather than the process managed as a whole, as with the multi-donor Rwanda evaluation. In the event, OCHA took responsibility for coordination; FAO, SDC and WHO for needs assessment; UNDP and AIDMI for capacities; Sida for LRRD; and Danida for the funding response study.

15 See endnote E2.

16 Three of the TEC's evaluations – Capacities, LRRD and the Funding Response Local Study Overview – used beneficiary surveys as part of their research toolkit. This enabled the evaluations to make better assessment of the quality of the response from local perspectives. See Annex A for more information.

- difficulty in identifying interviewees who had been present in the relief phase of the response;
- the collection of data in different field locations, which were not always fully comparable.

Annex A also contains information on evaluation management and other issues, including the membership of the evaluation teams, role of the evaluation Steering Committees and the funders of each evaluation.

## 1.2 The TEC Synthesis Report

This Synthesis Report represents the culmination of over a year's work by TEC member agencies. In line with the TEC's thematic evaluations, it examines the successes and failures as well as the constraints of the response up to the first 11 months after the tsunami. It is based on a distillation of the findings and learning from the TEC's thematic evaluations, and also from over 170 additional reports. Full sources for this report are listed in the Bibliography in Annex I. In summary, they consist of:

- Primary sources: the five TEC thematic reports. In addition, this report draws on a number of the constituent studies to these evaluations, such as the country case studies.
- Secondary sources: other evaluations and reviews relating to the tsunami response. Most of these are individual agency studies, including evaluations and lesson learning reviews from TEC members.
- Tertiary sources: eg, reports and materials from the World Bank and governments of the affected countries, focusing on the overall capacity, performance and accountability of the international humanitarian system.

### 1.2.1 Approach, limitations and constraints

In writing this Synthesis Report the team took the following approach:

- analysis of the five overall TEC thematic evaluations and their constituent studies, as well as discussions with evaluation team leaders;
- review and triangulation<sup>17</sup> of secondary and tertiary materials, including the production of a regularly updated summary of issues, lessons and recommendations from the materials;
- discussion with a number of policy experts with regard to analysis of different aspects of humanitarian policy and practice relevant to this report;

<sup>17</sup> Triangulation is the process of comparing information across a variety of sources in order to validate that information between documents or data sets.

- re-drafting based on comments received on two drafts, including from an expert peer review panel as well as all interested TEC stakeholders.

While the thematic evaluations each identify their own limitations and constraints, as noted in Annex A, when viewing the evaluation set as a whole it is possible to note a number of additional points:

- The TEC evaluations were designed to focus on specific aspects of the international disaster response. While the TEC reports, including this one, refer to other actors, such as affected states and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), they do not study their response systematically.
- While TEC members selected five themes reflecting recurrent policy and operational challenges, the thematic set would have benefited from the inclusion of a study on impact, or at least 'results' assessment.<sup>E2</sup> Without this there can be no conclusive statement about the scale of the effects of the systemic weaknesses on the outcome of the response.
- Another important aspect of the response not directly addressed in the TEC themes is the question of how the tsunami and the aid influenced the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Aceh. Related to this, reports – both primary and secondary – generally do not consider relief and recovery interventions from the perspective of the vastly differing ethnic and political contexts in which the response occurred.
- Individual studies do not always distinguish between the different phases of the response. Neither do they always define the different phases (occasionally even using different terminology) and/or assign timelines to these phases. While this is understandable in that phases of the response are not chronologically distinct but rather location-specific, context-dependent and often run alongside each other, it has sometimes made it hard to decipher which aspects of the response the studies are referring to.
- Not all TEC evaluations differentiate systematically between, for example, good and less good practice, and link this to specific agencies. While this is partly because of the TEC focus on process rather than results, it is also because even within a single national context individual organisations performed both well and less well – as evidenced throughout this report. However, this has made it difficult to identify good practice easily, and to make differentiated judgements across agency groupings – including between strictly humanitarian and mixed-mandate agencies. Nevertheless, and particularly in Section 3 (The Response), an attempt has been made to disaggregate international agencies by referring, where possible, to a specific agency or to types of agencies.
- It is hardly surprising that in such an extensive response there were examples of poor practice by nearly all agencies. However, there were also examples of good practice by most of the major agencies. The Synthesis Report refers to examples of good and/or bad work by individual agencies, but these examples are used to illustrate general points and should not be

understood as a statement of the overall performance of that agency (which the Synthesis team are not in a position to offer).

- The studies covered a number of countries, as specified in each individual report. The focus has been mostly on Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand, with references to other countries, including India. As far as possible, references are made in this Synthesis to specific countries, but given that the materials do not always specify locations this has not always been achievable.
- Finally, the evolving nature of the thematic reports, some of which were finalised only during the later stages of writing this Synthesis Report, meant that the Synthesis authors had to incorporate new material at different stages.

In addition, the Synthesis team faced constraints similar to all those writing syntheses – namely, the challenge of drawing lessons from evaluations on different topics, in different contexts and by different teams applying a variety of methodologies. One of the recurring points in the two learning reviews already undertaken on the TEC process (see Footnote 2) has been the need for greater coherence between the individual terms of reference (ToR) – either through use of a common framework for writing the ToRs (the key idea being to increase comparability for increased lesson learning) or alternatively through use of one overarching ToR.

### **1.2.2 The Synthesis team**

This Synthesis Report has been prepared by two senior international experts on humanitarian response, who have direct experience of both evaluation and participation in humanitarian action, including natural disaster prevention, preparedness and response. They were supported by a consultant with considerable monitoring and evaluation experience in both humanitarian and community development contexts. The report has benefited from the advice of an expert peer review panel. The reviewers provided experience and knowledge of the affected region and of international aid (including humanitarian, recovery and development aid). Some of the thematic evaluation team leaders have also commented on drafts of this report, as has the CMG – the latter acting as the quality control mechanism for the report. Short biographies of the three authors, the peer reviewers, the CMG and the evaluation team leaders are contained in Annex C. Biographies of the TEC evaluation team members are included in the relevant TEC reports.

### **1.2.3 Terminology**

This Synthesis Report and the five thematic TEC reports generally use the term ‘affected population’ (or ‘affected individuals’ or ‘affected community’, as appropriate) rather than, for example, ‘beneficiary’ or ‘victim’. This is a deliberate choice by the team as aid recipients do not necessarily ‘benefit’ from the aid that they receive, and not all those who are affected may receive aid.

There is no commonly accepted definition of an affected person, an important issue raised in the studies.<sup>18</sup> The term is applied loosely in this report to people living and present in the affected region who were in some significant manner affected by the disaster. In most cases this implies losses and damage involving themselves, their families and friends, property and livelihoods.

When referring to agencies that make up the international humanitarian response sector, the following terms are used:

- When referring to the Red Cross Movement, the shorthand 'RC Movement' is used. This is also taken to include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the IFRC and Red Crescent Societies, and all the National Red Cross Societies.
- Reference to 'international agencies' refers to any operational agency and therefore includes the UN, international NGOs (INGOs), the RC Movement, and any *operational* donor entities.
- Governmental or inter-governmental donors are referred to as 'donors' or 'official' or 'institutional' donors.
- The term 'private' covers both the general public and private entities such as companies, religious groups or associations. 'Public' money comes from governments while 'private' money (generally) comes from these non-institutional donors (ie, the public and these private entities).
- The term INGOs includes regional NGOs 'national NGOs' refers to NGOs that have a nationwide presence but don't extend beyond national borders; and 'local NGOs' refers to NGOs that don't have nationwide presence. The term NGO on its own may refer to any or all of international, national or local NGOs.

The term 'humanitarian response' is used for the overall response to the tsunami, and implicitly constitutes relief and recovery. The 'immediate relief phase' is used for immediate search and rescue and life-saving activities that, in the case of the tsunami, lasted from a few days to a few weeks. The 'relief phase' then refers to traditional humanitarian activity focused on saving and protecting lives, such as the provision of food aid and temporary shelter. In the tsunami response, the length of the relief phase depended on the sector and the geographic location, with some relief activities such as food aid continuing well beyond the relief phase. Thus relief and recovery phases happened at the same time alongside each other.

The term 'recovery' is used most commonly in this report. Recovery constituted the most significant proportion of the response. In comparison with relief, recovery is about saving, protecting and regenerating livelihoods and communities. Disaster-affected populations, while still concerned about basic needs, within days become absorbed in longer term concerns such as permanent

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<sup>18</sup> Some of the best practice noted in the TEC Capacities Report was observed when the definition of affected communities was broadened to include entire geographical units, such as the district in Sri Lanka, so that inequities were not heightened and conflicts not exacerbated.



housing, schooling and how to re-establish their livelihoods. Similarly, communities and authorities move rapidly from saving lives and rescuing survivors to re-establishing basic services and infrastructure. Recovery therefore involves all decisions and actions taken by both international and national actors after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving pre-disaster living conditions, while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. Though often referred to as a phase, recovery is better defined by qualitative, contextual aspects and is more a description of concerns, steps and happenings.

The term 'reconstruction' is used sparingly and only when referring specifically to reconstruction standards or reconstruction of specific infrastructure. It is also used if quoting from one of the sub-studies that utilises the term. 'Rehabilitation' is also rarely used except in relation to the LRRD Report, which includes the term in its title. As with reconstruction, rehabilitation is also used when quoting from the thematic reports and sub-studies.

#### 1.2.4 Structure of the report

Following this Introduction, Section 2 provides a brief overview of the impact of the earthquake and tsunamis on the affected region. It raises the need to see beyond the human tragedy, in terms of lives lost and the immediate economic shock of the disaster, to the larger issue: the impact on people's livelihoods, their social structures and their environment. Section 3 presents an account of the response. Moving from the immediate relief phase, through stabilisation to the beginnings of recovery, the report traces the relief phase through the movement to recovery – a highly complex socioeconomic and ultimately political process. It also addresses the issues of 'building back better', disaster reduction and funding flows.

The conclusions presented in Section 4 are based primarily on the findings identified in Section 3, as well as in the accompanying TEC reports. Analysis proceeds under the following headings:

**Ownership and accountability** which addresses the degree to which the international response recognised and supported national and local 'ownership' of the response, during both the relief and recovery phases.

**Funding** which mainly considers the exceptional public and official donor global funding for the response, and its broader implications.

**International Response Capacities** which looks at the international aid sector's capacity to respond to disasters, including support to recovery.

**Quality** which examines the reasons why major quality problems persist despite a decade of reform initiatives in the humanitarian sector.

Finally, Section 5, Lessons and Recommendations, is based around the principle recommendation about the need for a fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector to shift emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation of the relief and recovery priorities of affected populations, including:

- Accountability and support to affected populations and authorities.
- Strengthening international disaster response capacity.

- Strengthening international disaster funding to improve proportionality and impartiality.

Some of the conclusions and recommendations are unique to the tsunami response, while some may also be applicable to other similarly large-scale natural disasters, or even to the humanitarian system as a whole. Clearly the context of a sudden-onset natural disaster in middle income countries with considerable resources of their own is very different from the chronic political emergencies in the poorest countries which probably form the bulk of humanitarian interventions, and readers should bear this in mind when considering any recommendations made.

The Annexes to this report present details of the five TEC thematic evaluations, the ToR for this Synthesis Report, biographies of the CMG, authors and peer reviewers, sources of data for tables and charts, and a full bibliography. Importantly, Annex E contains a more detailed breakdown of recommendations by actor. Recommendations for ongoing operations or for specific countries can be found in the individual thematic reports and their constituent sub-reports. These are available on the TEC's website and on the CD Rom being made available with this report.

Finally, this report highlights issues for ongoing TEC studies,<sup>19</sup> for other potential research on the tsunami, and on research topics of wider relevance to the humanitarian sector. Suggestions for further research have been derived from some of the analytical gaps found in the TEC and other studies.<sup>20</sup>

19 The LRRD study is being conducted in two phases as it was realised at the outset that it is too early to draw firm conclusions about many aspects of LRRD. A second round of empirical research will therefore be conducted during early 2007.

20 These gaps result more from the discrete, thematic focus as well as the scope of the studies (as set out in the ToR) rather than from inadequate analysis in the studies themselves.



# The disaster: an overview

## 2.1 Immediate effects of the disaster

**Table 2.1. Numbers of people lost (dead or missing)<sup>21</sup>**

Country	Number lost
Indonesia	167,540
Sri Lanka	35,322
India	16,269
Thailand	8,212
Somalia	289
Maldives	108
Malaysia	75
Myanmar	61
Tanzania	13
Seychelles	2
Bangladesh	2
Yemen	2
South Africa	2
Kenya	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>227,898</b>

See sources p159.

At 07.58 Aceh time on 26 December 2004, the biggest earthquake for 40 years struck off the west coast of Northern Sumatra. The earthquake led to the most destructive series of tsunamis in recorded history, which radiated through the Indian Ocean at speeds of more than 500km/h. The waves, while not very big in deep water, slowed down and grew in size as they reached shallower water near land. In the worst cases the waves reached over 20m high at landfall in parts of Aceh; in other locations they spread 3km inland, carrying debris and salt water with them. The retreating waters eroded whole shorelines.


The tsunamis killed people in 14 counties around the Indian Ocean. In terms of lives lost and people missing, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand were the hardest hit. By the end of January 2005, 40 other countries had reported that their citizens were among the dead and 12 more reported that their citizens had been in the area and were feared dead.<sup>22</sup> Germany and Sweden were the worst affected counties outside the region and lost more citizens (over 500 each) than all but the four most affected counties.

The tsunami gripped the world's attention, though news of the extent of the tsunami emerged only slowly (Figure 2.1). The published death toll was

21 Sources for tables and base data and sources for charts are presented in Annex G. Please refer to the page reference provided at the foot of each table or figure.







22 Table 3.1 gives details of those lost from outside the region. The numbers given in Table 2.1 include tourists from other countries who were killed or went missing in the affected countries.

**Figure 2.1. Changes in death toll (including missing) over the first month**



Sources BBC, Channel AsiaNews, Agence France-Press, and *The Guardian*. See sources p153.

**Figure 2.2. Age-specific tsunami mortality at five locations (plus one historic disaster)**



Sources Figure 2.2a Doocy et al, 2006 (based on 291 deaths); Figure 2.2b Nishikiori et al, 2006 (based on 456 deaths); Figure 2.2c Birkmann et al, 2006 (based on 94 deaths); Figure 2.2d Guha-Sapir et al, 2006 (based on 231 deaths); Figure 2.2e Maldives Disaster Management Centre and Maldivian 2000 Census data (based on 104 deaths); Figure 2.2f Chowdhury et al, 1993 (based on 1,206 deaths). See sources p153.

12,000 on 26 December 2004, and it was only on 30 December that it went over the 100,000 mark. By the end of January 2005 the death toll stood at 286,000 only to fall back by over 50,000 when Indonesia reduced its estimate for numbers missing on 7 April.

The raw death toll tells only part of the story. Disproportionate numbers of the most vulnerable people died. In the Maldives those aged 65 or over, though comprising only 3.1 per cent of the population, accounted for 17.3 per cent of the deaths, or five-and-a-half times the proportional level. Elsewhere the tsunami typically claimed more of the under-15s and the over-50s, although countries varied as to which of these two groups had the highest mortality rates (Figure 2.2).

More women than men died. This was highlighted early on when Oxfam announced that, in the villages it had surveyed, there were three times as many adult male survivors as female ones (Oxfam, 2005a). This was a very small sample, however, and the ratio may have been due to specific factors in fishing villages. Figure 2.3 shows the relative risk for females compared with males: a value of 1 here would indicate equal risk of death for females and males, but the data show that the relative risk varied from 1.2 (1.2 times as many women died) to 2.1. There were wide variations for individual villages.



Sources Various.

See sources p154.

Note Some data points refer to relative mortality rather than relative risk.

The increased risk that flood events like the tsunami pose for children, the elderly and, in this context, women is highlighted by historical data from the storm surges in the Bay of Bengal in 1970 (Sommer and Mosley, 1972) and 1991 (Bern et al, 1993; Chowdhury et al, 1993). All of these instances show a relatively low mortality rate for 15–49-year-olds and increased mortality rates for children and older people.

The examples also show higher mortality rates for adult females compared with adult males. The reasons given for the gender and age differences in survival rates in these disasters are usually related to strength and stamina, and the ability to swim or climb trees. One study in Tamil Nadu found that women who were able to swim were more than twice as likely to survive (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006). However, it is clear that factors such as location also play a role in determining survival.


The succession of tsunamis manifested differently in different locations. In Aceh the tsunamis were walls of mud and debris, but by the time they reached the Maldives they were more akin to a storm surge with a swell sweeping over the islands. The ratio of dead to injured varied with location. While the ratio of tsunami fatalities to injuries in Aceh seems to have been over 6:1,<sup>E3</sup> the ratio was 4.53:1 in Sri Lanka (WHO, 2005) and 0.28:1 in Tamil Nadu (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006).

## 2.2 Media coverage

In late December, many factors combined to make the tsunami a key news story that generated enormous media coverage: the lack of other news stories; the time of year; the involvement of Western tourists; the geographical range of the tsunami; the daily climbing death toll; the availability of dramatic amateur footage of the waves hitting shore; and the celebrities who perished or survived.<sup>E4</sup> The tsunami was probably the most reported disaster up to that date.<sup>23</sup>

As shown in Figure 2.4, press coverage of the tsunami in the first six weeks was more than the combined total coverage for the previous year for 10 key humanitarian 'stories'<sup>E5</sup> selected by an expert panel (Jones, 2005). The tsunami dominated the internet as well.<sup>24</sup> All of this media attention, together with the time

**Figure 2.4. Tsunami press citations** (for 12 months to February 2005)



See sources p155.

23 The tsunami occurred prior to Hurricane Katrina, which also generated enormous media coverage.

24 A search for the phrase 'Indian ocean tsunami' on 5 April 2006 on Google indicates that there are 1,380,000 documents on the web bearing this phrase. The phrase 'tsunami disaster' returns nearly six million hits.

of year, the level of association with those affected and familiarity with some of the affected countries, prompted an unprecedented flood of both official and private funding and of material assistance.

**Table 2.2. Demographic and economic impact of the tsunami<sup>25</sup>**

	Indonesia	Sri Lanka	India	Maldives	Thailand
<b>Demographic impact</b>					
Population (million)	214.7	19.2	1,064.40	0.293	62
Population loss (incl. missing)	167,540	35,322	16,269	108	8,212
Population loss (incl. missing) as % of total population	0.077%	0.184%	0.002%	0.037%	0.013%
Population loss in the most affected province	2.3%	2.7%	n/a	n/a	1.5%
<b>Economic impact</b>					
GDP per capita, US\$	970	950	564	2,440	2,306
Calculated GDP US\$billion	208.3	18.2	600.3	0.7	143.0
Total D&L from tsunami, US\$m	4,451	1,454	1,224	603	2,198
Total D&L from tsunami, % of GDP	2.0%	7.6%	0.2%	83.6%	1.4%
Most affected province D&L as % of GDP of that province	97.0%	90.0%	4.0%		8.0%
Pre-disaster GDP growth rate 2005	5.4%	6.0%	7.2%	7.5%	6.0%
Revised GDP growth rate 2005	5.2%	5.4%	7.2%	-1.7%	5.7%
<b>Damage and losses</b>					
Damage, US\$m	2,920	1,144	575	450	508
Damage, % of total D&L	65.6%	78.7%	47.0%	74.6%	23.1%
Losses, US\$m	1,531	310	649	153	1,690
Losses, % of total D&L	34.4%	21.3%	53.0%	25.4%	76.9%
Losses, % of GDP	0.7%	1.5%	0.1%	21.3%	1.0%
<b>Sectoral % of total damage</b>					
Housing	47.9%	36.0%	33.6%	20.9%	4.3%
Physic infrastructure	21.8%	23.9%	13.6%	27.3%	5.3%
Social sectors	9.5%	7.2%	1.9%	7.3%	1.8%
Productive sectors	12.1%	31.8%	46.1%	28.4%	88.6%
Other	8.8%	1.1%	4.9%	16.0%	0.0%
<b>Remittances (for comparison only)</b>					
Remittances in US\$bn (2004 est.)	4.6	1.3	23.0		1.6
As % of GDP (by calculation)	2.2%	7.1%	3.8%		1.1%
Remittances as % of D&L	103.3%	89.4%	1,879.1%		72.8%

**Note** D&L = damages and losses

See sources p159.

25 Please note the comments on the accuracy of this table in the text.

The coverage in the Western press was not balanced, however. For example, in a survey of press coverage of humanitarian disasters, CARMA (2006) found that 40 per cent of the tsunami articles that dealt with the impact of the tsunami on people looked at Western tourists (who accounted for just over 1 per cent of the casualties). Partly as a result of all this media attention, hundreds of international humanitarian agencies and military forces from nearby descended on the affected countries in what some referred to as the 'second tsunami' (Brochard, 2005). The result, as shown by examples throughout this report, was a largely muddled relief operation in which 'information circulated badly and coordination at times appeared non-existent' (IFRC, 2005b, p84).

The tsunami disaster threatened development. Economic, infrastructural and human development losses, both actual and projected, were originally estimated at some US\$9.9bn across the affected region. This has to be contrasted with international funding of at least US\$13.5bn (See Section 3.6 below, on funding). This does not represent 40 per cent over-funding as it may first appear, however, as the US\$13.5bn includes the cost of the international relief effort, some parts of which were quite expensive (the US military services cost US\$0.25bn alone). Also, the figure for loss and damage does not include costs of transitional shelter or livelihood support, all of which have to be borne by the response. Some initial cost estimates (such as for housing) have proved optimistic, and some components of the response have wasted money.<sup>26</sup>

Indonesia has borne the brunt of the losses, accounting for almost half of the total. However, in terms of impact relative to the overall size of the economy the Maldives was worst affected, with damage and losses equivalent to 83.6 per cent of GDP (BRR and World Bank, 2005).

Table 2.2 shows both sustained and projected losses in five of the most affected countries: India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This table should be interpreted with caution as it presents initial estimates of loss and damage. Estimates of GDP growth were later revised and the figures for projected losses were probably pessimistic. The economic impacts of disasters are dynamic and complex (Benson and Clay, 2003), and the lumping together of damage (the capital cost of rebuilding assets) with losses (expected lost income) is problematic.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the magnitude of the economic losses it is noticeable that, except for the case of the Maldives, the loss and damage from the tsunami is not much more than the value of remittances in 2004 for Sri Lanka and Thailand, slightly less than 2004 remittances to Indonesia, and only about 6 per cent of remittances for India. In line with experiences from other disasters, remittance flows can be expected to increase to the region following the tsunami (World Bank, 2006, p99). The data for remittances are included in Table 2.2 not to suggest that remittance flows can replace international assistance, but merely to highlight the relative size of these flows compared to the tsunami impact.

26 For example, the wholly unsuitable fishing boats supplied by Kuwait via the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society that were unfit for use in Aceh (Schulze, 2005, pp14–15).



Economic data need to be considered at the provincial level, and not just at the national level. Total damage and economic losses in Aceh alone are estimated at some US\$4.5bn – equal to almost the entire GDP of Aceh (BAPPENAS and World Bank, 2005). The extent of this localised devastation reveals the real magnitude of the disaster as it has affected local populations.

The overall impact of the tsunami should also be understood in terms of the type of damage suffered: How many houses were lost? To what extent was the water supply damaged? What happened in the productive sectors of fishing and agriculture? Answers to these questions give some indication of the likely time – and resources – required for recovery.

The sector that experienced most damage in Indonesia has been housing and human settlements: 141,000 houses were destroyed, which accounts for 47.9 per cent of the total damage (BRR & World Bank, 2005). Over 600,000 people in Aceh lost their livelihoods (in some cases for only a few months) including all those in the fishery sector and 30 per cent of those in agriculture (Government of Indonesia, 2005). Different countries had different contexts, different economic histories, and were under different economic stresses at the time of the tsunami. Fisheries were hardest hit in India, but tourism was the worst affected sector in Thailand and the Maldives (BRR and World Bank, 2005).<sup>E7</sup>

The devastation has reached far beyond lives lost and economic damage caused, however. Disasters are increasingly recognised as having psychological and social consequences (Mattock, 2005). This will necessarily affect the speed and nature of the recovery and is proving a challenge to agencies designing livelihoods programmes. The tsunami has also had an environmental impact. Land has been contaminated by salt water, forests damaged and ecosystems disturbed.

The affected countries were already dealing with problems such as chronic poverty, environmental degradation, displacement, poor governance, inequality, overly bureaucratic administration systems, caste, conflict and weak respect for human rights. Whole sections of populations were already marginalised, many as a result of several different causes. It is these poorest groups, including the sick and the elderly, those in remote locations, migrant workers and the landless – in some cases all living within armed conflict areas – that have been the hardest hit by the effects of the tsunami (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).



## 3 Chapter three

# The response

## 3.1 Pre-disaster risk reduction and early warning

Six months before the 2004 tsunami, the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission warned that the 'Indian Ocean has a significant threat from both local and distant tsunamis' (Revkin, 2004). Risk reduction and preparedness prior to a disaster event can reduce fatalities. The Indian Ocean region is at risk from natural hazards, including tropical cyclones, tidal surges and earthquakes. Yet little attention was paid to these tsunami risks as they were not considered to be a major hazard<sup>27</sup> – even though tsunamis killed many in Sumatra and Java following the Krakatoa eruption in 1883.<sup>E8</sup>

Unlike the tsunami warning system in the Pacific, set up after a tsunami killed 159 people in Hawaii in 1946, no tsunami warning system had been installed in the Indian Ocean.<sup>28</sup> And while the Hawaii Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) issued a bulletin to its regular circulation list<sup>29</sup> in the Pacific basin informing that a tsunami watch was advised within 15 minutes of the December 2004 earthquake, it did not warn affected countries (which were all outside the Pacific Ocean) of the possibility of a tsunami.

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27 A 2004 publication from ADPC lists Indonesia as facing a low relative intensity of tsunami hazards and does not even include tsunamis in the table of nine hazards in the South East Asia region (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004, p137).

28 An interim tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean is expected to be operational by the end of July 2006.

29 Anyone can join the circulation list by submitting their email address via a link on the PTWC site: [www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc](http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc).

Despite the absence of a formal system, some life-saving warnings were given – mostly by ordinary people. Traditional knowledge helped to save tribes on India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the worst of the tsunami (Bhaumik, 2005). Phonecalls to family members in India advised them to evacuate (IFRC, 2005b, p16) and a 10-year-old British tourist recognised the signs of a tsunami from her geography class. This led to more than 100 people evacuating a beach and hotel (BBC, 2005a).

There were reports that a warning to the mainland from the Indian military in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands went unheeded. Apparently, the Indian meteorological service sent a warning fax to a former minister of science rather than the incumbent (Singh, 2004). In Thailand, the head of the Meteorological Service was sacked because he had decided not to issue a warning (Associated Press, 2005; Watts, 2005).

These warnings were far from generalised, however. While parts of Indonesia were struck within 20 minutes, Thai officials discussed the earthquake and tsunami risk an hour before the waves struck but decided against causing a panic (*Financial Times*, 2005). It was more than an hour-and-a-half before Sri Lanka was hit, ample time for a warning to circulate. In the Maldives, 108 people were killed when the tsunami struck three hours after the earthquake. Wider knowledge of the nature of tsunamis, the ability to swim,<sup>29</sup> or simple systems for communicating warnings could have saved many lives. Media organisations could, for example, have issued warnings for India and Sri Lanka had they been better educated about the phenomenon.

Better construction would also have saved lives and property lost due to both the tsunamis and the earthquake.<sup>30</sup> Better disaster preparedness would

### Box 3.1. The nature of disasters

Disasters can be defined as: 'A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources' (DHA, 1992, p27). The ability or capacity to cope is a key aspect of impact and response to a disaster, and the assistance provided by national or international responses is intended to alleviate this shortfall in capacity.


Clearly a society (which can be a community, a province or a whole country) with greater capacity to cope with the impact of any disaster event is less vulnerable to the effects of that disaster. Some disasters exceed the local capacity but fall within the national capacity and need no international assistance.

There is a significant difference in the pattern of need for external assistance between the cases of sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters (Figure 3.1).

Rapid-onset disasters, like the tsunami, have a very high initial need for relief assistance, which may be followed by a second peak for recovery assistance. Slow-onset disasters have a slowly building requirement for external assistance. The timescale over which assistance is needed depends on the extent of the disaster and the complexity of the affected infrastructure.

<sup>30</sup> No separate death toll is available for the earthquake as the tsunamis followed within 20 minutes. However, the relatively light damage from the earthquake suggests that the death toll was probably no worse than for the earthquake of 28 March 2005 – that is, fewer than 1,000.

**Figure 3.1. General patterns of need imposed by rapid- and slow-onset disasters**



have made the response more effective and efficient. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness receive a relatively small portion of international aid. Developing a community's capacity to deal with disasters (be it a storm or a tsunami) is normally a cost-efficient approach (IFRC, 2005b, p46). Moreover: 'It may pay more to prepare our national counterparts than to invest in our own readiness to intervene forever' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p63).

## 3.2 Emergency

### 3.2.1 Survival and safety

The tsunami was a sudden-onset natural disaster, and local people did most of the search and rescue and life saving. Survivors were rescued by their neighbours and by other survivors using whatever means were at hand. Surviving doctors, nurses and paramedics rendered first aid in makeshift or remaining health facilities. While the fatalities and missing made world headlines, initially it was the survivors who were of most concern locally. The recovery of bodies and, where possible, dignified burial and mourning came later.

In Indonesia, 91 per cent of those interviewed by the Fritz Institute (2005c, p4) reported that they had been rescued by private individuals. In Sri Lanka and Thailand, life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days was led almost entirely by the general public from adjacent areas (TEC Capacities Report, 2006). The first few flights to Aceh were jammed with volunteers and official teams from all over Indonesia and the national military played a key role in the initial rescue. In Sri Lanka damage was limited to the coastal strip so local health services did all the main medical work.


The TEC Capacities Report (2006, p23) notes:

Some 4 per cent of the population of Aceh province was killed in the tsunami. An estimated 60 senior leaders of civil society... 5,200 staff from local authorities and 3,000 civil servants died and another 2,275 were reported missing. Despite the scale of the disaster and loss of government leadership, communities coped effectively on their own in the first days after the disaster.

Survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya, or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban settings in Aceh Besar. Depending on the proximity to the capital and the scale of the destruction, it took aid workers between one (for Banda Aceh) and 40 days (for Krueng Sabee) to reach the affected communities. The Indonesian Marines provided immediate response to remote Aceh Jaya district, which was cut off by road, while Special Operations and TNI (Indonesian army) reached Banda Aceh by road.

Teams formed spontaneously, the skilled and unskilled, rich and poor, one ethnicity or class side-by-side with another. Some uncovered, others cleaned and

**Figure 3.2. National and international capacities in Aceh (illustrative)**



See sources p155.

### Box 3.2. The multi-layered relief response

The response to the tsunami disaster had many components – from the affected population, provincial and national authorities and the military, to international agencies and international military. All of these components layer together to provide the overall response. The contribution that any component can make to the response depends on both its mobilisation time and its resource base. Traditionally, local and national components bring context-specific knowledge and international components bring technical skills and financial resources.

The first relief response after the tsunami came from the affected communities. (This is not shown in Figure 3.2 as there is no means of estimating this, but it does fill up part of the white area shown in the figure.) After the community capacities came the national military and civil capacities, and later the international military and civil capacities (such as the UN, RC Movement and INGOs).

It can be several weeks before international civilian response components are fully in place. In Aceh this was complicated by the former exclusion of international actors and the fact that it was two days after the tsunami before the decision to open the province became widely known.

The peak need for rescue, food and medical assistance occurs in the first few hours and days and these needs have to be met first from local and then from national resources. Clearly, not all needs are met in this very first phase. It can be seen that the mobilisation time for the international civilian response means that international assistance may have only a limited impact on the acute phase of a sudden-onset disaster.

The interplay of the various capacities making up the response is quite complex. This interplay is not neutral but can be positive or negative in terms of the overall response. The TEC Capacities Report (2006) found that cash grants enabled people to use their skills and abilities in their own way. It also allowed people to make good use of the economic resources held by the international agencies in a synergistic way. The TEC Coordination Report (2006) found that most of the international military contingents in Indonesia had their tasks allocated by the Indonesian military, thus coupling the immense foreign logistics capacity with detailed local knowledge.

Capacities can also interact negatively. The TEC Capacities Report (2006) found that build-up of the international capacity may lead to the reduction of local and national capacity through the poaching of staff and through the marginalisation of local structures, or the recognition of only English-language-based local capacities. Similarly, the capacity of the international response can be reduced by delays in gaining access or through customs delays (TEC LRRD Sri Lanka Case Study, 2006) or through a lack of policy coherence – as was the case over the ‘buffer-zone’ policy about whether reconstruction should take place near the sea (TEC LRRD Policy Study, 2006).

tended. Some carried, others drove. More gave water, covered, informed or comforted. Local people, officials, the police and the military, the Red Cross/Crescent, religious people, students, different associations, private companies, political groupings – every component of society – responded with blankets, transport, fuel, medicines, materials, equipment, removal machinery and labour.

Private and public vehicles and boats, offices, halls, schools, places of worship and homes all became immediately available. In the Maldives, communities backed by island and atoll authorities used boats to rescue those from islands that were uninhabitable, housing them with host families or in community buildings. Affected families on islands where there was partial damage were similarly rehoused. Food was provided from local shops until external help arrived between three and five days later (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).

Despite the importance of the local response the very definition of a disaster is that needs exceed local capacities (Box 3.4). Outside assistance is necessary from the provincial, national, or international levels, depending on the scale of the disaster.

### 3.2.2 National institutional responses<sup>31</sup>

An influx from provincial and national capitals and beyond followed the immediate local response. Roads were gradually opened and hospitals accessed. Technicians pumped floodwaters, restored electricity and reconnected pipes, using rudimentary tools and materials as well as ingenuity. For most victims, however, this was achieved too late. Few if any international agencies could say they managed to save significant numbers of lives. One actor, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), recognised this reality honestly and early:

The reasons why MSF has lowered... its effort is [that] when MSF arrived in the worst affected regions within 72 hours, the local relief effort was already well underway. Capable national medical staff [had] covered many of the emergency needs. Another reason is the absence of major epidemics or life-threatening diseases except for tetanus. (Indonesia Relief, 2005b)

Both national and international responses were slowed by the time it took to form a full picture of the extent of damage. This was particularly the case with Aceh, where the destruction cut normal communications links. The Indonesian government activated the ad hoc National Disaster Management Board (BAKORNAS) on the afternoon of 26 December and the Vice-President was sent to Aceh where all district disaster management secretariats and most other government offices were severely effected. It was only on arrival in Aceh on 27 December that the Vice-President and his advisers fully understood the extent of the damage. This led to the request for foreign assistance and the decision to allow international agencies access to Aceh.

The Indonesia National Army (TNI) and BRIMOB (paramilitary police), present in large numbers because of martial law, coordinated most of the search and

31 See the TEC Capacities Report on how capacities were used after the disaster.

recovery work in Banda Aceh. They were aided in the recovery and burial work by Muslim youth groups from all over Indonesia and with relief assistance from military forces from (eventually) 17 countries.<sup>32</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami the Sri Lankan government reintroduced emergency regulations that increased the military's role in the relief phase. The armed forces of more nations assisted in the first phase of the relief operations in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia, although the militarisation of relief delivery was neither as extensive nor as visible as in Indonesia. The Presidential Secretariat initially coordinated the relief effort, and created the Centre for National Operations with staff from the public and private sectors to act as a de facto National Disaster Management Authority (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).

In the Maldives, with no previous experience of a national disaster, the government immediately established an ad hoc Ministerial Task Force which, in turn, set up a National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) to coordinate relief.

The Thai national response began with enabling the existing Civil Defence Act. This allowed senior government staff to be delegated to affected districts, re-directed existing government budgets for relief efforts, and brought the response of different line ministries under the central coordination of the Ministry of the Interior. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's Civil Defence Committee managed international and domestic call centres and a public donation centre and mobilised personnel and equipment, while the Ad Hoc Tsunami Disaster Task Force (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) coordinated foreign assistance (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).

### 3.2.3 Support for affected tourists

The numbers of tourists among the dead, missing and injured both increased Western media interest and sparked emergency procedures in the tourists' home countries. It also most likely fed into the enormously generous global public response. Insistent and vocal demands from the media and relatives put pressure on governments to act fast and visibly, both in response to their own nationals' needs and through aid for affected areas.


Foreign ministries and embassies mobilised, some more effectively than others.<sup>E10</sup> Hotlines and task forces were set up, and emergency funds made available. Search and forensic identification teams were dispatched, many continuing their tasks for months. Donor state actors who would normally be dedicated uniquely to the aid process were also tasked in relation to their own nationals, such as the search for and identification and transport of mortal remains. Bitter public frustration and acerbic media criticism of perceived weaknesses in accounting for, repatriating and supporting their own nationals rapidly surfaced in some countries.<sup>E11</sup> In others the process was better managed (Grünewald et al, 2006).

32 It should also be noted that while the Singaporean (from 28 December), US, UK (from 2 January) and some other military were quick off the mark, the main Australian contingent came ashore only on 15 January. It was three weeks before the Russian field hospital arrived and four weeks before the Japanese deployed on 23 January. All these military forces were not, therefore, involved in immediate relief assistance.

**Table 3.1. Numbers killed and missing from outside the affected countries<sup>33</sup>**

	Killed	Missing	Total		Killed	Missing	Total
<b>EUROPE</b>				<b>ASIA-PACIFIC</b>			
Austria	74		74	Australia	26		26
Belgium	11		11	China	3	7	10
Croatia	1		1	Hong Kong	38	2	40
Czech Rep.	7	1	8	Japan	37	7	44
Denmark	45	1	46	Philippines	8		8
Estonia	3		3	New Zealand	5		5
Finland	171	7	178	Singapore	9		9
France	95		95	South Korea	17	3	20
Germany	537	15	552	Taiwan	3		3
Great Britain	149	1	150	<i>Sub-total</i>	146	19	165
Greece	2	3	5				
Ireland	4		4	<b>AMERICAS</b>			
Italy	40		40	Argentina	2		2
Luxembourg	2		2	Brazil	2		2
Netherlands	36		36	Canada	15	5	20
Norway	84		84	Chile	1		1
Poland	4	5	9	Colombia	1		1
Portugal	4	4	8	Mexico	2	1	3
Romania			0	United States	18	13	31
Russia	2	7	9	<i>Sub-total</i>	41	19	60
Sweden	527	16	543				
Switzerland	106	5	111	<b>AFRICA</b>			
Turkey		1	1	South Africa	14		14
<i>Sub-total</i>	1,904	66	1,970				
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>				<b>ALL AREAS</b>			
Israel	4	3	7	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2,111</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>2,216</b>

See sources p159.

**Figure 3.3. Comparison of UK aid and UK expenditure on consular services**

See sources p155.

33 Full details on the sources can be found in Annex G on data and sources.



Looking after tourists has been very expensive. The total cost for the consular operation for the UK was estimated at £42.5mn (US\$77.5mn at the average exchange rate for the period). Most of this (94 per cent) was for the UK police who provided the emergency call service for families and then provided victim identification services (National Audit Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2005). Given that there were only 150 UK fatalities, this gives a total cost of just over half-a-million dollars per UK fatality. By contrast, UK disbursements<sup>E12</sup> for tsunami relief to the end of September 2005 were US\$130mn (Figure 3.3), with total commitments running at US\$149mn – just under twice the cost of the consular operation (OECD/DAC, 2006b).

## 3.3 Stabilisation and relief

### 3.3.1 Assessing and informing

Estimation of fatalities, damage, losses and needs was very approximate in the early stages. Initial assessments (and even later assessments) drew significantly on media reports. The Christmas holiday season slowed reactions in some countries. Gradually, international agencies responded. Teams were dispatched from affected country or regional centres, or from head offices. Wherever international agencies had a pre-tsunami presence the assessment of needs was more comprehensive (TEC Needs Assessment Study, 2006), the response faster (TEC Capacities Study, 2006) and more effective (TEC Coordination Study, 2006).

Many agencies and governments posted situation reports on their websites. In Indonesia the government relief agency, BAKORNAS, produced 43 situation reports between 26 December 2004 and the end of February 2005. The government of India emitted 13 situation reports, credited with being timely and effective. Daily situation reports were provided by the government of Sri Lanka (TEC Needs Assessment Study, 2006). The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team report was one of the earliest formal assessments, together with the UN Synthesized District Report in Sri Lanka.

Despite the wide range of such reports they were not very good guides for action: 'Too often, situation reports and assessments served the interest or mandate of the assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p12). Assessments carried out by agencies for their own programmes were used by agencies for their own decision making. The same was not true of collective assessments. Despite some examples of successful and influential assessments, the assessments overall did not fulfil their primary function of guiding decision making.<sup>34</sup>

34 The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006) provides evaluation ratings for the influence that different types of assessments had on decision making.

Assessments suffered from a number of weaknesses. Emergency needs assessments by international actors were not geographically comprehensive. The most geographically comprehensive assessments came later, supported by the IFIs. Broad coverage reports included the UN Synthesized District Report in Sri Lanka and the World Food Programme (WFP) Emergency Needs Assessment in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006). Despite these good examples, the UN's constricting security rules and inadequate support hampered the UN in many locations. While INGOs could contract helicopters quite quickly, it was nearly four weeks before UNHAS had helicopters in Aceh.<sup>E13</sup>

Nor were reports comprehensive across aid sectors. Assessments prioritised some sectors such as health and shelter over others such as water, sanitation and livelihood recovery. Difficulties of access to some areas led to the most accessible getting more aid than the less accessible. Centrally coordinated assessments applying agreed criteria and methods, and covering most areas and most affected people, were developed in none of the affected countries.

The most common and glaring deficiency in assessments was the non-involvement of affected communities in either the collection or validation of assessment data. This is a persistent problem that has been observed in many natural disasters. Assessments were not shared with local communities or officials after completion.<sup>E14</sup> The lack of such feedback to communities was one of the factors in the gap between the international perception of needs and the perception by local communities and officials.

Agreed standards of assessment quality and common approaches were lacking throughout the response. Common, countrywide information standards, definitions, criteria and software (for collection, analysis, storage and dissemination) were not established. An uncoordinated, duplicative scramble for often ill-defined, rarely-to-be-shared<sup>35</sup> data, resulted. Assessors used multiple assessment forms of variable quality, methods and expertise, covering some areas repeatedly and others not at all.

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that assessors failed to produce an accurate description of needs, the capacities available to meet them, and the priority gaps to be filled.<sup>36</sup> The result was a mixed bag of usable and useful knowledge, accompanied by unusable and useless information. Time was thus wasted by those who collected information and, more importantly, by those who patiently informed them (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006).

Reliable databanks were slow to be developed. At no time in any country was a single, reliable, common census register or database of the affected population established during the emergency phase.<sup>37</sup> UN, governmental and INGO databases were fragmented and duplicative. High quality and timely analysis to support

35 One example of good practice was the sharing of early livelihood assessments by Save the Children in India and Sri Lanka. However, such sharing was the exception rather than the rule.

36 Even though assessments did not identify gaps, the rising tide of assistance filled most gaps in any case.

37 The TEC Coordination Report (2006) recommends that the creation of a comprehensive beneficiary database should be an early priority in the initial phase of the emergency response.

decisions was rarely available. Over- and under-estimation of affected persons resulted, in part, from the variety of definitions of who was a potential beneficiary (in, for example, Sri Lanka). In other cases figures were adapted to suit programmatic agendas.

Local coping processes were largely ignored in needs assessment (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006). International agencies failed to recognise, map and measure local capacities (TEC Capacities Report, 2006). Assessments of specific groups were also lacking or poorly prepared. For example, contrary to international policies, reliable vulnerabilities and gender data were rarely collected.

Notwithstanding, decisions were made – some considered, and some more precipitous. Funding was allocated in what the EU's aid commissioner Louis Michel condemned as a donor 'beauty contest', with world leaders vying to announce spectacular aid pledges regardless of the actual needs or capacities of affected countries (AFP, 2005b).<sup>E15</sup> However, the largest flow of funds was from private sources, with funding based presumably on media coverage and agency appeals.

### 3.3.2 Basic needs

The response moved rapidly from life-saving search and rescue and first aid to protecting, relieving and comforting. Again, the affected populations provided most and first.

It is probable that the opinions of affected people have rarely, if ever, been so canvassed as they were in this disaster.<sup>38</sup> In the past it has been less common for affected populations to be asked for their opinions about the aid they have received. This constant surveying of the views of the affected population may be one of the most significant innovations of the tsunami response. The majority of these surveys have not been carried out by implementing agencies seeking to

**Table 3.2. Varying estimates of the number of IDPs with host families in Aceh**

293,740	BPDE (Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik) Aceh Province: 08 Sep 2005
70,308	BPS. District totals from provisional census totals as of 24 Oct 2005
192,055	SPAN. Number for Aug and Sep 2005 when fieldwork carried out.
<b>For the Districts surveyed in the UN's IDP Survey</b>	
252,179	BPDE (Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik) Aceh Province: 08 Sep 2005
59,328	BPS provisional census data of 24 Oct 2005
39,292	Garansi's IDP census released in Dec 2005

See sources p160.

38 Three of the TEC studies (Capacities, LRRD and the Funding Response Local Study Overview) carried out their own affected-population surveys in at least two countries, and one of these included questions raised by the other two studies. Other evaluations have also conducted beneficiary studies. Many freestanding surveys have also been conducted (for example: Anderson, 2006; Dercon, 2006; Fritz Institute, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; IOM, 2005a; 2005b; IPS, 2005; Lindgren et al, 2005; Mattock, 2005; TNS and UNICEF, 2005; UNORC, 2006b; Wall, 2005).

**Box 3.3. Host families**

Host families provided the majority of the accommodation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Indonesia in the first six months. Data on host families are difficult to capture, as IDPs are dispersed and may regard themselves as staying with relatives rather than being displaced. The lack of hard information about host families is highlighted by the various official estimates of the numbers of IDPs with host families, as shown in Table 3.2.

Host families play a part in almost all emergencies, but while there is a great deal of literature on camps for the displaced there is very little on host families. This reflects the undervaluing of local capacities by the international aid community. One of the factors that made it difficult to identify the number of IDPs is the mobility of the affected population, again emphasising that affected persons are moving to take advantage of whatever resources they have access to, rather than simply sitting in one place and waiting for assistance.

One example of good practice was the small Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) project to support families hosting IDPs in Banda Aceh.<sup>39</sup> Generally, little assistance is targeted to IDPs staying with host families or at host families themselves. The TEC Coordination Indonesia Case Study (2006, p17) noted that, 'Where the international response was largely driven by high-visibility material inputs, little attention was given, for instance, to supporting host families'. The same report identified this as being a persistent problem of the aid system: there was much debate about how to target IDPs living with host families, but a perennial lack of technical expertise among INGOs (and WFP for food aid) in this respect.

know how well they have done, but by third parties, for academic study or for external evaluation. For example, the Sri Lanka 'claim-holder'<sup>40</sup> survey conducted by the TEC Capacities Report (in which 1,055 respondents were asked about how well their necessities had been provided for) indicates that nearly 30 per cent responded 'Good'. Asked how well their needs were provided for during the first week after the tsunami, however, the 'Good' answers rose to almost 45 per cent.

The national response was supplemented by a flood of international aid. Appreciation was given for outside aid and the generosity shown by outside helpers. A United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) survey (TNS and UNICEF, 2005, p48) found that 92 per cent of respondents in Aceh considered that aid agencies had made the most significant contribution in the first year after the tsunami.<sup>E16</sup>

39 A similar SDC cash-for-host-families project in Sri Lanka apparently had to be abandoned because it was not seen as being culturally appropriate there.

40 Adapted from the term 'claimant', claim-holder means somebody who holds the right ('entitlement') to make a claim (eg, to aid commitments or benefits) against a 'duty-bearer' (eg, a state or an aid agency).

Relatively timely, effective and competent aid, based on good quality technical expertise, methods and resources was provided, if neither uniformly nor continuously. Camps and sanitation facilities were established relatively rapidly and health services were set up. Cases of severe malnutrition due to the tsunami were not recorded (though such cases have been relatively rare in similar natural disasters). Though water and sanitation proved a challenge in some places, major water shortages or risks rarely existed. Community services and educational materials, facilities and staff were made available.

Inappropriate aid was just as evident, however: 'There were numerous instances of duplication, as well as of the distribution of inappropriate goods' (TEC LRRD Sri Lanka Case Study, 2006, p9); 'The women became very emotional when explaining about the indignity of receiving old, inappropriate clothing as part of the early relief' (TEC LRRD Indonesia Case Study, 2006, p88).<sup>E17</sup>

There were some gaps and overlaps in the aid provided: 'Despite the large amounts of funding raised for the Tsunami response, important gaps in crucial humanitarian sectors persist' (TEC Funding Response/Government Funding/EC Report, 2006, p7). However, there were far more reports about overlaps than about gaps: 'Overlaps and lack of coordination, like the cases mentioned in the section on the provision of housing ... can also be encountered in other sectors' (TEC Funding Response/Local Response/Indonesia Report, 2006, p18).

Duplication and overlaps were a constant background to the relief effort, and consumed valuable staff time: 'The meeting was initiated by Oxfam out of concern for numerous overlaps in livelihood activities in the district' and 'The overlap between Canadian Red Cross (CRC) and Caritas Czech in Setiabakti has been resolved' (UNORC, 2006a, p2). The World Bank attributed some of the overlap to the popularity of some high-visibility sectors: 'Some donors prefer reconstructing primary schools due to higher visibility and long-lasting nature of the support, but overlapping is a problem' (World Bank, 2005a, p75).

Easily accessible areas, not surprisingly, received most aid, and fastest. Populations of some other areas remained unattended for more than a week<sup>41</sup> while others received more than they required. As noted in the TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p43):

Representatives of local government tell a very different story. Often themselves victims and beneficiaries, when questioned about the needs of the affected population the first reaction was one of profuse appreciation to the overall international community. Then, after a brief pause, the tone would change slightly, leaning toward criticism. One agent, when asked about needs being met, said 'of course the needs were met... even he who had no needs had his needs met'.

Aid was sometimes provided regardless of actual needs (Government of Indonesia and United Nations, 2005). As in most natural disasters, diseases were not a major

41 For example, parts of eastern Sri Lanka, parts of the west coast of Indonesia. Both national and international NGOs were slow to reach parts of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands due to obstacles raised by the Indian Government.

**Box 3.4. Inappropriate aid**

Inappropriate aid is a feature of all large emergencies. The media recorded some dramatic examples of inappropriate aid in the tsunami response including Viagra and ski jackets (*The Guardian*, 2005) and even Father Christmas costumes (AFP, 2005c) as well as the usual expired drugs: 'Indonesia Health Ministry on Wednesday destroyed some 75 metric tons of expired medicines which had been part of humanitarian aid' (Indonesia Relief, 2005c). Tinned pork was sent to staunchly Muslim Aceh (Schulze, 2005, p14).<sup>42</sup> Expired food was also a problem: 'expired food aid was being sorted out and estimated will need another 4 trucks. Among the food destroyed is food that already expired since 2003' (Indonesia Relief, 2005a).

Much of the inappropriate aid may be due to ignorance, perhaps explaining the mountain of clothing, including heavy sweaters, sent to southern India (IFRC, 2005b). Some may have been due to a lack of concern with quality: 'Nobody cared whether the second-hand clothes were culturally inappropriate or of good enough quality. The presence of high-heeled shoes and female swimming costumes in some relief packs went unquestioned' (Fraser, 2005). Inappropriate aid is not just worthless to the recipients; it has a negative value. It occupies storage and transport space at the very time when this is needed for real aid. It then requires special handling to dispose of – all an additional burden on a response.

It is clear that inappropriate aid was a serious problem in the tsunami response, whereas it was a minor issue in the response to the Bam earthquake one year earlier (Chomilier et al, 2004, p24). In Indonesia, unsolicited and inappropriate goods caused the Secretary General of the Indonesian Red Cross to send a harsh letter to other RC Societies complaining of the failure to adhere to guidelines on such donations. The issue was also prevalent in India and Sri Lanka: 'More than 60% of NGOs in Sri Lanka and 40% of NGOs in India reported that the receipt of unsolicited supplies had been high' (Fritz Institute, 2005b, p3).

It is not possible to quantify this problem, as even those agencies that normally deal with donated goods in kind keep no special records of the level of inappropriate assistance. As the proportion and significance of inappropriate aid is unknown, so too is the proportion of appropriate aid. The absence of tracking of inappropriate and appropriate aid is a telling weakness among all actors in their accountability to affected populations and donors.

42 The issue was overcome through a fatwa declaring all aid food halal regardless of contents (AFP, 2005e).

threat. That did not inhibit governments, the media and agencies alike from repeatedly raising the threat of diseases, or from delivering expensive, unnecessary field hospitals and medical teams – which in the case of India were not accepted (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006).<sup>E18</sup>

### Box 3.5. Disasters and disease

One of the recurring myths of natural disasters is that outbreaks of disease inevitably follow disasters (Noji and Toole, 1997, p367). Clasen and Smith's review (2005) of the drinking water response to the tsunami quotes Blake's (1989) survey of 40 years of natural disasters which found that such outbreaks were rare, and Toole's (1997) more recent reprise which found only two outbreaks of waterborne disease and four other outbreaks of any kind in a review of 38 natural disasters between 1970 and 1992.

The theoretical risk certainly exists, as Alexander (1993) demonstrates with the aid of Blake's tables, but a recent review of over 600 geophysical disasters since 1985 found only three instances where such disasters led to epidemics (Floret et al, 2006). This is hardly surprising as such disasters often lack the aggregation of populations which Topley's (1942) work suggests to be a factor in the biology of epidemics.

As well as inappropriate aid and problems of gaps and duplication, there were also problems with: poor quality plastic sheeting; badly constructed, under-ventilated and under-sized 'family' tents; services (such as trauma counselling) provided by under-qualified, inexperienced 'experts'; and dabbling by agencies outside their area of expertise. 'The high number of NGOs failing to deliver on their commitments or providing poor quality services (including housing, provision of boats, psychosocial assistance) caused resentment locally' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p46).

One key issue highlighted by different surveys was the importance placed by affected communities on how they were treated: 'Survey results from both India and Sri Lanka strongly indicate that relief processes (the manner in which relief is distributed) and content (the timeliness and substantive adequacy of assistance) are both of high importance to aid beneficiaries' (Fritz Institute, 2005a, p4). One issue for communities was the lack of information about what agencies were planning: 'Lack of access to information is causing discontent within communities, even spilling over into anger and resentment against implementing agencies who are late in fulfilling promised infrastructure, livelihood and other programmes' (Eye on Aceh, 2006, p39).

The TEC LRRD Report picked up on this issue of the failure to inform communities and the risk that this brought for future development: '[S]ome... interventions may actually undermine future development... A lack of information to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects... Information is power, and the people affected by the tsunami do not have much of either. This failure has led to distrust toward aid providers and the government' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p10).



Effective supplies management, logistics and distribution proved troublesome. The sheer quantities involved overwhelmed many international agencies and national, provincial and local actors. In the absence of comprehensive lists of either supplies or affected people, distribution was often haphazard. Despite the heavy logistics elements of the response, the field-proven SUMA Logistics Support System developed by six UN agencies was not used.

Logistics operations in the tsunami response featured: choked airports;<sup>43</sup> abandoned heaps of clothing (IFRC, 2005b); vehicles and containers blocking sea-ports and customs areas (*Jakarta Post*, 2006); choked warehouses;<sup>44</sup> expensive materials and equipment deteriorating in the sun and rain (Belawan, 2005); inadequate supplies software and too few data-entry clerks; poor logistics reporting; and losses, theft or marketing of aid (Gunawan, 2005). While many of these may have been 'freak events' they indicate the varied quality of supplies management.

Despite major demands elsewhere for staffing (in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa, for instance), most agencies were able to deploy personnel, including a number of experienced managers, in a relatively short time. Some personnel were shifted from other emergencies. Staffing inadequacies were also evident, however. They included: excessive turnover, partly due to short-term contracting but also attrition (health-induced, for example, leading to gaps due to inadequate back-up staff); insufficient competent staff (Aglionby, 2005a), especially in programme management and specialised positions; and a predominance of inappropriate 'Western' profiles, with poor language skills and an inadequate understanding of context and culture.<sup>45</sup>

Some aspects of the response generated enormous amounts of publicity, but the reality is that it was a week before the international community began to operate in significant strength in Aceh and three weeks before the international relief effort was going at full speed.<sup>419</sup> The response in Sri Lanka was faster because access was easier, but even there: 'Larger national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were less nimble in getting out to villages, often arriving after a week or later' (Center for Peace Building International, 2006, p1).

Despite the weaknesses and delays in the response, the relief phase passed rapidly and reasonably effectively thanks largely to local inputs. Alleviation of transient poverty (temporary, tsunami-related destitution as opposed to longer term, chronic poverty) was quite successful. 'Progress has been rapid in alleviating much of the transient poverty that was created by the tsunami' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p81). Emergency conditions and related suffering were rapidly stabilised. The move from relief to intermediate solutions was also generally rapid. "Much has been achieved this year" a statement from UN and other agencies said, "[A]lmost 250,000 internally displaced people had been moved from emergency camps to some 54,000 transitional shelters".' (BBC, 2005c).

43 The Australian Minister of Defence had to cancel his visit to Aceh on 8 January as the airport was too congested with 150 aid flights per day (Indonesia Relief, 2005b).

44 Sri Lanka decided to release aid to those not affected rather than let it rot (AFP, 2005f).

45 One agency, for instance, flew over 100 expatriates to Sri Lanka, many inexperienced in the region (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).



**Table 3.3. Timeline for selected elements of international assistance in Aceh**

Date	Since tsunami	Event
2 Jan 05	7 days	US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln arrives off the coast of North Sumatra
7 Jan 05	12 days	US Marine expeditionary group arrives off Aceh
11 Jan 05	16 days	Danish Portable Hospital opens
13 Jan 05	18 days	Australian Navy Ship arrives off Banda Aceh but find nowhere to unload
15 Jan 05	20 days	Australian Engineers get their equipment ashore
16 Jan 05	21 days	ICRC hospital opens at Aceh airport

See sources p160.


In some cases cash payments facilitated people's move to intermediate livelihoods. Cash was provided in a number of locations, through both cash for work and cash entitlements or grants. Cash for work was criticised in some cases as destroying traditional group-work mechanisms. The same criticism does not apply to cash grants which were almost universally welcomed. These were generally well received as flexible, easily managed mechanisms for people to choose their own priorities.

### 3.3.3 Proliferation of international organisations

The number of international agencies involved in the response grew unabated. Well-resourced agencies and very small ones, competent and incompetent, well-prepared and unprepared, secular and faith-based, reputable and disreputable, household names and unknown, ambitious and humble, opportunistic and committed, governmental and non-governmental, national and international, bilateral and multilateral, well-established and just-formed – they all turned up. In one location in India: '[A]t least 150 NGOs/Donors registered... and almost an equal number were working unregistered in Nagapattinam District alone. All of them dip into the same basket of livelihood options... creating oversupply, depressing both the market for trained labor and products' (Alexander, 2006, p33).

Trying to build a picture of the number of international NGOs is difficult as reports do not necessarily distinguish them from national NGOs. As well as traditional NGOs there were people who came to help with their own money, or with donations from friends and relatives. In Sri Lanka especially, several organisations were set up by tourists who wanted to help.<sup>E20</sup> In the case of Banda Aceh, in addition to the cumulative number of registered agencies (Figure 3.4), there may have been as many as 200 small international agencies that stayed only a few weeks.

With the exception of India, Thailand and inland parts of Aceh, governments gave relatively free access to international agencies. In Aceh this access was conditional and there were confusing signals from the government about whether agencies would have to leave after three months. Uncertainty about which agencies would be allowed to continue working after the first three months paralysed some agency planning.<sup>E21</sup> Little or no regulation and monitoring was applied nationally



**Note** Based on news reports from Reuters, DPA, AFP, The Times, etc (430 local NGOs are also registered). Very small INGOs that arrived with a single donation or INGOs in other parts of Aceh are not included.

See sources p155.

or locally. An absence of relevant national legislation and capacity was a contributing factor. The quality of the work that agencies did varied greatly. Newer, inexperienced agencies were more commonly associated with inappropriate aid.

Proliferation was evident everywhere. For example, there were 22 medical NGOs working in the health sector in one part of the west coast of Aceh (IFRC, 2005b), 95 international organisations working on shelter in Aceh in December 2005,<sup>46</sup> and more than 60 agencies claiming to be working in Aceh’s education sector in December 2005 (World Bank, 2005a).

The Red Cross Movement response was enormous, as was the total funding it received (see Section 3.6 below). There are 183 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the world. Approximately half of these contributed to the response with cash, goods or teams. When responding to an emergency they are supposed to work through the National Society of the affected country and/or the IFRC. Of the affected countries, only the Maldives had no National RC Society. The capacities of the RC Movement in the affected countries varied, with the Indonesian Red Cross being highly regarded.

The Indonesian and Sri Lankan National Societies soon had problems with unwanted and inappropriate donations from other National Societies, despite the RC Movement protocol that supplies should be sent only in response to specific requests (Herson, 2005). Some National RC Societies took the opportunity to begin their first international operations, using the vast funds they had raised.<sup>47</sup> The results of these operations showed that some National Societies did not have the expertise for international operations. Dercon (2006) notes that a group of 25 agencies who had built only 500 houses from a total commitment to build 50,000, included 10 Red Cross organisations which between them committed to building 21,000 houses in Aceh.

46 ‘Someone Else’s Utopia’, by Caroline Baum, *Sydney Morning Herald*, First Edition, 8 December 2005.

47 The Irish RC received over euro31mn from the Irish public and began operations in Sri Lanka. The Irish RC had little or no international operational experience, but did have a strategic plan to become operational. It has since also started operations in Niger.

### Box 3.6. The costs of proliferation

Irrespective of its origin, proliferation has important implications for the quality and cost of a response.

- **Increased load on the affected populations, local authorities and coordination structures**, which try to understand, and navigate between, the agencies and attend to their demands for information or services. 'Affected individuals felt "assessed to death", too frequently interviewed and yet not truly consulted' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p48). The authorities don't know who's who and need to talk to all agencies in the hope of finding serious partners, rather than being in a position to pre-select: '[T]here were simply too many actors involved, at least in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. This posed huge additional challenges for governments at all levels, as well as for OCHA. In Aceh scarce management resources that should have been focused on reconstruction have had to go into coordination' (TEC Funding Report, 2006, p33).
- **Increased costs due to replicated offices and overheads**, as well as the ways in which non-traditional actors, such as the military and commercial entities, may use methods and resources that are not cost-effective.
- **Duplication and confusion of efforts**, including assessments. 'The duplication between UN and Red Cross initiatives is counterproductive. Over the first three weeks, 17 bilateral assessment teams reportedly arrived in Aceh' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p56). The same report found that: 'The timeliness and quality of needs assessment by Red Cross and NGOs varied from outstanding to poor. With a few exceptions, those assessments were not widely shared with others.'
- **Competition between agencies** for projects, 'clients', facilities, materials, staff and publicity. 'High levels of funding led to heightened competition both for partners and for areas in which to work' (LRRD Policy Study, 2006). The results were costly and damaging. Such competition has a corrosive impact on accountability,<sup>E22</sup> apparent in the 'accountability reports' issued by individual agencies on the anniversary of the tsunami that focused more on brand promotion than on accountability (Cosgrave, 2006).
- **Increased risks of inappropriate aid**, due to the time pressure that competition and the rush for publicity introduce: '[M]any of the items that were distributed were either inappropriate or unfamiliar to beneficiaries. Several agencies gave the same items to the same people, and even in October 2005, there were warehouses with large quantities of relief items that had not yet been distributed' (TEC LRRD Sri Lanka Case Study, 2006, p70).
- **Increased risk to the quality of the response and reputation of the humanitarian community** through the actions of inexperienced or irresponsible agencies. The presence of new and inexperienced NGOs 'that do not apply international humanitarian principles risks undermining community based approaches and the reputation of NGOs in general' (TEC Funding Response/NGO Funding/Ireland Report, 2006, p15).

Some National Red Cross Societies went first to the Federation, and if the Federation did not want what they had they then went to the National Society. If that failed they would try to interest the respective government in what they had to offer.

Typically, approximately 80 per cent of resources, capacity and activities were concentrated among about 20 per cent of the aid agencies (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). The greatest amount of funding to INGOS came mostly from the public directly and did not pass through government or UN agencies. INGOS were sometimes better prepared, funded<sup>E23</sup> and informed than the UN, to the point that in some instances they supported functions traditionally associated with the UN.<sup>48</sup>

Within the UN there were differences between agencies like WFP or OCHA which have a role in emergency response, and the UN development agencies.<sup>E24</sup> Among the UN agencies, UNDAC was a key actor. UNDAC deployed promptly and issued the first cross-sectoral, albeit geographically limited, assessments (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006). Its role was unclear and impact questionable, however:

- The combination of assessment and coordination within UNDAC's ToR<sup>E25</sup> complicated its role.
- The number, knowledge, and 'skill sets' of the UNDAC experts, and the support provided to them reflected neither the magnitude of the tsunami relief effort nor the specifics of certain countries.
- Certain donors and UN actors (who promote or fund UNDAC) either failed to use its services or duplicated them by deploying their own assessment teams.<sup>49</sup>
- The criteria for mobilising UNDAC teams (for instance to Thailand) are unclear.<sup>50</sup>
- The value added by UNDAC was not evident to important actors.<sup>E26</sup>

The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p53) found that: 'UNDAC neglected the actual analysis and compilation of information on needs... most NGO and many UN interlocutors found UNDAC "very weak in the field".' The TEC Coordination Report (2006, p36) added: 'In all countries, questions arose over the utility of UNDAC as a "common service" for assessment and coordination... The UNDAC team was under-equipped with even the basics for communication, there was no public information or civil-military liaison officer on the team, and no clear administrative procedures for operating in an environment where quick purchase decisions were required'.

48 Such as facilitating logistical capacity for the UN.

49 The UK sent an assessment team to Sri Lanka. This team collaborated with the UN and undertook a joint assessment of Ampara District.

50 The team had been requested by the UN's Resident Coordinator and not by the Government of Thailand. The TEC Coordination Report (2006, p36) notes that: 'The role of UNDAC in a middle-income country such as Thailand is questionable, especially where the team that did not request its services does not comprise sectoral specialists drawn from the skilled national resource base.'

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s participation in the response (mainly in shelter) is a major step for the refugee agency. It made history by appealing for and receiving large amounts of funding<sup>E27</sup> to respond to a natural disaster, despite its unique mandate to provide international protection for refugees. The agency's withdrawal from (as a result of pressure from the Indonesian government) and subsequent return to Aceh underlined the complexity of working in areas of armed conflict. On its return UNHCR had a far more modest target for providing shelter than it had before its withdrawal.

UNHCR reduced its plan to help build houses in Aceh from 35,000 to only 4,000 units (Indonesia Relief, 2005e).<sup>51</sup> Other UN agencies also had their shortcomings. For instance:

[T]he quality of the (WHO) assessment of needs for urgent medical care was below expectations. Despite the rapidly emerging evidence of an excessive and, at times inappropriate, medical response in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent in other countries, there has been no effort to ascertain the number of serious injuries, to register the incoming medical teams or hospitals and their capacities, or to monitor their effectiveness or, for that matter, to register the mortality occurring after the tsunami. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p101)


On Monday, UNICEF inaugurated the use of a temporary school building to mark the new school year... The agency has committed to build 200 temporary schools, and promised to complete as many of them as possible before the new school year started. According to its contractor, IOM (International Organization for Migration), only 3 temporary school buildings (are) completed. (Indonesia Relief, 2005f)

In Indonesia in January 2005, WFP documented a laudable triangulation of three methods to estimate the number of affected people. Although all three defensible methods came up with roughly 700,000 people needing food, allowance was made for one million people to feed for six months in terms of budgeting in the WFP appeal. UN officials in September 2005 claimed that while programmes ongoing in April 2005 were at their new maximum (feeding over 550,000), attempts were still being made to reach those 1 million hungry people. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p31)

Military resources – national, regional and from other countries – played a 'prominent role' (IFRC, 2005b, p86) and were 'pivotal' in filling capacity gaps (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). Their role was particularly critical in Aceh. Annex F lists the main logistics contributions from different countries.

Military capacity at times dwarfed that of the humanitarian sector. This is hardly surprising when one considers that international humanitarian spending is typically less than 1 per cent of global military spending, and that all Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is only about 10 per cent of global military spending (Figure 3.5).

51 This was apparently a reflection of a change from providing temporary shelter to permanent housing.



Note Data from OECD/DAC and SIPRI.

See sources p156.

The US spends as much on the military as does the rest of the world put together (SIPRI, 2005), and its contribution to the relief effort was on a similar scale. The US relief operation was, for example, its largest operation in the region since the Vietnam War, bigger even than Operation Sea Angel (GlobalSecurity.org, undated) in the follow-up to the 1991 storm surge in Bangladesh.

The commitment of the US administration to the relief effort could be seen in the sending of one of its first-line Carrier Strike Forces<sup>E28</sup> to the region, and the diversion of a Marine expeditionary force bound for the Persian Gulf. A further indication of commitment was the US agreement to operate unarmed when on Indonesian soil – an unusual concession.

NGO–military relations, however, bordered on the hostile. The TNI was very suspicious of NGOs as spies and supporters of Acehese independence. NGOs accused the TNI of distributing food unfairly (this was unfounded; Schulze, 2005, p9). NGOs were also critical of the US intervention as being intended to assuage Muslim opinion,<sup>E29</sup> and of the Australian one as being intended to rebuild relations with Indonesia after the damage done by the secession of East Timor. For their part, the international military saw NGOs as ineffective and self-promoting (Schulze, 2005, p9).

Despite this mutual suspicion, there were a significant number of joint military–civilian endeavours including the assessment missions flown from the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, the manning of the USS *Mercy* with civilian volunteers, and the transport of 60 NGO personnel from Singapore aboard a helicopter landing ship. The involvement of foreign military was relatively short-lived: the main US effort wound down at the end of January and the majority of the other forces left Aceh by the 26 March deadline set by the Defence Minister.<sup>52</sup>

Though competition for visibility was a feature of their work, the way in which the foreign military contingents related and worked to the command structures of the host nations – in particular, in recognising that the host nation is responsible for

52 The one exception was the Malaysians, who had been told that the 26 March deadline did not apply to fellow ASEAN nations, but were subsequently asked to leave in April.

its population and leads efforts on its own soil – was a good example of coordinated action (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). While military capacities were necessary<sup>53</sup> and generally effective, a number of important drawbacks exist. To start with, they can be hugely expensive. Military services can cost four to eight times that of similar commercial services (Borton et al, 1996, p61).<sup>53</sup> The US aircraft carrier used in the response probably cost US\$3mn dollars a day.<sup>53</sup> Apart from cost, there were other problems with the military involvement. Contextual awareness was not always strong among foreign military personnel,<sup>54</sup> and there were accusations that the different militaries gave priority to home-country VIP visits over aid (Schulze, 2005, p10). Proliferation among the military took the form of many very similar logistics packages being offered by different countries.

Private companies also assisted in the tsunami response. Much went unrecorded by the international aid system (such as by ReliefWeb), for example the contributions of Rolls Royce, Coca Cola and the Indian multinational Tata Group.<sup>55</sup> While their aid was generally welcomed and useful, questions arise regarding their expertise, experience and cost-effectiveness. For instance, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation spent \$500,000 on a clinic built from five recycled shipping containers in a project managed by Rolls Royce at Calang.<sup>56</sup> Also, Rolls Royce was in charge of health services and clinics in one location.<sup>57</sup> In any 'normal' circumstances such specialised and potentially life-impacting tasks would be restricted to agencies with specialist knowledge and skills.

The local business community also played a key role in recovery. In Sri Lanka, local chambers of commerce worked to promote local recovery in Hambantota and Ampara.

### 3.3.4 International coordination

One innovation in this response was the appointment of a very high-profile UN special envoy, former US President Bill Clinton. This choice may have been motivated by a desire to have an envoy who could shake loose the donor's purse strings (Clinton, 2006). Even though this proved unnecessary, the appointment of such a high-profile figure proved successful when the focus changed to promoting the effectiveness of the response, as the Special Envoy had the political clout to persuade governments to participate in coordination forums such as the special envoy's Global Consortium on Tsunami Recovery.<sup>532</sup> Overall, the Special Envoy's

53 As the logistics capacity the military brings is not available as quickly from civilian contractors.  
54 This was illustrated by the US military mistakenly handing an aid shipment over to GAM rather than to the TNI. They became aware of this mistake only when they showed pictures of the handover to the Indonesian military (Xinhua News Agency, 2005).

55 Asia Media reports (<http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/tsunami/1yearlater/india.asp>) about the Tata Relief Committee (TRC): 'The Tata Group's huge presence in South India has also made it a key player in relief efforts'. A Tata Group media release of 4 January 2005 adds: 'The TRC has undertaken relief and rehabilitation work in the tsunami affected area with the help of a 55-member team pooled from different Tata Group companies' ([http://www.tata.com/tata\\_sons/releases/20050104.htm](http://www.tata.com/tata_sons/releases/20050104.htm)).

56 This gives a building cost of approximately US\$3,500/m<sup>2</sup> for a product that, because it will rust, is far inferior to a structure of bricks and mortar.

57 Responsibilities included not only rebuilding the clinic and accommodation, but also equipping it with drugs (OCHA: Indonesia Earthquake and Tsunami: Situation Report 37). Agencies typically had to operate clinics for a few months before the Ministry of Health could take over.



role was much appreciated by senior UN and government officials interviewed during the TEC evaluation. UN officials were also very positive about the appointment of Margareta Wahlstrom as UN Special Representative for the Tsunami (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).

The establishment of a local Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) in Banda Aceh became a focal point for interagency coordination for those who attended. Principles, standards and policy in, for example, the construction of temporary living centres (TLCs) was promoted through this body (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). In Sri Lanka, the UN decided to engage the government at both local and provincial level rather than creating a new coordination structure.<sup>58</sup>

The large number of actors both significantly increased the costs of coordination (as there were so many more agencies to coordinate with) and reduced the effectiveness of coordination (as there were large numbers of agencies falling outside any coordination mechanism). In general, large private funding permitted INGOs and the RC Movement an unusual degree of flexibility and independence from formal coordination structures. The need and (in some cases) the will for INGOs to coordinate was consequently reduced.

Some of the NGOs – both INGOs and domestic NGOs who received external funds – controlled significant funds: '[W]ith their own funding secure, they face few incentives to improve coordination' (Jayasuriya, Steele et al, 2005, p18). Many of these organisations were 'cash rich' and keen to start their individual activities with limited need and incentive to coordinate with local government or with other actors (World Bank, 2005a).

Agencies have argued that this was in part due to the weak coordination provided via formal mechanisms. Weaknesses in coordination existed, including coordination of the transition from relief to recovery. This compounded problems caused by proliferation, though in Somalia, where there were relatively few organisations, coordination was still reported to have been weak (Vaux et al, 2005, p26).

The reasons for this weak coordination were complex:

- The UN's coordination role is one of coordination without having direct authority over the other actors. Sometimes the authority for coordination flows from the personality of the head of mission, in other cases it comes from the need of partners to get access to common services such as air transport or security advice. In the tsunami response the number of actors to be coordinated combined with deep pockets meant that they had no interest in common services, which made coordination a herculean task.
- Support and funding for coordination were often in short supply. While funds for coordination were made available in the Flash Appeal, neither immediate start-up nor subsequent (recovery phase) funds were guaranteed. More importantly, weak and inadequate administrative systems and support led to slow responses.

58 There had not been any local IASC equivalent in Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami.



- The lack of continuity, skills and experience among some senior UN coordinators posed problems (for example, poor meeting management skills). Their lack of personal authority denied OCHA the authority to coordinate.
- The fact that the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) were the same person meant that humanitarian coordination took a back seat to other issues.
- Coordinators were criticised for not taking a firm line with purveyors of inappropriate aid (such as the large number of field hospitals) and with the authorities on issues meriting joint-agency advocacy (be they mere bottlenecks, such as customs clearances, or, more fundamentally, allegations of human rights and other abuses).
- INGOs did not appoint special liaison officers to deal with the large number of other agencies and the need to share information with them.

Further, NGOs were insufficiently represented in many coordination bodies and coordinated poorly among themselves. The IASC, despite being replicated at field level, did not sufficiently reflect, nor speak for, the huge diversity of NGOs, including national NGOs. A recurring complaint from the deputy HCs was that INGOs did not bring consistent consensus on important issues being discussed. In April, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) proposed an NGO Platform for Aceh that would become a focal point (and Secretariat) for NGO coordination in the recovery phase. Gaining consensus around issues was next to impossible because the members of the INGO community did not agree among themselves on who had the right to speak on their behalf. It appears that ICVA membership was neither able to agree the terms of reference for an NGO liaison officer, nor to the establishment of some kind of NGO liaison office in Aceh (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).

The earthquake of 28 March 2006, which badly affected the islands of Nias and Simeulue, diverted resources and attention away from the tsunami response just as the emergency phase ended and may have slowed the development of more effective coordination. Several observers noted that the Nias and Simeulue response was better coordinated than the initial tsunami response, possibly because fewer agencies responded and there was a far smaller media presence compared with the initial weeks of the tsunami response.

Coordination structures also presented problems. As a rule they were fragmented into sectoral groups which, it is argued, inhibited integrated planning within any specific geographical area.

Recently one of the larger NGOs constructed a number of houses in an area where the community, working with another NGO, had developed a site plan that located a road in the area where the houses were built. Lack of coordination among donors working in the same area also ultimately weakens local, community-based organisations. (BRR and World Bank, 2005)

This example also shows a failure by the two NGOs to coordinate effectively with local authorities. Apart from inefficiencies in the response, poor coordination, especially in the early stages, led to poor 'lateral accountability' among

implementing agencies. Opportunities to share assessments, valuable reports and lessons identified were lost.

Another aspect of coordination that presents both efficiencies and weaknesses is that of UN Humanitarian Common Services (HCSs).<sup>53</sup> Some of the services were found to have been effective and efficient. A recurring problem was that certain services (and the so-called 'matrix' approach adopted by the HCS) were either not used or not known. The relationship of services and the host agencies (eg, WFP) was unclear in terms of management, planning and budgeting. Finally, the HCS could have been of greater benefit to promote among operational partners common agreements on issues such as procurement, staff hire and rental charges.

Coordination within donors' own administrative institutions showed advances on previous crises (such as the 1991 Iraq, 1991–95 former Yugoslavia, and 1994–95 Rwanda crises). In many cases the humanitarian and development 'wings' of a donor agency worked in very close cooperation. These included cross-functional (relief-development, political and even administrative) taskforces (Grünwald et al, 2006). That said, coordination among donors, especially in the initial 'funding bidding match', was notably poor in contrast to their commitments expressed through the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles (GHD).<sup>59</sup>

There remains a persistent preference among donors for highlighting their own individual contributions, and many operational agencies spend a disproportionate amount of time writing separate reports covering individual contributions. However, greater effort is needed, especially in the case of UN reports, to move beyond general statements of performance to providing sufficient detail to satisfy the monitoring requirements of donors (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).

### 3.3.5 Costs and efficiency

A question often posed by the donating public is: 'How much money actually got to the people?' As Section 3.6 on funding shows, it is impossible to answer this on the basis of the information available. Even the implication that all funds must be given directly to people in order to benefit them is flawed. Investments in administration and logistics are unavoidable, and the issue of surge capacity is a continuing problem for aid agencies.<sup>60</sup> Additionally, better cost-efficiency may mean reduced beneficiary choice<sup>61</sup> (World Bank, 2005a). It is nonetheless important to look at cost-efficiency.

Apart from gaps in reporting and differences in accounting definitions and practices, few agencies have published transparently, in local languages and in easily accessible formats, their detailed budgets and expenditures. It is usually very difficult to get information on salaries,<sup>64</sup> allowances, consultancy fees,

59 '[C]oordination among humanitarian donors lies at the heart of GHD' (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p26), eg General Principles 5, regarding collective obligation, and 10, regarding UN leadership and coordination (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003, p1).

60 Having a range of options is inherently more expensive for the provider than offering everyone a single standard option.

61 However, due to US tax law and Form 990, US NGOs have to publish details on their five highest-paid staff members other than board officers (all of whose salary details have to be given). This is a positive example of the impact of regulation on transparency.

international travel and capital costs. Oxfam, widely regarded as one of the leaders among the INGOs, spent 16.6 per cent of its total budget on programme management and planning, with another 2.6 per cent on advocacy and learning – a total of US\$16.2mn in the first 12 months (Oxfam International, 2005). While large, these costs are typical of the real cost of managing complex programmes well.<sup>E35</sup>

Hundreds of agencies established and maintained staff and offices in affected areas and in national and regional cities. Most were generously equipped and staffed. As noted above, many costly assessments were duplicated and many different agencies were present in the same locations.<sup>62</sup> Repeated administrative costs and overheads are also incurred (often without clarity), as funds pass down the layers of sub-contracts.

The proliferation of agencies also renders information and coordination services more expensive.<sup>63</sup> Data about numerous agencies must be collected, stored and updated. Coordination staff, space and services must be provided on a scale in accordance with the number of actors. Coordination during the tsunami was simultaneously more expensive in terms of staff time, and less effective in terms of results.

### **Box 3.7. What does it cost to open an aid office for one year?**

International agencies are not transparent about their operating costs, so direct information is not available. An INGO office would typically need two international managers with no project responsibility (typically the representative and the finance and administration manager). The other costs would include: renting an office and accommodation; buying or renting vehicles; buying computers, phones, radios and satellite phones; employing guards, drivers and other support personnel; and paying for flights. All of this suggests a minimum cost of some US\$200,000 to US\$250,000 for a cost-conscious INGO<sup>64</sup> with modest pay rates. Given that there were 180 INGOs in Banda Aceh in 2005, the total cost of all these offices was probably US\$35mn to US\$45mn.

First, it is not suggested that all the work should have been done by one super-agency, so not all these offices are duplicated. Second, this high cost has to be set against the overall level of NGO spending in Aceh – probably of the order of two-thirds of a billion dollars in the first year.<sup>E36</sup> However the work could have been done by fewer agencies, or by the same number of agencies working together in consortia for joint implementation. It should be noted that the cost of running a local partner NGO office is a small fraction of the cost of running an INGO office.<sup>65</sup>

62 Permata Hati Hospital got assistance from no less than 40 NGOs (Serambi Indonesia, 2005).

63 One hundred agencies may not sound like much, but this is over 16,000 bilateral relations between the agencies, and over one-and-a-half billion potential clusters of five agencies.

64 One of the authors worked for an INGO where the approximate figure for opening a new office was generally assumed to be US\$250,000 in the early 1990s.

65 Estimated at about 5 per cent of an INGO's cost in Sri Lanka.

The presence of multiple agencies drew multiple, expensive visiting delegations and missions. International missions are unavoidable for international agencies and donors. One assumes that some had a positive impact on affected people's lives, through subsequent decision making. The productive outcome of many of these visits, however, remains a mystery, certainly to locals and in some cases to field staff of the agencies concerned. While local transport and lodging might be regarded as a field-level investment (for either fundraising or planning purposes, albeit badly targeted), the cost in time, effort and services to local people and administrations is incalculable.

## 3.4 Building back better: capacities for recovery

### 3.4.1 Achievements

Local recovery began straight after the tsunami and earthquake – although the process will go on for years, and probably decades.<sup>66</sup> A year later, recovery activities had multiplied throughout the region, with mixed results. Notable areas of activity include: construction and the production of boats and nets; agriculture and fishing (including with support from cash grants) (TEC LRRD Report, 2006); small and medium enterprises (SMEs) providing food, recreation and tourism services; production of pickles, coir and jute bags; fish drying and marketing; outboard motor and vehicle repair, service stations; carpentry, plumbing, computing and electrical services.

It is undeniable that the quick response by NGOs and donors, despite some concerns about the quality of the assets provided and sustainability of marine resources, has helped a majority of active fishermen as both an important psychosocial intervention as well as doubling up during the short term, enabling them at least a minimal income stream and thus protecting their dignity and self-respect (Alexander, 2006). Another significant success has been that damage and loss assessments were more systematic and comprehensive, and better resourced and coordinated, than were assessments of humanitarian needs.<sup>67</sup>

About 100,000 new homes have been built or are under construction today across the tsunami-affected region. Thousands more are in the pipeline. Some 400 permanent schools are under construction and, with the work on

66 Recovery phases after hurricanes in Central America, earthquakes in Colombia, India, and Iran, and recurrent flooding in Bangladesh all indicate that it will be a long, uneven process. Apart from human fatalities and physical destruction, losses to livelihoods were devastating. (See Section 2, The Disaster, above in this report.)

67 These were not a main focus of the TEC evaluations, which concentrated on humanitarian actors. They are seen as possible models for comprehensive relief-phase assessments, as recommended in the TEC Needs Assessment Report.

temporary facilities, children went back to school more quickly than I thought they would. Tourist numbers are on the rebound in Thailand and in the Maldives. In Sri Lanka, over 70 per cent of households are reported to have regained a steady income. I am still frustrated that close to 50,000 people remain in tents in Aceh, but I am pleased that the temporary shelter construction has been moving much more rapidly. (AlertNet: Highlights of Former President Clinton's speech on disaster reduction, 30 March 2006)

In all countries children were back in school very quickly and health facilities and services were partly restored and, in several cases, much improved. More than 80 per cent of damaged fish markets (in Sri Lanka), boats and fishing equipment were rehabilitated (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). By month six in Aceh, some 500,000 people had a solid roof over their heads (albeit a majority in host families, with some 70,000 still in tents). More than 1,000 new houses were being built each month, and the pace of housing accelerated to 5,000/month in October 2005. In Aceh, the reconstruction effort provided an opportunity to strengthen the peace between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) by bringing entire communities together to plan for their future (TEC Coordination Report, 2006).

Although the tsunami devastated the livelihoods of many it did not result in mass, entrenched unemployment<sup>68</sup> and so a potential livelihoods crisis was clearly diverted. This was due to three factors:

- 1 the industrious efforts of the disaster-affected people (TEC LRRD Report, 2006);
- 2 the job opportunities created by the response, for example in the construction industry;
- 3 the use of cash in the relief and recovery efforts.<sup>69</sup>

The international presence in Aceh probably had a positive effect on the peace process there. While hard to quantify, local sources say that the international presence gave them confidence that the peace agreement would be observed. Some connected the international presence to the progress between the Indonesian government and the GAM in achieving a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). One person said, 'The international presence creates a pitch for peace' ('pitch', as in a playing field.) Others noted that the MoU was 'in part possible because of the international presence' and that 'the international presence supports peace' (Anderson, 2006, p13).

Civil figures were more positive than international actors, expressing support for international engagement. This fits with a commonly expressed Acehnese perspective that international involvement in Aceh's political problems will help resolve tensions between the region and the Jakarta-based Government. The following positive impacts were mentioned:

68 In Sri Lanka an International Labour Organisation survey (ILO, 2005) already in April reported that 60 per cent of those who had lost their employment due to the tsunami were back at work.

69 Cash-for-work programmes were often quite limited in duration; however, several governments made direct cash payments to those affected by the tsunami, in addition to cash grants from agencies.

- An economic boost which, if it continues, could become a 'peace dividend'.
- An international presence, which limits TNI abuses in particular.
- Greater accountability and reduced levels of corruption.
- More openness and increased confidence in government.
- Promotion of international experience, and encouragement of all parties towards peace.
- The international presence means domestic civil society can do more. (Burke and Afnan, 2005).

However, Schulze (2005, p23) notes that good progress on a settlement had already been made prior to the tsunami, and that:

It is often assumed that there was a direct cause and effect relationship between the tsunami and the Helsinki peace process – that the sheer magnitude of this natural disaster 'made' the warring factions see sense and 'instilled' in them the desire to end the conflict. In the case of Aceh that view is overly simplistic and neglects the dynamics and processes already underway which paved the way for a return to the negotiating table.

The outcome in Sri Lanka has been far gloomier. Here, the conclusion of a series of workshops on the impact of the tsunami was that:

In the short-run, the tsunami and aid promoted a pause in the civil war. In the long-run, the tensions leading to war have been made worse... Most of the post-tsunami response made no changes to the conflict or its resolution, while grievances by the war-affected communities have increased. (Center for Peace Building International, 2006, p6)

However, it should be clear that whatever, if any, impact the international response to the tsunami has had on these two conflicts, this effect was serendipitous rather than planned. In general, international agencies paid little explicit attention to conflict-sensitive programming in either Aceh or Sri Lanka.<sup>70</sup>

### **3.4.2 Disenchantment among the affected population**

Surveys<sup>71</sup> record a general satisfaction among affected populations for the assistance received during the initial stages of the tsunami response. The general satisfaction with the relief phase soon changed, however, as people's expectations moved from relief-item distribution to recovery opportunities and solutions. For the recovery process, surveys show growing frustration with the speed, direction and ownership, and not just with international programmes. For example, the

70 Eye on Aceh noted that many of the programmes examined by their study 'appeared to lack a conflict-sensitive perspective' (Eye on Aceh, 2006).

71 TEC and other surveys, such as those conducted by UNICEF (Lindgren et al, 2005; TNS and UNICEF, 2005).

claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicated that affected communities felt that their local leaders had failed them in ensuring equity and inclusion. The Fritz Institute found that '85% of the affected families surveyed ranked international NGOs highest in terms of quality, maintenance of dignity, and fairness in distribution of aid' (Fritz Institute, 2005c, p7).

One UNICEF survey in Indonesia found that, while 66 per cent of respondents believed that national and local governments were responsible for ensuring that the relief and recovery efforts were a success, 92 per cent considered that aid agencies (mostly international ones) had made the greatest contribution to date. The agency regarded as having made the most significant contribution overall was the Indonesian Red Cross, mentioned twice as often as the second-placed agency (Lindgren et al, 2005, p19).

The TEC Capacities survey of affected populations found that, at the five-month mark, a little over 5 per cent of respondents answered 'Good' and 20 per cent 'Somewhat Satisfied' to a question about how well their needs had been met. This contrasts with the more favourable opinions regarding the relief phase. While expectations may have risen once people saw the aid potentially available, the slow progress in livelihoods recovery and physical reconstruction has frustrated many, with only one-fifth of the displaced in permanent accommodation 12 months after the tsunami (Oxfam, 2005b, p2).

UNICEF's survey in Indonesia found that 91 per cent of respondents said that the response was taking much longer than they had expected (Lindgren et al, 2005, p19). The same survey found that fewer than half of respondents in Aceh had seen a significant improvement in shelter compared with the first three months after the tsunami (Lindgren et al, 2005, p41). Dercon (2006, pp1–2) reported that in mid-February 2006, 15,000 people were still living in tents in Aceh. WFP was also still providing emergency food relief in tandem with major reconstruction projects.

Surveys show that people's main concern after the initial days was to get on with their lives, and to recover as fast as possible. If not aid, they at least wanted – and deserved – reliable information about recovery plans, resources and methods to allow them take their own decisions. But evidence of misunderstandings, poor communication and false hopes emerge from interviews in affected areas and from media reports.<sup>E37</sup> Many agencies controlled more funds than they could reasonably use. This resulted in promises, real or perceived, that were simply impossible to fulfil:

Early promises were made that tens of thousands of houses would be built in a few months time... construction of transitional housing has been delayed and insufficient, especially in Aceh. Disaster affected people have shown a readiness to be patient in waiting for permanent housing, but they have been angered by false promises and the failure to plan for an inevitably protracted transitional period. This state of affairs is a reflection of how agencies' struggle for 'turf', by making grand promises, has superseded accountability to the affected populations. (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p10)

Some 25 agencies and donors have committed themselves to providing 50,000 housing units, and have started building only 500 collectively. This group includes

**Box 3.8. Impact on women**

The most significant impact of the tsunami on women was in terms of fatalities, as the tsunami killed 40,000 to 45,000 more women than men.<sup>E38</sup> The TEC claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicated that women were less satisfied than their male counterparts with the tsunami response in all phases, feeling that international agencies did less than they should have done to protect women, especially in camps. There were, however, some notable exceptions. Examples of good practice include the United Nations Development Fund for Women's (UNIFEM) work in Aceh fostering women's leadership, posting gender advisers in the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), and forming a working group, in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), to monitor Shari'a law and to develop a code on violence against women.

Governments have not always recognised or advanced the property rights of women. CBOs with a focus on women criticised inflexibility in relocation, housing and livelihood strategies. The following are some examples:

- Widows could not opt to rebuild their houses near relatives under the 'house for a house' policy, which provided for rebuilding on the prior location of the house or in a designated location.
- Women remained at a disadvantage in accessing livelihood and other recovery programmes.
- In the Maldives, women with small businesses often had no official registration and because they could not prove that they had lost their livelihoods, they did not qualify for assistance.
- Women on a cash-for-work project in the Maldives were initially told to stop work because they were said to be slower than men. (The INGO responsible intervened in this case, and women were employed on other activities.)
- Many of the livelihood projects offered to women, such as mat-weaving and snack-making, were criticised by female claim-holders as too small to provide a living.

International agencies recognised many of these problems but the pressure to spend was so great that much money went to easily dispensed items, such as fishing boats for men, without corrective action to support women's status. (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p33)



about 10 members of the Red Cross Movement (planning 24,000 units), KfW/GTZ and ADB, but also INGOs such as World Vision. Some of them are working where access is difficult, but organisational bottlenecks and lack of expertise are often the more serious reasons for delay (Dercon, 2006).

One of the most frequent themes raised by local people had to do with the 'promises' of NGOs. Many said that the NGOs make many promises that they do not keep. One man told the story of having been promised credit three separate times but, so far, 'the only thing I have gotten is a bucket!' One said, 'I am very sad about the lack of follow-through on promises.' Another said, 'We would prefer to eat poison than promises.' Others referred to a popular song that has the lyric 'Promises, promises, all we are left with is promises' as the way they see the work of NGOs (Anderson, 2006, p11).

[B]eginning early October, Oxfam staff held meetings with the community in Blang Oi, and promised 330 Type 36 houses. The community of Blang Oi had been promised housing on two previous occasions, by the Indonesian NGO Jenggala (recently renamed YPKI) who promised 100 houses, but built only 20 of such poor standard that nobody would live in them, and by World Vision who did not even reach the stage of laying the foundations... In total, 273 people registered, and the list was submitted to Oxfam for the MoU to be drafted – a process that would, according to Oxfam staff, take only 24 hours... The local organising committee was only slightly surprised when, mid-December, they received news that 'Oxfam, with its limited budget next year, will not be able to meet all of Blang Oi's housing needs. (Eye on Aceh, 2006)

However, it should be clear that affected populations understood almost any enquiry by NGOs to be an undertaking to do something about the issue raised. In particular it is becoming clear that community consultations, while extremely helpful, are not enough as a method of keeping communities informed. It is very easy for misunderstandings to occur when exchanges are purely verbal, especially when one party is an international working through a translator. Instances abound of communities feeling that they have been made promises that have not been fulfilled – whether or not the NGOs working with them consider that they have even made such promises (Wall, 2005).

The local media served an active part in highlighting problems in the supply of aid by both agencies and local government. For example, this is shown by an analysis of coverage in the *Ceylon Daily News* (Table 3.4).<sup>E39</sup>

### 3.4.3 Moving to recovery

One of the most remarkable achievements of the tsunami response has been the avoidance of the traditional funding gap between the relief phase and recovery. In the tsunami response, agencies had access to so much money that recovery projects started early. This is a major improvement over responses in many other disasters.<sup>72</sup> Despite this achievement, the perceived pressure to spend, competition for 'beneficiaries' and lack of expertise have resulted in shoddy results:

72 While the funding gap was avoided the problems of the relief-recovery transition were not.

**Table 3.4. Press coverage of the tsunami in Sri Lanka**

Topic	Number of instances
Inappropriate Aid	86
Corruption	57
Individual grievance	31
Accounts of psychological trauma	28
Reports of protests or violence	22
Gender issues	20
Waste of resources	18
Lack of consultation with communities	17
Mistakes due to ignorance	13
Military related issues	9

**Note** Tsunami response related reporting in the *Ceylon Daily News* in the first three months after the tsunami.

See sources p160.

**Source** TEC Capacities Sri Lanka Country Report, 2006.

- poor market research leading to inappropriate business models;<sup>73</sup>
- environmental damage to forestry, topsoil (Alexander, 2006) and fish stocks;
- poor access to credit;
- faulty or badly planned boat production;
- poor-quality reconstruction;
- inflation-inducing profligacy;
- poor anticipation of skills shortages and inadequate training, leading to outsiders meeting the demand for labour;<sup>74</sup>
- poor targeting, leading to waste and social tensions (such as non-fishermen receiving boats, sometimes more than one, while 'real' fishermen have been left empty-handed – TEC LRRD Report, 2006);
- fragmented programming resulting in houses without connection to water and sanitation, and schools where few or no children now exist, and fishing boats and nets where there is neither cold storage nor potential buyers.

73 Such as the telephone booth project for tsunami-affected families, just as phone-call prices in India plummeted (Alexander, 2006).

74 'These [construction programmes] turned [out] to be largely, external, contractor-driven operations. In the case of housing, workers were imported from within the district, within the state and some [from] as far away as Orissa and Gujarat. A leading Christian relief agency even justified this import[ation of labour] on the grounds that these workers besides possessing house-building experience in major disaster settings were given "an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity"!' (Alexander, 2006, p31).

An estimated 40 per cent of the small boats distributed in Aceh are expected to be unusable within 12 to 18 months (BRR and World Bank, 2005, p113). Poor quality boat construction has created dangers for fishermen and has led to many boats having already been abandoned in both countries. Poor quality assets have included 'fake' rice seeds (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). Similarly, the application of community-focused methods where no community exists (but, rather, collectives of disparate individuals and families lacking common interests, backgrounds and community cohesion) were ill-advised.

Complex livelihoods require complex solutions. Recovery and development are inescapably political processes. Meaningful commitments to and linkages with national, provincial and local development initiatives have been weak. Despite the scale of resources at their disposal NGOs have still concentrated on micro rather than macro interventions. Major employment investments have rarely been made by NGOs despite having large funds available. For example, in Sri Lanka there are many complaints that no assistance has been available for the larger, 'multi-day' boats that exploit different fish resources and provide employment and tax revenues (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). The replacement or upgrading of infrastructure such as roads and services has rarely been considered.

While 'build back better' became a slogan, many actors lacked the capacity to address complex poverty-related issues such as vulnerability reduction, asset creation rather than merely asset replacement, infrastructural development (even

### Box 3.9. Relief and recovery

Recovery poses a particular problem for relief agencies. Relief is intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of human-made crises and natural disasters. Recovery is post-disaster development, typically with a goal of restoring a population to at least its pre-disaster situation. Development is very contested, with little agreement on what it is, or how to achieve it. Developmental approaches clearly differ from relief ones. The tsunami response cannot be a magic bullet for recovery from decades of conflict and under-development. Humanitarian and recovery approaches, principles and standards differ, and so they probably should. One result of this, though, is that the responses by humanitarian actors have not always facilitated recovery.

Humanitarian actors take, by definition, short- or medium-term approaches. Recovery is a longer term endeavour. For example, it was mid-April before the recovery Master Plan or Blueprint was approved for Aceh.<sup>E40</sup> While some agencies (such as the IFRC) have committed themselves to multi-year plans, not all did so. Despite recommendations, the DEC board has, for instance, decided against increasing the DEC funding period from three to five years.<sup>E41</sup> The need for time is as linked to gradual development processes as it is to political and administrative realities. The saga of the 'buffer-zones', and the related patience-sapping imposition, errors and confusion, are a case in point.

on a small, local scale), seizing the opportunity for peace-building, gender-sensitive policy change (including land titling and inheritance) and avoiding reinforcing local elites. Many agencies simply did not have a sufficient understanding of the dynamics of local poverty, or the skills to address it. Relief standards, such as Sphere<sup>E42</sup> and the Red Cross Code of Conduct, were never intended for complex economic, social and political recovery processes. The general, or 'common' Sphere standards<sup>E43</sup> are perhaps more relevant to recovery than the sector-specific standards. Ironically, while the latter were often met by the more professional agencies the former were often not met.

Participation in and support to national and local recovery implies an understanding of and subtle involvement in local and national debates and processes. Inevitably this involves political decisions. Humanitarian actors, working to humanitarian principles,<sup>75</sup> generally eschew this type of low-level political engagement. International agencies and donors have shown a poor understanding of the complexity of recovery and development, including the inter-relationships among economics, politics, social structures and culture. As the TEC LRRD Report (2006) termed it, their 'arrogance and ignorance'<sup>76</sup> have resulted in false starts, waste and inappropriate aid.

Context insensitive, quick-fix, one-size-fits-all emergency approaches, based on principles of independence and impartiality, have complicated recovery as much as they have facilitated it (TEC LRRD Report, 2006). Recovery requires integrated planning with long timeframes. Linkages among international agencies have also been weak. While the tsunami response saw increasing cooperation between members of some brand networks,<sup>77</sup> there are relatively few examples of broader consortia, trust funds or joint implementation, despite the proliferation of agencies.

### 3.4.4 Inequities and accountability

Overall, with such generous funding available, most affected people seem to have received some assistance. Many received more than they ever expected and have been able to sell the surplus (TEC Donor Response/Local Response/Indonesia Report, 2006). However, this does not necessarily mean that assistance has been impartial or equitable. Inequalities in aid were evident: globally between emergencies (eg, Darfur and Congo versus the tsunami); regionally among tsunami-affected countries (eg, the Maldives versus Indonesia and Sri Lanka); nationally (one zone to another, including between conflict and non-conflict areas); sectorally (between fishing and other sectors); geographically (between more accessible areas and the less accessible); and socially (between the poorest and better off, owners and renters, and ordinary people and leaders).

75 Such as the Red Cross Code of Conduct, which includes principles of independence and impartiality.

76 In India, another report found that: 'Most NGOs and donors are aware of the tourism options [for recovery] but do not know how to go about it and have not linked this with their housing programs' (Alexander, 2006, p18).

77 Such as Oxfam International or the Caritas network.

For example, in India fishing communities tended to be more organised and therefore more successful at accessing aid. On the other hand a focus on asset replacement has meant that poor labourers or those who dealt in fish, who had no assets to replace, were left out. TEC studies found that in general the needs of vulnerable groups (women, the elderly and children) tended to be overlooked or were not met at the pace or scale expected (TEC Funding Response/Local Response/Overview, 2006). More generally the need to push out money led to the duplication of goods and services for some, and the abandonment of others. Disparate shelter solutions were offered by different NGOs in the same community.

In terms of the rich often receiving more assistance than the poor, this was evident in government compensation programmes; in aid to property owners versus renters; to and through community leaders versus ordinary people; and where fishers (and non-fishers) received boats while employees, casual labourers, other self-employed and 'fishwives' were provided with few or no assets or even credit to compensate for their losses. Important inequities were also evident, and persist, between war-affected IDPs in both Sri Lanka and Aceh and people affected by the tsunami. In Sri Lanka at least, these differences have been seen as fuelling the sense of grievance of war-affected populations (Center for Peace Building International, 2006, p6).

Accountability and complaints mechanisms were initially established in only a few locations. In the Maldives, OCHA supported IDP information and complaints committees. In Sri Lanka, Medair set up a complaints handling mechanism for their large shelter project. In Indonesia, Transparency International and a local anti-corruption movement have been in place for some months, while in Sri Lanka, Aid Watch and two citizens' commissions had just begun at the time of the evaluation. In Thailand the mass media have been used to highlight issues of accountability and corruption (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).

Despite these mechanisms, accountability and complaints mechanisms overall were not commensurate with the scale of the funding. They were largely ineffective in addressing the worst cases of inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence among internationally, nationally and locally managed recovery programmes. However, there is evidence that accountability has improved with time and agencies are now paying more attention to the views of affected populations.

### **3.4.5 Accountability and support to affected people**

As shown throughout this section, local and national capacities to save lives, alleviate suffering, maintain human dignity and move toward recovery have been impressive. India and Thailand decided to manage without massive international aid.<sup>78</sup> Despite their requests for international assistance, other affected states were neither 'failed' nor among the world's most impoverished. This conclusion stands, even considering the weaknesses, gaps, abuses, violation of rights and

78 Some aid was provided, however, through international organisations already active in those countries (eg through UN agencies, the RC Movement and large NGOs involved in development programmes).

perceived corruption of national and local authorities and representatives (especially in conflict zones), as recorded in interviews with disaster-affected people (Anderson, 2006).

International agencies made positive contributions at a local level in a number of ways. The raising of awareness about, and provision of expert guidance on, the rights and entitlements of IDPs is an example (TEC Capacities Maldives Country Report, 2006). Working in partnership is another. International actors were more effective and efficient when they built on sustained prior partnerships with local actors. In Aceh, Oxfam's NGO support network is a noteworthy example (TEC Capacities Report, 2006).

In the Maldives, the Care Society, in association with an international agency, formed a partnership with 25 island community-based organisations (CBOs) to implement a joint tsunami response programme. This added to the momentum that led to the nation's first Civil Society Conference and concluded with the drafting of a Civil Society Charter for the first time in the country's history. Again, though few gender-sensitive approaches were observed in the housing and livelihood recovery programmes, both international agencies and local NGOs with a specific women's mandate have developed interesting pilot initiatives. These can serve as models for improved women's involvement in the reconstruction phase (TEC Capacities Indonesia Country Report, 2006).

Notwithstanding such practices, the elaborate LRRD policies developed by many agencies were rarely applied. The 'LRRD gap' has been more between international agencies and local people and institutions than among international agencies of differing cultures, policies and mandates. With, or despite, outside assistance, people have proceeded with their own recovery. Linkages between relief and development are better found in people's own recovery activities, in sectors most relevant to them, than in over-arching aid-agency plans and policies. Shelter and livelihoods recovery were the sectors of greatest relevance to most people.

### Box 3.10. Local capacities and humanitarian standards

Most established aid agencies subscribe to standards and codes that enshrine respect for, involvement of, and investment in, local capacities.

We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities... All people and communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and ICRC, 1994 [Red Cross Code of Conduct, principle 6])

Disaster-affected populations must not be seen as helpless victims, and this includes members of vulnerable groups. They possess, and acquire skills and capacities and have structures to cope with and respond to a disaster situation that need to be recognized and supported. (Sphere Project, 2004, p9)

Despite the principles quoted in Box 3.10, local and national capacities have been undervalued, poorly supported and often ignored by international agencies (TEC Capacities Report, 2006). While international aid has benefited victims of the tsunami (which they recognise) it has also been demanding of local people. The impact of the 'aid tsunami' on affected communities has, on balance, not been overwhelmingly positive. For example:

- Considerable time was given (generally uncomplainingly) by affected people for assessments that frequently did not result in their preferences being turned into action.
- Authorities received endless demands for demographic data, maps, water and sanitation plans, etc, again without any counterpart commitment to benefit the respective peoples or administrations.
- Meetings, interviews and 'events' and special arrangements for visiting delegations, VIPs, senior managers, politicians, special representatives, the media, monitors, auditors and evaluators absorbed time, space, transport, fuel and even food.<sup>79</sup>
- Although some international agencies (notably in the Maldives) were successful in seconding international staff to support public sector institutions (TEC Capacities Report, 2006), high salaries in international agencies resulted in a brain-drain of national and local talent.
- Funds passed through international agencies to national and local actors without any tangible value being added. A cascade of sub-contracts may have existed for a single donation, incurring repeated administrative costs. While the 'ownership' of the funds remains with the international agency, knowledge and skills are provided by nationals and locals.
- The constant turnover of international staff created difficulties for local officials and communities in terms of maintaining relationships and getting earlier promises implemented.

Agency preferences, interests and brands dominated their interventions. Few if any agencies attempted to discover (or map) national or local response capacities – this despite, in many cases, pre-tsunami presence in the respective countries. Agency reports rarely noted local and national achievements and local support to international efforts. Local contributions and remittances remained largely invisible to the international system.<sup>E44</sup>

English was assumed to be the standard language of coordination and reporting, thus marginalising and disenfranchising national and local officials, media representatives and ordinary people.<sup>80</sup> Authorities and the public alike were involved more as adjuncts to international decision making than as protagonists

79 These visits sometimes interrupted the aid effort, as was the case when Jeb Bush and Colin Powell's visit to Banda Aceh closed the airport to incoming relief flights for 4 hours in early January (Aglionby, 2005b).

80 However, having a single language for coordination and reporting does bring benefits for the international organisations.

(through, for instance, no more than cursory consultations). Local recruitment was also often based more on English-language skills than on technical skills or other specific knowledge.

The issues of accountability and quality are closely linked. A lack of accountability creates a situation in which poor quality projects can persist. There have been quite a few instances of civil society organisations being discredited on counts of poor quality of intervention, lack of transparency in financial dealings and not being accountable to the community. The tensions and competition observed among civil society organisations has also affected the quality, delivery and efficacy of aid. Given that there is widespread awareness and information about standards in humanitarian aid (for instance, the Sphere standards), it is unfortunate that issues related to quality, participation and accountability still continue to plague disaster response interventions (Srinivasan et al, 2005).

Reliable and timely information on programme criteria and content, planned activities, beneficiary rights and entitlements, budgets, expenditure, staffing, office location and accessibility and the expected duration of an agency's presence was rarely shared, despite having great potential impact on people's lives. National authorities, such as the Indonesian BRR, recognise that they do not demand such detailed reporting nor exercise tight monitoring of international agencies,<sup>81</sup> although there is recent evidence that this may be changing (Reuters, 2006).

National and local leadership and quality control of international efforts were rarely fostered by the agencies. Despite this, national and local ownership and leadership is recovering. Varied government structures have been created to manage the response and, to a lesser degree, prepare for future disasters. National and local leadership is reasserting itself, evident in demands for fulfilment of agency commitments and for better reporting and accountability.

But still transparency and accountability to both funding publics and affected people play second fiddle to agency brand promotion. One year on, a range of media, governmental, parliamentary and agency reports were released. Some were critical. Most, if not all, agency reports were self-laudatory or insubstantial, however. At best, only minor failures, or those that can be easily explained away, were noted. Some reports were not even officially released<sup>82</sup> to the publics by whom they were funded and in whose name funds were solicited. A voice from the region sums up a reader's frustration:

It is now fashionable for NGOs and donor agencies to claim or project that they are totally transparent, accountable and very much a 'learning organization', carrying out numerous 'learning' reviews and moderating workshops...

81 *Jakarta Times*, 26 December 2006 (Thang D Nguyen's column).

82 The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK, for example, has never released the full version of its tsunami evaluation report. The IFRC has published only the Synthesis Studies for their Real Time Evaluations but not the constituent country reports.



designed to discover what worked and what did not and why? Yet [among] One-Year-After reports, only a handful are... prepared to actually... publicly admit... at least some... minimal... failings[.] What bombards us instead are 'sanitized' reports containing usually a lot of hype, (empty) rhetoric combined with (often misleading and meaningless?) statistics of aid delivery. Such deliberate policies of concealment create an overall (mistaken?) impression that their programs are unmitigated successes, free of controversies. (Alexander, 2006, p7)

While there have been some positive developments on accountability, such as Oxfam publicly acknowledging a minor problem with fraud in one programme (Oxfam, 2006), overall accountability was weak. Despite the problems with aid identified in this report, no sanctions were applied, and few agencies had Oxfam's courage to deal openly with fraud or errors.

## 3.5 Disaster risk reduction

The 'build back better' motto has been used frequently, but applied with varying results. While standards and laws have been set regarding the location and quality of reconstruction, disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been generally poor. Early warning initiatives have been mostly focused on high technology approaches (such as ocean gauges, transmitters and communications systems). Comparatively little has been achieved regarding more painstaking community-based reduction of disaster risk – such as supporting communities to identify local risks and developing collective mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities and warn against and respond to disasters.

International preparedness is similarly limited. National and local partnerships for disaster preparedness are only rarely set up prior to disasters. Guidance materials, training and tools emphasise managerial, material and technical preparedness instead of preparedness to support response, map local capacities and develop strategic alliances during disasters.

DRR has been set as a global priority, in accordance with the Hyogo principles for action (see Box 3.11 below). In the tsunami response, an opportunity to build back less vulnerable societies has so far been missed. This is despite international policies and commitments to sustainable risk reduction.

**Box 3.11. Hyogo principles for action**

The Hyogo Framework for Action<sup>83</sup> is a negotiated outcome of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in 2005 in Kobe, Japan. The Framework was adopted by 168 governments as a blueprint for DRR targeting the following five priorities for action:

- 1** Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
- 2** Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.
- 3** Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
- 4** Reduce the underlying risk factors.
- 5** Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

## 3.6 Funding flows

### 3.6.1 Funding scale and speed

The financial response to the tsunami was the largest international response to a natural disaster on record. At least US\$13.5bn has been pledged or donated for emergency relief and reconstruction: 44 per cent from governments and 44 per cent from private sources, with the remainder from IFIs (these figures are based on the countries studied in the TEC Funding Response study). The general public provided the vast majority of the US\$5.5bn in private donations. In Japan, corporations accounted for twice as much as private individuals.

The total figure of US\$13.5bn excludes: private donations in countries not covered by the TEC funding studies; private remittances and projects; private donations in the affected countries; cash and in-kind donations from within affected communities; and spending pledges by the governments of the affected countries. Although there is a risk of some double counting, the total amount pledged and donated from all sources is likely to have been well in excess of US\$13.5bn.

At US\$8bn, however, the official response was not the largest ever.<sup>84</sup> DAC donors pledged \$5.3bn (Table 3.5). As at 30 September 2005, US\$3.7bn (69 per cent) of the pledged amount had been translated into firm commitments.<sup>E45</sup>

83 See [www.unisdr.org](http://www.unisdr.org).

84 This is less than the US\$9bn pledged to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the US\$8.2bn pledged to Afghanistan for 2004–2007 and the US\$9.4bn committed to Iraq in 2004. Iraq received nearly US\$15bn of ODA as debt relief in 2005. DAC donor disbursements to the tsunami in 2005 were just less than half of disbursements to Iraq in the same year. The UN appeal for the tsunami was the third largest on record. The UN appeals for Sudan (2005) and Iraq (2003) were both larger.

An unprecedented number of countries contributed to the response: 99 governments (77 non-DAC) and two intergovernmental organisations. Many governments had never made a recorded contribution to a disaster before. An unprecedented number of RC national societies also raised funds: 100 from a total of 183 member societies worldwide.<sup>85</sup> The response was similar among INGOs. Probably the largest ever number of implementing agencies in an emergency were involved in the tsunami response. At least 202 NGOs received private donations. As described elsewhere in this report, some lacked previous experience.

The response was not only large but also fast. In the UK the world record for online donations was broken, with over £10mn (some \$17.2mn) donated to the DEC website in 24 hours. While this speed of donation was partly down to increased use of the internet for collecting donations, phone-in donations also broke records. While government pledges were initially modest, the huge public and media reaction encouraged a rapid and generous official response.

### 3.6.2 General public financial response

The private response was unprecedented. The minimum of US\$5.5bn given by the general public to NGOs and UN agencies exceeded the total pledged by all DAC donors.<sup>86</sup> On average, the general public donated 77 per cent of NGO income,

**Table 3.5. Funding for the tsunami response**


Source of funding	Amount	Totals
<b>International Flows</b>	US\$m	US\$m
Pledged by OECD/DAC Governments	5,324	
Pledged by non DAC Governments	593	
Pledged by Governments		5,917
Private donations to NGOs	3,214	
Private donations to the UN (mostly Unicef)	494	
Private donations to the Red Cross	1,783	
Total private donations (for countries covered by TEC studies)		5,491
Pledged by Multilateral development banks		2,095
Total of International Flows		<b>13,503</b>
<b>National Flows</b>		
Affected country governments (at least)	3,400	
Private donations in affected countries (at least)	190	
Private donations from countries outside TEC studies (at most)	1,953	
Contribution by affected populations	not measured	
Additional remittance flows	not measured	

See sources p160.

<sup>85</sup> Funding timeliness was a record for the RC Movement: 19 per cent of the IFRC appeal was received in the last week of December 2004, and 58 per cent by the end of January 2005.

<sup>86</sup> Unverified contributions may amount to another US\$2bn.

**Figure 3.6. DAC Donor commitments and disbursements against pledges**



Source OECD/DAC statement of 12 December 2005. Data to 30 September 2005. See sources p156.

compared with 13 per cent from corporations. Private individuals were also the largest source of funds (78 per cent) for the RC Movement (US\$1.7bn from the general public; US\$82mn from corporations).

Private donations were concentrated on a relatively small number of agencies. While 202 NGOs received at least US\$3.2bn from private sources – with 45 receiving more than US\$10 million each – 50 per cent of the private donations (US\$1.7bn) went to just 10 NGOs. Another 20 per cent was shared by the Red Cross Movement and UNICEF. Importantly, NGOs and the RC Movement were the primary beneficiaries of private funding, getting 91 per cent of all such funding.

The large amounts of private funds had at least two consequences. First, the money had to be spent, and relatively fast (most was collected in what were termed emergency or disaster appeals or campaigns). Second, the generous funding liberated receiving organisations from any dependence on the purse strings of official donors. The combination of these two factors enhanced the independent action of NGOs and the RC Movement. Arguably, this in turn reduced their need to coordinate with multilateral and bilateral actors. In 2003, 15 per cent of humanitarian funding came from private sources. In 2005 this increased to 40 per cent. The massive increase in private funding associated with the tsunami has made non-government agencies, including the RC Movement, much more important and numerous actors in the response.

### 3.6.3 Official funding


Although official funding was overtaken by private giving, it was still a very important part of the response. It was the main source of funds for UN agencies, and UN relief agencies attracted the bulk of this funding. Some institutional donors earmarked funds by sector. An analysis of the sectoral earmarking for seven donors (Figure 3.10) shows a concentration on traditional humanitarian sectors such as food and non-food, and health. In many emergencies, food makes up 50 per cent of the total assistance; by contrast, in the case of the tsunami, food accounted for only a few per cent of the total.

### 3.6.4 Funding balance


The allocation of funds was unbalanced and not according to need. International pledges and donations exceeded the estimated total economic impact of the tsunami (US\$9.3bn).<sup>87</sup> This is especially so if local responses are included.<sup>88</sup> Contrary to GHD principles, donor pledging was largely

87 'Socio Economic Impacts of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004', ADPC.

88 The Funding Response/Local Response Overview includes figures of US\$2.5bn for India and US\$1.7bn for Thailand. Some of this will be international funding (ie, double counted).



See sources p156.




See sources p157.

**Box 3.12. Why was the public so generous?**


Why was the public so generous in the tsunami response? Two of the TEC studies looked at funding from the public in Spain and Germany, and these identified some reasons for the support. In Spain those donating for the tsunami response gave their reasons, in order of decreasing importance, as: always donate after such an event (64.2 per cent); the media coverage (28.7 per cent); Christmas spirit (17.3 per cent); presence of tourists (8.7 per cent); familiarity with the affected area (2.4 per cent) (TEC Funding Response/General Public/Spain Report, 2006).

In Germany the reasons given for the level of donations included: the scale of the disaster; that people were emotionally affected by the disaster; it was not human-made, and the victims were innocent; people could really help rather than just waiting; donors had been to some of the affected countries as tourists; the media spotlight and the ease of giving; political leaders and celebrities supported fundraising campaigns; quick response from the aid organisations; peer pressure – everyone was giving, including friends, families, and colleagues – making it almost impossible not to donate (TEC Funding Response/General Public/Germany Report, 2006).



Source TEC Funding Response/Government Funding Synthesis Report, 2006. See sources p157.

Note Other organisations include UNHCR, FAO, IOM, UNDSS, UNEP, UNFPA, ILO, ISDR, UNESCO, UNIFEM, Habitat, as well as the non-UN IOM and IDLO.



See sources p157.

driven by concerns for public visibility and other political factors. Bilateral or regional interest, proximity and previous presence were defining factors. Identified needs were not a priority.


One way in which politics intruded on pledging can be seen from how the generous public response put pressure on official donors to follow suit. In Canada, a pledge to match public donations made by 11 January 2005 cost the Canadian Taxpayer over US\$171mn (TEC Funding Response/Government

Funding/Canada Report, 2006). This was more than had been budgeted for, and led to the Canadian government using tsunami recovery funds to fill the gap. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony Blair said on 5 January 2005 that the British government would: 'far and away more than match the generosity of the British people' (BBC, 2005b). In the event, the UK government sensibly abandoned this implicit promise and gave, in direct aid, less than one quarter of what the public gave (Beeston, 2005).

Though recovery needs were significantly greater than emergency needs,<sup>89</sup> institutional donor funding was distributed in roughly equal measure between the two. About half the tsunami pledges made in January 2005 were for emergency assistance, a quarter for recovery in 2005 and a quarter for recovery in 2006–2010. This balance may reflect bureaucratic constraints within some donor administrations on the labelling of funding as relief or recovery. Individual institutional donors varied widely in the proportions of their funding for relief and for recovery (Figure 3.11).

Funding was not provided according to agency quality and capacity to implement. Most government donors tied the bulk of their NGO support to domestic NGOs for domestic reasons, regardless of whether these were the best placed channels for this or not. Additionally, some official donors responded to the lack of spending opportunities through NGOs by increasing their funding of UN agencies, despite criticism of the slow reaction and poor performance of some of these agencies. Of all government funding, 34 per cent went to UN agencies.

The funding for the tsunami far exceeded that for many past or current humanitarian crises, irrespective of assessed needs in the affected countries. Only one donor – the Netherlands – reallocated unspent humanitarian aid pledged for the tsunami to crises in Africa. Volumes of aid per affected person in the tsunami response are of a completely different order of magnitude from those of previous disasters (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006).



Source TEC Funding Response/Government Funding Synthesis Report, 2006. See sources p157.

89 Comparing damage-and-loss assessments with humanitarian assessments.

One NGO – Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – acknowledged on 3 January that it had received sufficient funds for its tsunami operations, and later reduced its budget. (The flow of money did not stop, however, and MSF has since sought permission from its donors to divert almost 60 per cent of the funds it collected to the victims of other emergencies, illustrating the need for more flexible fundraising practices<sup>E46</sup>). In this example of good practice, MSF ran its Niger programme from reallocated tsunami donations.

Unlike the vast majority of international agencies, only two other NGOs signalled early on that they had raised enough funding relative to their capacity to spend it effectively and efficiently – Concern Worldwide in mid-January and CARE International at the end of January 2005. Both agencies engage in relief and development. Agencies that declared publicly that they needed no more money were criticised by other agencies for jeopardising the general flow of funds.

Comparisons on aid volumes per affected person need to be treated with care, as 'affected person' is not a consistent standard. In the tsunami disaster, for instance, roughly 2 million people have been killed, injured or made homeless. But according to the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), at the time of the tsunami about 10.4 million people lived within one kilometre of the affected coastal area and 18.9 million lived within two kilometres. For areas known to have major impacts where the relief effort was concentrated, the population estimates are 1.9 million and 3.7 million respectively. Assessments of affected people in other disasters are similarly varied, so comparisons are only indicative.

If all the tsunami commitments<sup>90</sup> were shared out equally among the 1.9 million people directly affected, each person would receive roughly US\$7,100. Funding for people affected by other disasters has been much lower – in some cases as little as US\$3 per capita (Table 3.6). While there is no evidence from the TEC funding studies that funding of other emergencies has declined as a result of the tsunami response,<sup>E47</sup> the tsunami response has reduced the human resources available for other emergencies.

### 3.6.5 Country allocation and proportionality

By contrast funding has, broadly speaking, been allocated to countries in proportion to their needs. Funding has gone almost exclusively to the four worst affected countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives. Indonesia has received 37 per cent of all commitments (including the regional/unspecified) but 50 per cent of the commitments that were allocable by country. It suffered 48 per cent of the economic impact, and 55 per cent of the human impact (number of people affected). Comparing the impact percentages to total commitments suggests that Indonesia has been under-aided and Sri Lanka over-aided.<sup>91</sup>

90 These are only indicative figures, however. Much of the tsunami money is for long-term national reconstruction.

91 Country allocations by the UN and RC/RC Movement are broadly similar to the DAC commitments. Between a third and a half of funds have been allocated to Indonesia, and approximately a quarter to a third to Sri Lanka.




Crisis	per capita US\$
Tsunami 1.9mn directly affected	7,100
Tsunami: 3.7mn living in affected areas	3,650
Somalia (Drought 2005) 0.7 to 1.1mn affected	114–117
Eritrea (2005) 2.2mn affected	50
Bangladesh floods (36mn affected, 1.2mn homes damaged or destroyed)	3

See sources p160.

### 3.6.6 Appeals

Most of the initial appeals were relatively fully funded. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IFRC appeals were both within a few per cent of full funding. The UN Flash Appeal was 86 per cent funded. Some UN agencies (such as UNICEF) received more than they requested in the Appeal, and 82 per cent (\$4.7bn) of the funding for the tsunami recorded by the Financial Tracking System (FTS) in October 2005 was given outside the Appeal<sup>92</sup> (that is, for activities and agencies that were not part of the Appeal).

The UN Appeal was not an accurate statement of all priority humanitarian needs identified by all relevant UN agencies and major NGOs. Pressure for a speedy appeal encouraged UN agencies to maximise their requirement well before reconstruction needs or levels of non-Appeal funding were known. The original UN Appeal amount of US\$1.28bn was a largely arbitrary calculation.<sup>93</sup> The UN Appeal did its job in the narrow sense of providing funds for the main UN agencies. It was a less useful tool for the 37 other agencies participating, which received only 41 per cent of the total. And it was not useful, in the opinion of most donors, in defining priorities or framing the response. (Although not covered by the funding studies, it is likely that IFI funding decisions were more soundly based on needs assessments.)



Source TEC Funding Response Report, 2006.

See sources p158.

<sup>92</sup> This compares with 14 per cent outside the Appeal for Sudan 2005 and 41 per cent outside the Appeal for Iraq in 2003.

<sup>93</sup> For example, sufficiently accurate and comprehensive assessments had not been available at that stage.

It is worth noting, however, that funding via official channels was subject to a number of significant blockages in Indonesia in 2005. These included delays in releasing budget funds – for example, BRR got its budget for 2005 only in July, while provincial and district-level governments got their funds only in May. The bulk of the budget allotment for tsunami reconstruction (US\$700mn) was approved only in June (World Bank, 2005b).

### 3.6.7 Flexibility and earmarking

Over half of the funds for the UN Appeal were given as un-earmarked money (that is, not allocated to a specific sector or agency). For the IFRC, a comparatively small proportion of funds (less than 40 per cent) were earmarked. Donations from the general public to NGOs are un-earmarked and reporting less rigorous than for funding from institutional donors. This general lack of earmarking meant that agencies could be far more flexible in the use of funds than is normally the case.

Some aid was, however, still tied. This probably slowed commitment and disbursement for donor countries with the highest proportion of tied aid (including tied goods and services, not all of which were appropriate or of good quality). Also, tied aid limited the ability of national coordinators to re-direct flows to under-funded activities.

### 3.6.8 Financial tracking and reporting

For the first time the DAC surveyed donor pledges, commitments and disbursements, and figures were reported rapidly. This was a very positive innovation, being the first time that pledges have been monitored. Government donors have been generally transparent in the reporting of commitments.<sup>94</sup> The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have also, for example, been explicit about how much funding has been a reallocation from previous loans.<sup>95</sup>

Trying to sort the wheat from the chaff is always a problem. The TEC Funding Response Report identified apparent pledges by DAC donors totalling US\$5,888mn; however, the official DAC figure is only US\$5,324mn. Donors are not always transparent about their funding. The British government in late 2005 said that it had contributed £275mn to the tsunami response. However, an analysis of the detailed figures paints a less generous picture (Beeston, 2005).

A major weakness of the funding system is the difficulty of tracing a contribution through to the actual beneficiary. Tracking stops at the disbursement to an implementing agency or a second-level donor. Very little is known about what

94 Reporting is not clear enough, however, to say whether tsunami funding represents additional commitments related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, on this occasion the DAC has monitored both pledges and commitments and there is every indication that the tsunami funding is largely additional.

95 A fifth of IFI-reported finance from their own funds (that is excluding funds that they administer such as the trust funds) has come from transfers from other activities within tsunami-affected countries (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006).

funds are received by a government, community or individual. Whether a pledge has been delivered, and what proportion of the original commitment has resulted in the delivery of a benefit, is thus hard or even impossible to say.

Nor are the costs of each transaction clear. Only OCHA recorded on the Financial Tracking System (FTS) the 3 per cent overhead it was required to charge. A variety of definitions and charges are made by different agencies. The OCHA FTS relies on voluntary reporting by governments, agencies and NGOs. Coverage is neither complete nor consistent.<sup>96</sup> For example, only 15 of the UK NGOs studied<sup>97</sup> (5 per cent) participated in the FTS. Thus the FTS objective of improving decisions on resource allocation by indicating to what extent populations in crisis receive humanitarian aid, and in what proportion to need, could not possibly be achieved.

Financial reporting standards among UN agencies, the RC Movement and international NGOs leave the humanitarian system open to criticism. For example, by September 2005, only 20 per cent of NGOs acting in response to the tsunami reviewed in the TEC Funding Response/Government Funding/Germany Report (2006) had reported in detail on their donations and the tsunami-related activities.

### 3.6.9 Global aid flows

Globally, humanitarian aid has expanded as a percentage of official development assistance (ODA) over the last 15 years. After falling in the early 1990s, ODA began to rise in the late 1990s, and saw the steepest ever rise in 2005 (mostly due to the Gleneagles agreement on debt relief).<sup>48</sup> Humanitarian aid has been increasing, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of overall ODA, but often falls back after major emergencies.

The impact on development aid of the increased percentage in humanitarian aid is not clear. All international aid flows globally are, however, chronically low.<sup>98</sup> In addition, much aid is in fact loans; essentially mortgages on future development.<sup>99</sup>

**Table 3.7. UK official funding for the tsunami**

Type of funding	£m	of total	\$m
Direct tsunami funding	75	27%	132
Estimate of tax relief on private donations	50	18%	88
Long term development projects in region	65	24%	114
UK's share of EU spending	40	15%	70
Debt relief for Sri Lanka over the next decade	45	16%	79
	<b>275</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>483</b>

**Note** Conversion rate of 1.75529 US\$/GB£ for 12 December 2005.

See sources p160.

96 UN report, p3.


97 Of those covered by the UK NGO study.

98 See Cosgrave, 2006.

99 Preferential access to loans and preferential conditions and costs can be regarded as aid; however, the grant component is often calculated using a discount rate of 10 per cent – a high rate that artificially inflates the grant element of loans.

Aid is pitifully small compared to both needs and other investments and consumption including, for example, agricultural subsidies, ice-cream, cosmetics, pet food and, of course, the arms industry. For the first time, in 2005, annual international spending on relief was more than 1 per cent of global military spending for the same year. The three-fold increase in ODA shown in figure 3.13 should be compared with the 13-fold increase in the global economy over the same period.

**Figure 3.13. Net relief disbursements as a percentage of all net ODA disbursement**



Source OECD/DAC DAC Online Table 1, consulted 4 June 2006 (2005 data is provisional).

See sources p158.



## 4 Chapter four

# Conclusions

## 4.1 Ownership and accountability

91

### 4.1.1 Role and achievements of local people

Despite popular misconceptions,<sup>100</sup> disaster-affected people are far from helpless: 'communities effectively coped on their own in the first days after the disaster' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p68). Practically all life-saving actions and initial emergency support were provided by local people, often assisted by the wider national public. They showed strength and resilience in getting on with their own recovery efforts. They have also, albeit slowly, demonstrated a growing sense of ownership of aid efforts.<sup>101</sup> The crucial role of host families is an example. Moreover, despite weaknesses noted below, 'In general, the relief and recovery effort benefited from ... well-developed (though not always well-functioning) national institutions and legal frameworks' (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p39).

'Ownership' is defined as the right of possession of, or power or control over, whatever is 'owned'.<sup>102</sup> In industrialised countries, affected states and communities control responses to natural disasters. Supporting national and local 'ownership' is a core principle of international development which

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100 See 'Myths and Realities in Disaster Situations' <http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/myths/en/>.

101 Examples from Aceh include angry local people's 'rejection of promised aid' by a large INGO due to perceived poor performance, and increasingly firm requirements from authorities for detailed reporting by international organisations on their programmes.

102 Definitions from the Webster and Encarta dictionaries.

is also embedded in both the Sphere Minimum Standards and the Red Cross Code of Conduct: 'We recognise that it is first through their own efforts that the basic needs of people affected by calamity or armed conflict are met, and we acknowledge the primary role and responsibility of the state to provide assistance when people's capacity to cope has been exceeded' (Sphere Project, 2004, p18): 'Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme' (Red Cross Code of Conduct Principle 6 [Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and ICRC, 1994]).

#### **4.1.2 Good practices despite constraints**

The TEC studies identified a number of constraints faced by international agencies, many related to national and local capacities. For instance, the 'Maldives had very little capacity in disaster preparedness and mitigation' (TEC Coordination Report/Maldives Case Study, 2006, p24). Other constraints include: ill-advised, confusing or bureaucratic official policies and procedures; politicised and centralised decision making, regarding, for instance, beneficiary targeting; and concerns about corruption and distrust of local leaders. Political and armed conflicts, as in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, raise dilemmas around independence of humanitarian action.

Other constraints are rooted within international agencies themselves, and include the quantity and quality of international personnel, inappropriate methods and tools, and weak or lack of willingness to engage in coordination. The lack of significant, predictable, non-earmarked, multi-year funding for developing appropriate international response capacities is a major drawback.

Despite these impediments, international agencies have illustrated that local and national ownership of aid programmes can be supported through patient, discerning, context-sensitive approaches. These include: the use of cash grants; participatory, complaints and polling<sup>103</sup> mechanisms; joint activities; respect for national reconstruction standards; capacity building; staff secondments; training of national staff members; and detailed reporting to authorities.

#### **4.1.3 Information and accountability**

Information is power. It helps affected people to design their own coping and recovery strategies and to make informed decisions and choices. Access to usable, easily accessible information is a major step for people and communities to define and demand accountability, based on their own standards, regarding entitlements, involvement and delivery. It also enables them to organise in the face of unfulfilled promises, poor performance, negligence, abuse or corruption. Finally, it counters selective reporting ('spin') and competitive public relations which are ever more prevalent among international response actors.

103 As conducted by UNICEF, for instance, regarding children's opinions of the tsunami response (TNS and UNICEF, 2005).

TEC studies found that international organisations have frequently failed in the modest objective of adequately informing affected people. The TEC LRRD Report (2006) notes: 'A tragic combination of arrogance and ignorance has characterised how much of the aid community... misled people[.]' (p83); 'Poor information flow is undoubtedly the biggest source of dissatisfaction, anger and frustration among affected people.' (p73); '[S]ome... interventions... may actually undermine future development[.] A lack of information to affected populations about reconstruction plans greatly limits their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects' (p10). 'At the time the evaluation was conducted, the public accountability of the international efforts toward intended beneficiaries appeared virtually non-existent. An indicator of this is the difficulty the evaluation team encountered in obtaining project documents, budgets and progress reports' (p69).

#### **4.1.4 Overall: a missed opportunity**

There is no doubting the complexity of the tasks, contexts and constraints facing locals, nationals and internationals alike. Exceptional international funding, however, provided the opportunity for an exceptional international response, including respect for the principle of local and national ownership. As noted above, some international agencies managed well; but many did not. Institutional imperatives of international humanitarian agencies, such as the urgency to spend money visibly, worked against making the best use of local and national capacities. Local contexts, institutions and contributions were frequently neglected. Affected people's will and capacity to move from reliance on handouts to rebuilding their lives were inadequately exploited in the relief and early recovery phases of the international response. They were marginalised, even undermined, by an overwhelming flood of international agencies controlling immense resources.

These include supply-driven, unsolicited and inappropriate aid, and inappropriate housing designs and livelihood solutions. Such aid has led to inequities, gender- and conflict-insensitive programmes, indignities, cultural offence and waste. It is rarely tracked accurately by international agencies. The myth that 'any kind of international assistance is needed, and now' is fuelled through poor understanding among the media and donor public. Other examples include: brushing aside or misleading authorities, communities and local organisations; inadequate support to host families; displacement of able local staff by poorly prepared internationals; dominance of English as a 'lingua franca'; 'misrecognition' of local capacities; applying more demanding conditions to national and local 'partners' than those accepted by international organisations; 'poaching' staff from national and local entities; and poor-quality beneficiary participation.

Treating affected countries as 'failed states' was a common error (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p46). On balance, the TEC studies do not find that many international agencies lived up to their own principles and standards regarding respect for local and national ownership, noting:

- A ‘tendency of assessors to disregard local coping capacity as if none of the needs were or would be met by national or local actors’ (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p10).
- ‘[L]ocal ownership... was undermined and some local capacities were rendered more vulnerable’ (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p9).
- ‘The evaluation learned of many instances of minimal contact with governments and a lackadaisical approach to providing timely information to appropriate authorities’ (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p39).
- ‘There was... no correlation between... (international) staff numbers and (international) efforts to enhance the coordination capabilities of respective governments’ (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p42; referring to the Maldives).
- ‘The local response in the first few days was critical, as was the role of locally raised funding from governments and the public, and from international remittances. These are all unrecorded, and therefore unacknowledged, by international systems’ (TEC Funding Report, 2006, p43).

As Chambers (1997) might ask: ‘So, whose emergency was it?’

## 4.2 Funding

Governments, multilateral bodies and INGOs may all play a donor role whenever they channel funds from the real donors – the ordinary contributing and tax-paying public, including remittance-contributing diasporas. Unless specified otherwise, however, the term ‘donor’ is used in this section to refer to ‘official donors’ – that is, governmental or intergovernmental institutions that specialise in channelling official aid funds. This section should be read in conjunction with Section 4.5 on aid quality, which addresses issues around accountability to disaster-affected and donor publics.

### 4.2.1 Scale, speed and strengths

‘This has been the most generous and immediately funded international humanitarian response ever’ (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006, p8): US\$13.5bn has been pledged or donated internationally for emergency relief and reconstruction. More than US\$5.5bn of international resources for the tsunami came directly from the general public in developed countries. Unfortunately, the international system for tracking funding flows does not register the very substantial contributions made by the people and governments in the affected countries.

The TEC studies represent a unique joint undertaking in terms of tracking and estimating funds in response to a major disaster (involving some 30 country-



specific studies – see the Annexes for details).<sup>104</sup> Funding broke many records. Unusually, NGOs and the RC Movement often had more funding than donor administrations or multilateral agencies. The budgetary constraints normally associated with humanitarian action (Sphere Project, 2004) did not exist. A unique opportunity was provided to respond in accordance with international standards. Notwithstanding, TEC Needs Assessment Report summed up the impact of generous funding on implementing agencies as follows:

Generous funding not only exceeded the absorption capacity of an overstretched humanitarian industry and deprived it of its customary excuse for built-in systemic shortcomings, but also led to the proliferation of new actors with insufficient experience (and therefore competence), as well as to established actors venturing into activities outside their normal area of expertise. Finally, the relative excess of funding was a disincentive to assess, to coordinate and to apply the results of the few collective assessments. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p11)

The actions by the few international agencies that tried to ‘turn off the fundraising tap’ when limits were reached (and the ire that such decisions engendered among organisations eager to continue fundraising) are notable.

The tsunami response has again demonstrated that non-financial assistance, whether it be goods-in-kind or tied aid, is less effective and efficient than cash assistance.<sup>105</sup> Official donor flexibility was notable; as a rule, aid was untied and often paid in full ‘up front’.<sup>106</sup> Reporting of pledges and commitments and the timeliness of official donations was improved in comparison to other crises. In some cases, once the enormous scale of global funding became apparent, funds were shifted to other programmes.<sup>107</sup> A number of donors gave reassurances that the extraordinary funding represented additional resources, and was not a substitute for other official aid. Finally, despite weaknesses in transparency noted elsewhere in this report, many donors and international agencies commissioned early audits and evaluations.

## 4.2.2 Imbalances in allocation and programming

Imbalances, non-needs-driven motivations (including supporting NGOs based in a donor’s own country, regardless of any comparative advantage), poor end-user ‘traceability’ and monitoring were evident, however. Donors failed to live up to many of their own donorship principles. Commitments<sup>108</sup> have been made to

104 In addition to the TEC studies on funding, past studies are also enlightening, such as the OCHA 2003 study on humanitarian financing (by Randolph Kent).

105 Studies have consistently found that tied aid is worth 25 per cent less than the equivalent amount of untied aid (World Bank, 1998). The same may be true of assistance in goods-in-kind rather than cash.

106 However, the OCHA Financial Tracking Systems shows that of a total of US\$2.5bn emergency aid pledges made by government donors, some 21 per cent (US\$0.55bn) remains uncommitted nearly 18 months after the tsunami.

107 Such as DFID’s reallocation of some 10 per cent of its original pledges to its disaster risk reduction programme (National Audit Office, 2006).

108 A group of 17 donors has developed 23 Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and good practices (GHD, 2003). These are being adopted by the OECD/DAC.

'allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments' (GHD, 2003). A senior official of a donor department signatory to the GHD initiative put it honestly: 'When the tsunami hit, GHD went out the window', alluding to the political and media pressures brought to bear on official funding decisions.

The TEC Funding Response Report (2006, p38) comes to a similar conclusion: 'Allocation and programming, particularly in the first weeks and months of 2005, were driven by politics and funds not by assessment and need.' The TEC Needs Assessment Report showed that most early funding decisions were made irrespective of assessments. Slow, overlapping, poorly shared and imprecise assessments were a constraint for donors, which often left them with difficult choices. Though they commit to supporting the UN in its 'vital and unique role in providing leadership and coordination',<sup>409</sup> as the TEC Needs Assessment Report shows, some major donors by-passed UN mechanisms, such as UNDAC, by deploying their own assessments.

Imbalances in funding (both private and official) existed among agencies and activities. Most private funding went to a dozen or so main actors.<sup>410</sup> Also, allocation of funds did not reflect the reality that recovery needs are by far the most important. Some donors strongly favoured recovery or reconstruction, however, while others funded mainly emergency needs. Finally, funding was not based on systematic measurement of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of different agencies and their programmes. The limited availability of agencies with the will and capacity to absorb the scale of funding available was also a constraint.

### **4.2.3 Accountability and transparency in funding**

Inadequate transparency in reporting funds was also an issue. The TEC Funding Response Report (2006, p36) notes that 'accountability and transparency may be improving, but the standards of financial reporting among UN agencies, the RC Movement and international NGOs leave the humanitarian system vulnerable to criticism'. The lack of system-wide definitions and standards for reporting is a major constraint. 'Cascading' layers of contracts among international, national and local organisations is a further complication. Additionally, each donor has unique proposal and reporting formats which makes donor reporting costly, complicates tracking and adds little value.

More importantly, locally donated funds, resources and services and international remittances go unrecorded, and therefore unacknowledged, by international

109 GHD paragraph 10: 'Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action' (GHD, 2003).

110 Overall, 70 per cent of private donations (an estimated US\$3.9bn) went to just 12 agencies: the RC Movement, UNICEF and the 10 largest INGOs.

systems.<sup>111</sup> Finally, the flow of financial information locally to affected populations in their own languages was weak. Even when language was not an impediment, complications existed: 'Almost all the organisations shared the notion that records of financial flows should be made available but when asked by the study team to provide this data they were not prepared [to] share it' (TEC Funding Response Report, 2006, p36, quoting the Local Response Overview Report).

#### 4.2.4 Impartiality and global funding

The tsunami response demonstrated that the current international appeals system delivers variable amounts of funding bearing little correlation with real needs on a global level. Funding for emergencies continues to be arbitrary, with WFP in the Sudan being forced to cut rations by half<sup>112</sup> while donors generously fund programmes in Iraq or Afghanistan. This lack of adherence to core funding principles almost three years after the adoption of the GHD principles is amazing. It illustrates the urgent need for external monitoring and control of donor accountability and performance. Self-regulation is clearly not working. While tsunami funding may not have reduced funding for other emergencies, if more of it had been reallocated it would have increased funding for other emergencies. This implies a responsibility for official donors and agencies collecting private funds to act in a principled fashion in the face of imbalanced funding. They should either 'turn-off the funding tap', or reallocate funds to other operations. In most cases this was not done.

## 4.3 International relief capacity

### 4.3.1 Interwoven capacities

Apart from local capacities, all other national and international disaster response capacities normally experience some delay in mobilising resources. The required capacity of the international humanitarian response community and the level of disaster preparedness in affected countries are two sides of the same coin. The greater the level of affected-country disaster preparedness, the lower the need is for international response, and the more effectively and efficiently it can be applied. For example, 'The engagement of international actors with local capacities was most effective and efficient when it was built on sustained prior partnerships with the local actors' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p14). This section examines three priority aspects of international response capacity: staffing, coordination and assessment.

111 This gap is not specific to the tsunami: 'There is a vast parallel universe of Islamic charities and funds for humanitarian assistance provided by Arab and other Islamic countries, remittances from diasporas and contributions from local entities in crisis countries that are not recorded in the official statistics of humanitarian assistance' (Donini, 2004).

112 '[R]educing the daily rations to as little as 1,050 kilocalories — half the minimum daily requirement of 2,100 kilocalories per person while UNICEF is reporting increased malnutrition' (WFP, 2006).

### 4.3.2 Staffing

The tsunami response demonstrated that the capacity of the international disaster response system to respond to sudden increases in demand (so-called surge capacity) is very limited. Agencies' investment in their own capacity is limited by both the uneven pattern of funding for emergencies, and by the low priority given to such investment within many agencies.<sup>113</sup> 'The normal level of funding available for emergencies is much lower than that available [in the tsunami response], so the "baseline" of staff resources is low' (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p42).

Agencies have only relatively small numbers of appropriately experienced personnel who can operate in an emergency at an international level. The lack of a predictable career structure encourages high turnover in the sector. 'Pressure for quick results... led to recruitment of inexperienced staff' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p36). This may solve the numerical problem but it brings other problems. TEC studies found that the tsunami response highlighted major weaknesses in international staff profiles (TEC Capacities Report, 2006), staff quality (TEC LRRD Sri Lanka Case Study and TEC Coordination Report, 2006), and continuity (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). This is not surprising as these issues are highlighted year after year in, for instance, the *ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action*.

The last decade has seen initiatives within the sector to address some of these issues,<sup>114</sup> including improved surge capacity in agencies<sup>115</sup> with the introduction of standby rosters and preparatory training.<sup>116</sup> The numbers trained are still relatively small, however, and relatively few of those trained are from developing countries.<sup>117</sup> Schemes to improve emergency response capacity<sup>118</sup> are still limited compared to need. Investment in capacity development is at the discretion of agencies themselves.<sup>119</sup>

International agencies often met the need for competent national staff by recruiting from local organisations. 'The evaluation found some evidence of staff "poaching" from local NGOs by international agencies' (TEC Coordination Report,

113 There are exceptions: MSF and Oxfam's emergency response capacity is the result of continuing investment in the surge capacity by both of these agencies.

114 Initiatives include People In Aid and their Code of Good Practice, the Emergency Personnel Network annual seminars, and recent work on staff retention. However such initiatives have so far had only limited impact.

115 For example World Vision's regional emergency response structure, CARE's Emergency Response Team, as well as the expansion of Oxfam's long-established Humanitarian Support Personnel system.

116 Most relief workers have no training whatsoever for their relief role, other than learning on the job. This applies not only at the field-worker level but also at the Humanitarian Coordinator level, a lack highlighted by the recent Humanitarian Response Review. Training initiatives in the sector include practical training from RedR, diploma-level training from Bioforce, academic preparation from the ECHO-funded NOHA programme, and a handful of postgraduate degree programmes. However, these initiatives mostly target personnel from developed countries and together train only a small proportion of those involved in aid work.

117 Visa requirements present constraints for developing-country personnel coming for training in other developing countries or in developed countries, and, worse, slow their deployment to disaster-affected countries.

118 For example, the Emergency Capacity Building project of the Interagency Working Group and UN and RC emergency response capacity enhancement.

119 The United Nations has generally taken the view that personnel are hired for the skills they already possess before taking up a post.

2006, p14). The TEC Capacities Report (2006, p35) found that: 'local agencies were sometimes undermined by poaching of their staff by international agencies'. Poaching can have a major negative impact on local authorities and NGOs. It may, however, place knowledgeable individuals in positions of influence over large resources held by international actors. It may also contribute to the development of the poached personnel. The questions here are whether poached individuals are placed in management positions or serve only as support staff;<sup>120</sup> and what impact the loss of capacity for the local partner has on the response and recovery.

### 4.3.3 Coordination of international capacities

Effective coordination has a cost in time and resources. It is necessary, however, if the mix of national and international actors (civil and military) and their different capacities are to work together in a synergistic rather than counter-productive way. While the appointment of a high-profile Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery was seen as positive, there were still problems with coordination at field level. The TEC reports give numerous examples of poor coordination, and the reasons for it are presented in Section 3. Three key issues stand out: the number and diversity of actors make coordination simultaneously more expensive and less effective; the large amounts of funding (especially private) reduced organisations' incentives to coordinate; and the competitive atmosphere associated with this funding reduced, in some cases, their interest in coordination.

A number of related issues merit mention.

- The military played a key role in the disaster response. The international humanitarian system has a very limited standby capacity (even through contractors), such as for airlifting. It looks likely that the military, despite its high cost, will continue to play a role in global international disaster response. There is, however, little joint planning and training between the military and traditional humanitarian actors – and coordination between them remains weak.
- There was little distinction between coordination at the operational level (who does what) and coordination at the policy level (on joint advocacy).
- In Aceh, for example, coordination was still based around large meetings. The number of participants and weaknesses in meeting-management skills frequently rendered such meetings ineffective.
- There is no agreed representative mechanism for NGOs. NGO joint bodies are members of the IASC, but they have no authority to make binding commitments for their members.<sup>121</sup> 'A recurring complaint from senior

120 United Nations agencies in particular have been noted for recruiting managerial-level staff from national agencies and then using them as support staff.

121 INGO joint bodies, like InterAction, ICVA or the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), cannot themselves make commitments that are binding on their members. The lack of any NGO representative body with such delegated authority means that each NGO usually speaks only for itself, making coordination difficult.

coordinators was that INGOs did not bring consistent consensus on important issues being discussed, mainly because the NGO community were not in agreement about who had the right to speak on their behalf' (TEC Coordination Report, 2006, p9). The level of funding held directly by NGOs made this particularly important.

#### 4.3.4 Assessment

Most of the multiple assessments were conducted for agencies' own requirements. They rarely influenced collective decision takers. 'Overall, the international response was insufficiently evidence-based' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p13). The media influenced donor policy and effectively took the place of more formal assessments. Joint assessment, at least between the UN, the RC Movement and the authorities would have made sense. With few exceptions, UN agencies are at a disadvantage as UN security rules and finance procedures often inhibit rapid deployment. The TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006, p14) suggested that 'UN procurement and recruitment procedures must be improved to secure immediate human resources and logistic support. If not possible, outsourcing should be considered.'

Finally, better national and local preparedness would have made a big difference. Almost all the assessments prepared by the international community were based on data culled from national and local sources.

The weakness at national levels, especially in Indonesia, was in the validation, compilation and dissemination of these raw data. A modest external investment in building national capacity would have gone a long way toward providing a consolidated picture of needs – the 'big picture' that, in the opinion of many donors and decision makers, was sorely missing. (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006, p13)

The same report (p12) also found that:

Humanitarian agencies have much to learn from the successful approach adopted by the IFIs: expedient cooperation among all partners (above all, the national governments), significant influx of expertise and visibility, and use of teams of analysts to reconcile and compile the various sources of information.

## 4.4 International recovery capacity<sup>122</sup>

As explained in the Introduction, recovery is not a strict chronological phase. It is context- and location-specific, rather than time-bound. It is defined by actions and aspirations, especially those of affected people, in the move away from emergency conditions. These generally arise within days, sometimes hours, of a disaster event, and simultaneously with relief efforts. Disaster-affected populations, while still concerned about basic needs, soon concentrate on longer term concerns such as permanent housing, schooling and how to re-establish their livelihoods. Communities and authorities rapidly move their focus from rescuing survivors and providing relief to re-establishing basic services, infrastructure and economic activities.

### 4.4.1 Recovery and humanitarian action<sup>123</sup>

‘The tsunami had an immense impact on development processes, conflicts, patterns of risk and poverty in the affected areas. So did the subsequent relief and development efforts’ (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p24). Recovery is about moving toward development – a complex phenomenon described by Chambers as ‘good change’ (Chambers, 1997). Recovery is facilitated by appropriate LRRD. ‘In practice, it is very difficult to distinguish between “reconstruction” and “development” interventions, especially in the case of the tsunami where reconstruction will take many years’ (TEC LRRD Policy Study, 2006, p17).

Despite its affinity with development, recovery is placed firmly among the objectives of humanitarian actors: ‘Donors will provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities’ (GHD, 2003). The Red Cross Code of Conduct adds: ‘we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries’ vulnerability to future disasters... and help create sustainable lifestyles’ (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and ICRC, 1994).

### 4.4.2 Achievements and constraints

Relief provided affected populations with the security that they needed to begin planning what to do next. Large amounts of un-earmarked funding allowed initial recovery activities to commence almost immediately. The gap between relief and

122 Note that while large-scale infrastructural reconstruction and the role of national authorities and IFIs are key to the success of recovery, they are not a primary focus of TEC studies. Also, This section is linked with Section 4.1 above on Ownership and Accountability.

123 Note that this section makes frequent reference to ‘rehabilitation’ rather than ‘recovery’, as it is based on the TEC LRRD Report. That report uses the terms rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction interchangeably.

rehabilitation that commonly appears in disaster response was avoided. 'The aid community ensured that affected populations obtained the means to live with a modicum of dignity during the early rehabilitation phase' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p9). The use of pre-existing development programmes limited 'the distorting impacts of (international) relief interventions' (TEC LRRD Policy Study, 2006, p36), and the joint assessment of damage and economic impact produced baseline data still serving as a reference for recovery.

International agencies must grapple with factors outside their control or outside their areas of competence and also which depend on many actors. These include issues of land rights and availability, national policies and poverty trajectories, and environmental considerations. Pre-existing development challenges posed structural, social and capacity constraints for international organisations in their LRRD efforts (see also Section 4.1.2 above). Affected governments have at times demonstrated weak leadership, vacillating on and promulgating different or damaging policies at different levels of government. They have been slow and have imposed restrictions. For example, it took several months for a recovery Master Plan or Blueprint to be approved in Aceh.<sup>124</sup> The saga of the 'buffer zones', where residential reconstruction was forbidden within a set distance from the shore, but later permitted, is another case in point. Also, the absence of clear, pre-determined national codes for registering and monitoring 'micro-level' initiatives (such as those by concerned tourists), means that we cannot learn from them.

Shelter reconstruction, poverty alleviation, risk reduction and livelihood recovery are slow and highly complex undertakings. A shortage of 'recovery' expertise was an important drawback, as was a fragmented approach. The latter was due in part to the proliferation of international agencies and a shortage of operational consortia and international-national-local pooled-funding partnerships which could have reduced fragmentation.

#### **4.4.3 Relief approaches and recovery: an uncomfortable mix**

It is too early to judge the ultimate success of tsunami recovery efforts as recovery will take years, possibly decades.<sup>125</sup> Indications of initial performance are available, however. While good practices and achievements have been evident, short-term approaches applied in isolation from development realities have frequently proven inappropriate. This is echoed in a recent DAC publication: 'Short-term strategies for relief are no longer viewed as an end in themselves, but part of a process of system and capacity development' (OECD/DAC, 2005, p96). Underlying dynamics of poverty are central to recovery. The humanitarian response addressed transient poverty but it did not and cannot solve problems of chronic poverty, though it may

124 It was designed by the Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS) with support from the World Bank, to integrate and coordinate local, national and international response initiatives. The blueprint was approved on 16 April 2005 (Government of Indonesia, 2005).

125 As already noted, a follow-up TEC LRRD study will be conducted in 2007 to begin to assess the efficacy of recovery.



make a modest contribution.<sup>126</sup> According to the TEC evaluations, many agencies involved in the early tsunami response lacked the qualities to make such a contribution. 'The incentives of the aid industry need to change in order to encourage agencies to "get out of the way" when critical tasks require skills and endurance that exceed what they can actually muster for field-level operations' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p10).

#### 4.4.4 The key: context sensitivity

Affected populations have attempted to move from living on relief to rebuilding their lives. This is the driving force for recovery. International agencies require an understanding of how their inputs contribute to ongoing national and local recovery processes. Generally, however, they have been identified as hindering people's own recovery efforts through poor understanding of local contexts and dynamics (including in addressing populations affected by the armed conflicts). Important instances of waste, duplication, mistakes and exclusion resulted.

Weaknesses were evident in areas of priority for affected people such as shelter, livelihoods recovery and chronic poverty alleviation. The concentration on the distribution of assets, especially boats, was particularly problematic. The failure to understand or support diversified and sustainable livelihoods, community development, the development role of income and tax generation, and resource management beyond own-account fishing and farming was notable. Stereotyping of options for women, small-farmers and small entrepreneurs was frequent. One-size-fits-all options were too often the preferred solution. Addressing poor and affected peoples' attempts to sustain their livelihoods through participation in labour markets and the service sector were generally ignored by comparison. Other 'blind spots' mentioned in the TEC studies include the failure to consider wider perspectives on fisheries, tourism and aquaculture.

Again, short-term approaches were an obstacle. The statement by an INGO country director that 'You've got too many people running around with no knowledge of the local context'<sup>127</sup> is echoed in TEC studies: '[H]igh staff turnover hampered the ability of international agencies to build institutional memory, in terms of both contextual knowledge and relationships' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p68). The TEC reports maintain that only a small proportion of international personnel demonstrated a deep understanding of what kinds of interventions might eventually prove sustainable with respect to livelihoods, market relations, community development and natural resource management.

The link between rehabilitation efforts and wider development trends has not been sufficiently thought through. LRRD is not about a transition from international relief projects to international development projects. It is a transition

126 Some surveys found that some of the poor were materially better off after the disaster than before, but there is no indication as to how sustainable this change might be.

127 Quote attributed to Bud Crandall, then Indonesia Country Director for CARE, in: 'Tsunami: as Relief Groups Tackle the Immense Task of Rebuilding, they're Running up against a Suspicion of Do-gooders that's been Growing at a Worrying Pace' (Feroz et al, 2005).

whereby recovery comes to be led by the affected people themselves. Such a shift away from dominance by the international community has been slow to take hold. International agencies tended to ignore and 'mis-recognise' local capacities in the early stages, and only later looked for local organisations to help with recovery. By that stage, many existing capacities had been weakened, marginalised and alienated (see, eg, TEC Capacities Report).

#### 4.4.5 Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

Support to national preparedness is foreseen in most humanitarian policies. For instance, donors commit to: 'Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises' (GHD, 2003, p1). The tsunami response has rarely enhanced local preparedness in terms of significantly reducing structural vulnerabilities. Despite advances in early warning systems,<sup>128</sup> DRR 'has not been of the magnitude suggested by calls for mainstreaming made in the first months after the tsunami' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p70).

Reasons for this are complex and are examined in the TEC LRRD Report. Among them is the fact that 'the contention surrounding the buffer zones... severely undermined the will to pursue disaster risk management through land-use planning and resettlement' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p71). In general, risk analysis has been weak, concentrating more on obvious hazards and vulnerabilities while missing more complex aspects – be they geotechnical, socioeconomic or cultural. Crucially, how people conceptualise and respond to risk in organising their own recovery has been, so far, inadequately addressed. Also, apart from steps such as addressing deforestation in relation to building materials, or de-salination and replanting flooded zones, environmental aspects of DRR (and 'building back better') have been under-addressed.

#### 4.4.6 Inequalities and armed conflict

Affected people and communities are not homogenous entities. Both Sri Lanka and Aceh have suffered from chronic armed conflicts. Marginalisation at a micro-level is also evident. Affected people in Acehnese villages, for example, complain bitterly that NGOs deal only with village officials and that poorer people are marginalised. Many communities express a distrust of their leadership.<sup>129</sup> 'The international response... in some cases has unintentionally exacerbated inequalities and tensions' (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, p38). With few exceptions, at best the international response restored the 'status quo ante'. At worst it strengthened those who were better off and/or more articulate (such as fishermen who possessed boats) while marginalising those who had few assets, notably women.

128 The absence of a tsunami early-warning system proved costly. Steps have since been taken to establish an Indian Ocean regional tsunami early-warning system through, for instance, international coordination meetings and technical missions (involving actors such as UNESCO-IOC and ISDR).

129 Both TEC and other surveys, such as those conducted by UNICEF (Lindgren et al, 2005; TNS and UNICEF, 2005) and the Listening Project (Anderson, 2006).

The tsunami and the tsunami response have had an impact on the armed conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (Aceh). While the TEC studies provide a variety of perspectives, the impact of the international presence on the peace and governance situation in Aceh is deemed to have been positive. This is irrespective of whether or not this was explicitly planned and commensurate with the funding available to international organisations to achieve positive change. However, the predominant factor in these conflicts was, and continues to be, the ongoing political and military processes. Overall, the international response has probably had a limited impact, at best. Demonstrably, in the case of Sri Lanka, the impact has not been positive.

## 4.5 Quality

### 4.5.1 What is quality?

Aid is intended to meet the needs of affected or target populations. The quality of any external aid effort can be thought of as the extent of the overlap between that effort and a population's needs (all or targeted). This concept of quality encompasses all of the traditional evaluation criteria with the exception of efficiency.<sup>130</sup> Quality and capacity are closely linked. The quality of an agency's performance depends in large part on the quality of its personnel and systems. Similarly, the quality of an overall response depends on the quality of all its different components. Poor performance by some agencies can detract from the aggregate quality of all.

### 4.5.2 Quality is an enduring problem in the sector

All major relief responses have raised questions about the quality of the response. Concerns about operations in the Balkans preceded quality initiatives such as the draft Red Cross Code of Conduct. The Rwanda crisis spurred the ratification of the Code by many agencies, and other initiatives such as the Sphere project, the Humanitarian Ombudsman project (which led to Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International, HAP-I), ALNAP, the GHD principles, and People in Aid, among others.

130 The five standard DAC Evaluation Criteria are efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance and sustainability. For humanitarian assistance these criteria can be elaborated (appropriateness, and connectedness) with some additional sub- criteria added, such as coverage, coherence and coordination (OECD/DAC, 1999). All of these factors, with the exception of efficiency, are a reflection of how well the aid operation fits the current unmet needs of the affected population (effectiveness, impact, relevance, appropriateness, coherence, coverage and coordination) or their implied future needs (sustainability and connectedness).

Yet despite these initiatives, some of the very same problems that plagued Rwanda and Kosovo, and the response to Hurricane Mitch, were also seen in the tsunami response. Their identification can be traced back to the Ethiopian famine of 1984 and beyond. They have been described year after year in the *ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action* and in numerous agency's own evaluations and lesson-learning publications. For example, the Joint Evaluation in Rwanda concluded that:

While voluntary adoption and implementation of the Code of Conduct and standards is clearly preferable to edicts imposed on NGOs from outside, the Rwanda experience indicates that it will not be enough to rely on voluntary adoption alone... Some form of regulation or enforcement is needed to ensure improvements in performance by NGOs. (Borton et al, 1996, pp161–162)

The TEC tsunami evaluations again highlight this point – that the lack of enforcement mechanisms for good practice mean that the same problems keep reappearing in emergency responses.

#### Box 4.1. Types of regulation

Regulation is the 'act of controlling or directing according to rule' (WordWeb Dictionary). Compliance with regulation is usually supported by the threat of sanctions. Regulation can take two basic forms: external regulation, where an external actor is responsible for regulating a sector; and self-regulation, where the actors in a sector regulate the sector themselves.

There are two main options for self regulation, *inter*-agency regulation and *intra*-agency regulation. Inter-agency regulation is where a group of agencies agree to an *inter*-agency mechanism to guarantee compliance. This might be compared to the self-regulation used by professional groups such as doctors or lawyers in some countries. With such a mechanism the collective of agencies would apply sanctions to errant members. However, experience of other professional groups suggests that such groups are very reluctant to apply sanctions to members.

This is different from the type of regulation implicit in many of the quality initiatives of the last 15 years. For these the model is what can be called *intra*-agency self-regulation, with each agency being responsible for ensuring its own compliance with, for example, the Red Cross Code of Conduct or the Sphere guidelines. Clearly, *intra*-agency regulation means that there is no external oversight, not even by peers, and there can be no effective sanctions.

### 4.5.3 Quality and proliferation

There is general agreement that there were far too many agencies present in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The low entry barrier to the system permits the entry of inexperienced and incompetent actors.<sup>131</sup> New NGOs emerge all the time. There are almost no mergers in the sector, and few consortia that *implement* as one entity. Once they have reached a certain size, agencies usually only go out of business due to poor financial management and rarely if ever due to poor field performance.

While the problem of proliferation of international agencies was worst in the NGO sector, this is also an issue for the UN and the Red Cross, but in a different way. 'Mandate-stretch' saw an increase in the number of UN actors becoming involved in natural disaster response.<sup>132</sup> For the RC Movement the issue is not so much about proliferation of RC actors as the number of RC national societies that set up their own operational programmes in the response, some of which had little or no operational experience. Other actors are also increasingly present in disaster response. As relief budgets grow, we see the rise of humanitarian actors whose primary institutional motivation is not humanitarian. These include:

- military forces, whose mandate is to implement government policy as given to them via the military chain of command;
- commercial enterprises, whose primary motivation is maximising profit (while providing services that encourage the further purchase of those services), or generating a favourable public image, again with increased longer term profits as the goal.

Proliferation was also a problem for the military, with many different international military contingents offering essentially the same packages of assistance (airlift).

In addition to proliferation, poor performance could be traced back to capacity constraints, poor understanding of recovery, and the fact that agencies were sometimes operating outside their area of competence. Another factor was that, due to the large number of surveys of the affected population there is far more information than usual about how the affected population viewed the response. The link between quality and capacity was made very clearly by Oxfam in its report into a fraud in Aceh that led to a temporary suspension of parts of its programme: 'The investigation found that while Oxfam's policies and procedures are of the highest standard, weak management and monitoring systems in certain areas, aggravated by high staff turnover and difficulties with recruitment, created the possibility for fraud to occur' (Oxfam, 2006).

131 Experienced agencies are not immune from low quality work, but the risks are higher with inexperienced actors.

132 For example, UNHCR went beyond its mandate of refugee protection to become involved in shelter for those displaced by the tsunami.

#### 4.5.4 Why does quality continue to be such an issue?

The failure of the various quality initiatives to make a major impact on enduring weaknesses can be attributed to a number of factors. These include resource constraints and the 'drivers for quality'. The former are addressed in Section 4.2 above. Here, the discussion will concentrate on what drives the quality of aid interventions.

The quality delivered by a normal business is driven by its customers. If the customers don't think that they are getting good enough quality for the price that they are paying, they switch to another supplier (where they have multiple suppliers) or use political pressure to press for improved quality (in the case of services controlled by a monopoly or by the state, such as the National Health Service in the UK). The same model of quality control does not operate in the aid sector. The tsunami evaluations show that the affected populations, far from controlling what agencies were doing, were often unaware of what the international agencies were planning.

As shown in Figure 4.1, the donor public does not get good information on the quality of the response by any particular agency. Figure 4.1 shows three main routes for information flow from the affected population. The first and most voluminous of these is communication by the agency itself. Such communications are often more focused on maintaining brand image and retaining supporters than on providing a fair and balanced view of the agency's work. They tend to concentrate on successes and ignore or gloss over failures.<sup>133</sup> The media do not adequately fill the information gap, as media coverage tends to concentrate on single dramatic instances rather than a balanced review of overall quality.

The most detailed information on agency performance may be obtained from agency evaluation reports, but:


- only some agencies (generally the better ones) undertake evaluations of their work;
- evaluators may not consult with the affected population;
- evaluators may not be sufficiently expert or, more importantly, independent to provide an honest and balanced overview of what an agency has done;
- evaluations may not be published at all, or only in a low-key way, so that this information is only easily accessible internally, or within the sector.

The biggest potential driver for quality should be feedback to the donor public on the quality of an agency's operations. But the donor public simply does not get enough good information and can generally judge an agency's performance only on the basis of the materials produced by the agency's own communications department.

133 As a visit to most international agencies' websites readily demonstrates.

Those within agencies trying to promote accountability and transparency have to struggle against increasingly powerful press and communications departments which have argued that releasing information about agency problems and shortcomings could lead to unfavourable publicity and damage to the agency's brand. This lack of external pressure for change is one of the critical reasons why performance has improved so little in the last 10 years (including the performance of donors). Change in any organisation is difficult, as it runs counter to the organisational status quo. Without external pressure for change, it is difficult for champions of change within organisations to push improvements forward.

**Figure 4.1. Information flow from affected population to the donor public**





## 5 Chapter five

# Lessons and recommendations

These lessons and recommendations relate to natural disasters. They should be read in conjunction with the recommendations in the TEC studies from which they are synthesised. In line with the focus of the studies they are mostly directed to international agencies, including official donors. Annex E contains detailed recommendations presented by category of international agency. Additional recommendations, some relating to individual countries, are contained in the TEC studies. The Section is organised under the following four sub-headings:

- 1 A fundamental re-orientation
- 2 Accountability and support to affected people and authorities
- 3 Strengthening international disaster response capacities and quality
- 4 Strengthening international disaster response funding

## 5.1 A fundamental re-orientation

### **Recommendation 1**

**The international humanitarian community needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities' own relief and recovery priorities.**

'A fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector is required to recognise that the ownership of humanitarian assistance rests with the claim-holders – i.e. that local capacities are the starting point, that long-term sustainable risk reduction is the aim, and that the role of other players is to



support. Only when vulnerable people take control of their environment will they escape from vulnerability. Otherwise they will simply be dependent on fickle Western public responses and the reliability or otherwise of international aid.' (TEC Capacities Study, 2006, p44)

This evaluation calls for sector-wide discussions to close the gap between international practices and international policies that contain the principle of local and national ownership of disaster response. This will require 'a fundamental re-orientation' from the emphasis on delivery of goods and services to support and facilitation of local and national capacities. International agencies should focus on affected people's priorities rather than on their own institutional or bureaucratic preoccupations. Two elements are essential:

- 1 support to pre-disaster capacity preparedness and risk reduction programmes;
- 2 appropriate international response approaches during disasters.

Both elements necessitate a commitment to devolve decision making to affected people as far as possible. Given that policies already exist, including the GHD principles, the Sphere standards, and the Red Cross Code of Conduct, discussions should focus on: aid methods, tools and standards; staffing practices and profiles; administrative and funding procedures; and a long-term strategy to educate the public and media in donor countries about the realities of disasters and the rightful ownership of responses by affected peoples and their states. A number of implications are examined below.

## 5.2 Accountability and support to affected people and authorities

### 5.2.1 Accountability to affected people

The degree of success in meeting affected people's needs (including the need for a supportive, enabling environment) should be the primary indicator for all accountabilities. Arguably, information is the most powerful tool not just for accountability, but also for coping and recovery strategies. There is a need to develop an aid principle based on the right 'to seek, receive and impart information'.<sup>134</sup> This would establish freedom of information regarding all disaster response efforts, including international activities. It would imply a responsibility to inform affected people in an accessible language – not just about performance

standards, programmes and concerns or complaints mechanisms, but about all significant aspects of programming, including budgets. International agencies should make their systems and practices suitable for maximum participation by local people, starting with information management. This requires appropriate assessment, planning, intervention and communication methods, tools and skills. The following list of practical steps could be developed into 'good practice' guidance materials.

Transparency can be improved through a commitment by response actors to proactive transparency, not just passive publication of operational data, accounts and reports. This would imply active diffusion and public analysis of information about agencies' operations, financial performance and accountability. This would include detailed explanations of aims; methods; beneficiary entitlements and lists; key partners and intermediaries; sources and amounts of funding, expenditure and aid distribution sites; and timetables. It would require the systematic sharing with and validation by local leaders and communities of assessments and project proposals, soliciting or reporting on funds for aiding those same communities. Information should include aid agencies' medium- and longer term intentions, if any, regarding disaster recovery. Budgets and accounts should be presented in lay-person's terms, explaining what the money was spent on, where, through and for whom and when. Senior staff profiles and salaries should also be made available.

Transparency could also be improved through:

- Methods such as mass communication campaigns, including the use of radio and television, internet and printed media targeted especially at local populations. The distribution of low-cost pocket radios could, for instance, complement targeted local radio information slots.
- Adopting as an aid standard that a language accessible to local people is used for communicating with them and for coordination at the local level. This would, naturally, require greater emphasis on hiring appropriately skilled staff, both international and local.
- Systematic targeting of information at marginalised groups, be they socially, ethnically or gender based. Strategies should be developed to ensure that, for example, women have full access to information.
- Improving and adapting assessment processes so that they involve local people as much as possible and address local concerns as rapidly as possible.

Based on the above, policies, standards and indicators regarding transparency and accountability should be developed to support the over-arching principle of 'the right to know and the responsibility to inform'. (Information standards should be considered in, for example, any international regulatory system – see Section 5.3.4). These might address: the proportion of relevant information that is made available in local languages and how fast (what key aid data have been published locally and how soon after initial assessments); the range, effectiveness, frequency and quality of dissemination events and methods; the proportion of staff members who can communicate effectively in local languages; and the accuracy and regularity of updating information. Such standards should be adapted for use in

measuring accountability to donor publics and peer agencies. Adherence to such standards could be a requirement for international agencies' accreditation and/or certification.

Just as agencies develop accountability manuals and training for themselves, such tools are even more necessary for communities to facilitate them in their demands for accountability and good performance, rather than waiting for agencies to act voluntarily. For example, response agencies should promote and strengthen self-managed watchdog movements and public audits. Signboards, complaints hotlines, opinion surveys, suggestion boxes, focus groups and opinion polls are insufficient in isolation. They need to be augmented by intensive community capacity-mapping and reinforcing, including facilitation by people who can link communities with decision makers and vice versa. The facilitators, in turn, require independence (for example, in terms of their resources and decision making) in order to play this bridging role effectively. The facilitators need to have sufficient understanding of the context to avoid the 'capture' of the interface with the community by local elites. Finally, more research should be undertaken on which accountability interventions tend to work well, which do not and why.

## 5.2.2 Support to local capacities

Support should aim to empower affected people to articulate claims, demand accountability and make their own choices. Agencies should recognise that appropriate approaches are less to do with over-arching policies than with methodologies<sup>135</sup> and capacities, especially skills, knowledge, attitudes and tools. For instance, tools and skills for systematically mapping local capacities and contexts should be developed. These should include tools for estimating the value of local contributions and remittances in emergencies, and the opportunity costs of international operations.<sup>136</sup>

During disasters, the control of resources should be vested in local actors through culturally sensitive and context-specific approaches. These include: cash payments; locally managed trust-fund mechanisms; better-supported national staff in management positions; and more and better support to host families. This also requires institutional reinforcement and partnership strategies (with, for example, cooperatives, associations and federations)<sup>137</sup> to strengthen local relief and recovery. International agency partnership procedures should be adapted, leading

135 The following simple methodology should be adopted by international organisations: mapping the external environment (including an analysis of disaster impact on and needs and capacities of local actors); mapping the internal environment (including an analysis of the international organisation's own mandate, capacity to respond and that of its partners); and developing an appropriate response strategy (including the scope and scale of interventions, implementation methodology, management arrangements, programme approach and risk management).

136 The opportunity cost of resources being channelled through international agencies rather than through national and local actors in terms of the demands placed on local people and the differences between international and local organisation 'operational' costs, such as salaries and benefits.

137 Through, for example, providing funds, technical assistance and perhaps materials, in accordance with their own identified priorities.

to, for example: longer time periods for grants; more flexible reporting and overhead requirements; agreements to address poaching<sup>138</sup> of staff; and commitments to capacity recognition and building instead of mere sub-contracting.

Aid should be provided according to need rather than limited to a narrow disaster-affected population. Increased attention should be given to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies in disaster responses. International agencies' planning should be based on the assumption that aid is likely to reinforce inequalities within the community unless corrective action is taken. Identification and inclusion of the most marginalised should be treated as a fundamental principle. For instance, women claim-holders should be represented in all decision-making bodies affecting them.

All actors should strive to reduce disaster risks and increase disaster response capacities at community, national, and international levels, within the framework of local development processes and plans. Generous, patient and multi-year investments and technical support are required in, for instance: spatial planning; community-based risk education and risk identification; vulnerability reduction measures; institutional support; contingency planning; and legal reforms. Support should extend to a wide range of local civil-society organisations including poorer, marginalised and specific groups (such as women's associations).

Finally, international agencies should improve *global* disaster risk reduction by systematising learning from successful indigenous and other local experience and practices. Research is needed to capture replicable examples.

### 5.2.3 Accountability to host authorities

International agencies need to respect the role and responsibility of affected states as the primary authorities – be they national, provincial, local – in responding to natural disasters and ensuring risk reduction. Similarly, states in high-risk regions have a responsibility as the primary duty-bearers in risk-reduction activities and natural disaster response. States should set standards and procedures for inviting, receiving and regulating international assistance. These should include speedy initial assessments (on a joint national–international basis) to determine the degree to which national and local capacities have been overwhelmed, and thus the need for external aid. Procedures and standards governing international agency admission, registration, accountability, performance, reporting and information sharing should be established. Contingency planning may identify probable response gaps and allow for negotiation of pre-disaster Memorandums of Understanding or protocols with probable responding agencies.

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138 Options include: time-limited staff development secondments from local organisations to international and vice versa; limiting the recruitment of experienced staff from local organisations to situations where the staff member is placed in an equivalent or more senior position than he or she previously held; and/or payment of a 'transfer fee' to the local agency to compensate them for their investment in developing the staff member's capacities (for example, an amount equal to three months gross salary at the new level).

International agencies should respect and promote national coordination of all response activities. International coordination should be conducted as a component of national coordination. The membership, language(s), location, accessibility, priorities, authority and capacities of international coordination mechanisms should be determined accordingly. The UN should play its mandated coordination role in improving linkages and coherence between the different disaster response actors by developing a coordination model that supports national coordination efforts, by ensuring that the complementary international effort is itself coherent. This could involve the establishment, in line with the recommendations of the UN's Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), of a coordination system for international disaster response actors built around the IASC model.

This coordination system should mesh fully with national coordination initiatives. The mechanism should coordinate the deployment of international agencies in accordance with identified needs and gaps. States should be supported, especially by the UN, to develop expertise to ensure that agencies are allocated and carry out tasks appropriate to their capacities and funding. Where appropriate, and with the support of multilateral agencies, states should establish, and international agencies should be prepared to work through, common mechanisms, such as consortia and trust funds. (Further lessons and recommendations are provided in the next section on Strengthening International Response Capacities and Quality.)

Donors and international agencies should support such measures through funding, technical assistance and encouragement, as necessary. They should also promote the development of International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) as a means of clarifying and strengthening the respective responsibilities, accountabilities and authority of affected states and international agencies, including bilateral actors, such as international military forces. Among these are states' responsibilities not only to regulate the quality of natural disaster response agencies operating within their territories, but also to facilitate invited actors regarding: prompt entry permits/visas; appropriate legal protection; recognition of professional qualifications; necessary financial transactions; import, export and transit of relief materials; exemption from taxes, fees and tolls on relief activities; necessary communications systems; and participation of locals as volunteers and staff.

Where national structures and methods are particularly centralised, international agencies should support affected people and their authorities in the delicate task of bridging gaps and building communication. This can be done most effectively through patient, long-term preparedness programmes that achieve a judicious balance between the potentially competing needs for centralised 'command and control' and decentralised decision making and response.

#### **5.2.4 Support to host authorities**

International agencies should map and support host authority capacities in a manner similar to that for mapping capacities of affected people. This should be conducted prior to any disaster event and updated during the response. This mapping should include all key official actors, nationally and sub-nationally,

including military forces. Multi-year support should be provided, both pre- and post-disaster, and integrated into relevant development programmes and with strategically placed counterpart institutions. This requires a long-term commitment and presence on the part of international agencies in high-risk countries. International agencies with a development mandate are best placed for providing such support.

International agencies should assist states in high-risk regions to establish or strengthen a national/sub-national institution to manage disaster preparedness and response and to enable cooperation between relevant government departments and between central and local government.<sup>139</sup> They should also be responsible for contingency planning, preparedness measures and liaison with all levels of the international community in disaster planning. International support should include appropriate technical expertise,<sup>140</sup> equipment and systems through capacity-building partnerships.

Support for joint national–international information services should include preparedness for the rapid deployment of initial assessments intended to provide a comprehensive overview of needs and resources and covering all affected areas and population groups. This should lead to the establishment of a single set of jointly managed databases of all affected people and resources provided to assist them. Aims of the databases would be to match needs and resources, and to plan and track responses. (UNDP’s DAD might be a model from which experience could be drawn.) This would require an agreed definition of ‘affected person’. While a widely accepted international definition would be ideal (for both specific disasters and in determining equitable disaster funding globally), at least national definitions should be developed and formalised through national legislation.

Beyond the initial days (at most weeks) of a disaster, donors should make funding for follow-on activities conditional on the application of such a comprehensive joint assessment. They should also fund pre-disaster preparation, including the establishment of regional rosters of experts.

International agencies and states in high-risk areas should reverse the pattern whereby DRR has long been advocated but rarely adequately funded or supported. Detailed guidance on DRR is available from a variety of sources.<sup>141</sup> Recovery is essential for introducing or strengthening DRR. Thus, lessons and recommendations contained in the next section regarding recovery are indirectly relevant to successful promotion of DRR. The following text emphasises a number of points:

- Donor governments and IFIs should consider allocating a set percentage of their relief budget to DRR. Funding should be long-term, predictable and aimed at the reduction of vulnerabilities in risk-prone regions.

139 Options should be identified jointly with national and international actors (especially donors).  
140 Agencies should, for example, assist disaster-prone countries to access remote-sensing data as well as to develop the capacity to process these data.

141 For example, DIPECHO, IFRC, CARE International, CRED, ISDR, OFDA, UNDP and others including IFIs such as the World Bank and regional investment banks.

- States should also set targets for national funding of DRR. If appealing for disaster response funding, they should design appeals to include funding for long-term DRR strategies and not just short- or medium-term relief and recovery.
- Comprehensive, multi-year risk reduction programmes should be established in all risk-prone countries on a scale commensurate with the risks faced, be they natural disasters, conflict or other factors.
- The programmes should be based on hazard and vulnerability analysis and anchored within national development and social protection structures. (The Hyogo, 2005 framework and related guidance should be applied as guidance in this respect.) These should link with local and community DRR initiatives.

## 5.3 Strengthening international disaster response capacity and quality

### Recommendation 2

**All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response system, including those from the affected countries themselves.**

Elements of this recommendation, regarding national and community capacity, have already been discussed above.

#### 5.3.1 Emergency surge capacity

This section makes recommendations regarding the capacity of response agencies to scale up quickly. It addresses: the unpredictable, episodic nature of funding; the low priority given to such capacity by some agencies; the lack of a career structure within the sector; and the cost of such preparedness.

Many constraints and impediments to effective surge capacity are specific to individual agencies. All international agencies should review periodically their disaster response capacities (for example, after each major disaster).<sup>142</sup> These agency-specific reviews should cover as a minimum: the capacity for rapid deployment of sufficient experienced managers and specialised personnel; rapid and effective assessments; logistical, administrative and financial management support; and coordination capacities.

<sup>142</sup> Some agencies already seem to be doing this under an initiative announced by the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery.

Donors need to support the development of surge capacity within agencies by funding<sup>143</sup> such development between emergencies. This could include seeking to increase the international emergency staff pool by supporting full-time standby emergency response mechanisms<sup>144</sup> and funding research into means to improve surge capacity. Donors and response agencies should be cognisant of and transparent about the considerable costs of developing and maintaining such surge capacities. This should be a major consideration in their choice of what type and level of response they aim to provide (and advertise as being available) – for example, an immediate emergency response (to be operational within 72 or 96 hours of a sudden-onset disaster event) or a later, intermediate response, or both.

In addition to full-time standby personnel, agencies need to develop or improve response rosters accompanied by appropriate training<sup>145</sup> to allow the rapid deployment of ‘regular’ personnel in emergencies (for example, the redeployment of personnel working in non-emergency aid activities). Staff members from countries and regions most likely to be affected by disasters should be given priority for such training. The same logic applies at the national level. Potentially affected governments also need to identify key emergency response staff and establish rosters for rapidly building up capacity at any disaster-affected location. Finally, all agencies need to reduce the high rates of turnover commonly seen in emergencies by providing contracts and conditions of employment that encourage staff to remain in post.

### **5.3.2 International coordination and information management**

In line with earlier recommendations regarding support to authorities, international agencies should invest more in their assessment capacities. Assessments should ideally be joint, involving national, local and international actors. The Red Cross and the UN system, in particular, should enter into discussions on how to achieve this (in line with the recommendations of the TEC Needs Assessment Report). In addition, all agencies should, as a principle, share assessment reports. The UN should integrate all assessment-support components of its response (UNDAC, Humanitarian Information Centre [HIC] and United Nations Joint Logistics Centre [UNJLC]) into one knowledge management programme, with a greater capacity to analyse data (including remote sensing data) in conjunction with local and national authorities.

Many actors make their initial funding or deployment decisions on the basis of media coverage. The quality of these decisions and public understanding could be improved if media organisations formally appoint journalists with an interest in the sector as their ‘aid correspondents’.

143 For example, Irish Aid has a funding scheme to increase the surge capacity of Irish NGOs.

144 As do a number of donors, such as Danida and Norad via respectively the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils (DRC and NRC).

145 CARE is doing this already on a small scale with its CARE Emergency Response Team programme.



Improvement of international coordination requires increased training, improved 'coordinator' rosters, the deployment of senior personnel beyond capitals to support local coordination, and greater involvement of NGOs. Where appropriate, integrated *geographic* coordination mechanisms (not just sectoral or 'cluster'-based models) should be considered. To improve advocacy, UN RC/HC's need to take a lead in developing a cross-agency consensus on sensitive issues before raising them with national authorities.

Civilian relief agencies and the military need to undertake joint training and exercises so that they are more aware of each other's procedures and approaches. The military is effectively the only source of large amounts of rapidly deployable helicopter lift in sudden-onset emergencies. Senior humanitarian actors should be more aware of the services that the military can offer in a rapid response. Military actors too need greater understanding of the nature of humanitarian coordination, and both the military and senior humanitarian actors should engage in joint exercises.

Further recommendations on both coordination and assessment can be found in the respective TEC reports.

### **5.3.3 Strengthening recovery practices and capacities**

Much of the guidance for 'good recovery' and 'LRRD' practices is contained in the preceding sections on accountability and support to local and national actors (particularly regarding information). This section supplements that guidance. It focuses on the lesson that international agencies need to pay as much attention to how they do things and their capacities to do them, as they do to the content of their policies and programmes.

First, entirely different sets of skills and ways of working are required for recovery compared to relief. Efforts should shift to removing obstacles and facilitating paths to help communities meet their own needs. Response actors should learn to stand back (or 'get out of the way', as the LRRD Report puts it), when they do not have the capacity or endurance to understand and support people's own recovery efforts. To improve management of the transition from relief to recovery, international agencies should adapt their: staffing (skills profiles and numbers); assessment and planning methods and data; funding sources and programme horizons; strategic partnerships; and operational methods. International agencies with a history of and commitment to longer term local presence and partnerships have a better chance of managing this transition than have new actors (that is, new to a country or area, and who are unwilling to commit to being there over the longer term). Established international-local relationships facilitate, for example, mutual capacity building during the emergency and early recovery phases, which in turn enhances later recovery efforts.

Second, sensitivity to context and the flexibility to adapt to evolving realities are essential instead of applying pre-determined strategies and one-size-fits-all solutions. Activities must be firmly rooted in national and local contexts and processes. International agencies should look to specific sectors reflecting people's

own priorities more than to organisational policies in the design of their recovery programmes. 'Poor people's realities [are] local, complex, diverse, dynamic and unpredictable' (Chambers, 1997, p162). Donors and agencies should continue to invest in national-international participatory assessments of livelihood recovery. This is in order to identify these sectors within specific locations or populations and to plan programmes based on ongoing poverty alleviation trajectories. This process implies close and often complicated linkages among international agencies, and between them and national and local authorities and NGOs.

Third, international agencies should treat recovery activities as longer term development interventions rather than as extensions to relief operations.<sup>146</sup> Recovery is dependent on gradual political, administrative and development processes. It is, for instance, more about re-establishing livelihoods and asset creation than it is about asset replacement. Further research is needed to identify principles for recovery including adapting existing DAC poverty reduction criteria to recovery scenarios.<sup>147</sup>

### 5.3.4 International regulation

#### Recommendation 3

**The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector.**

A regulatory system is necessary to ensure predictably high quality international disaster response. International agencies should take concrete steps to advance formal discussions in this direction. One mechanism for such a regulatory system would be through an accreditation and certification<sup>148</sup> system for aid agencies. This section provides a range of options for consideration.

Governments can support regulation by making tax-exempt status dependent on meeting accountability requirements, such as those required in the US, as well as demanding regular published audits and independent evaluations. Affected-country governments can demand similar transparency requirements of agencies responding to natural disasters in their countries. The European Commission could introduce a directive to ensure that NGOs in the European Union are

146 'Attention to "their LRRD projects" leads inevitably to greater engagement in micro- and macro-political processes...[E]ffective LRRD does demand close engagement with local institutions, with a consequent loss of independence. Weakened adherence to some aspects of humanitarian principles can nevertheless be balanced by political savvy, clarity of commitment and contextual awareness so as to ensure impartiality and neutrality in conflict situations and amid political efforts to influence resource flows' (TEC LRRD Report, 2006, p12).

147 A network such as the ProVention Consortium could be the platform for such an undertaking.  
148 Certification refers to the certification of an agency as meeting specific requirements, such as the quality of assessments. Agencies would be certified by a third party accredited by the humanitarian community as being competent to determine whether agencies meet the certification requirements. For example, the Société Générale de Surveillance is accredited by the International Standards Organisation to certify organisations as being ISO9001 compliant.

obliged to be as transparent about their finances and expenditures as are NGOs in the US.<sup>149</sup>

Complementary to the regulation of aid agencies is professionalising the role of aid workers, both national and international. The aid agencies should, together with academic institutions and training providers, set up a professional body with transparent criteria for admission and for the achievement of 'certified professional' or 'chartered' status. As an initial step, the IASC or a major donor could host discussions on what the requirements for such professional status would be.

#### **Box 5.1. Types of regulatory system**

There are a number of options for regulation. All regulatory systems have costs and disadvantages as well as the expected benefits. One option is inter-agency self-regulation, wherein the whole group of agencies, or a representative sub-group, monitors compliance by individual agencies. This would require agencies to submit to the consensus opinion of their peers. However, it is interesting that not one of the current initiatives to improve international humanitarian response has adopted this model, indicating that it is likely to be a non-starter.

- Regulation by a UN body might seem the natural course, but NGOs and the Red Cross would probably not accept this for a variety of reasons. These include questions about the UN's capacity to keep its own house in order, and issues of independence from a multilateral body made up of member states.
- Regulation could be (and in many cases already is) based on national legislation, but this creates a very uneven playing field with agencies from different countries operating within very different regulatory frameworks.
- Another option is to have a variant of the ISO9000 standards specifically for humanitarian aid agencies. An international standard gets around the issue of variations in the national legislation of different countries.
- A fourth option is for the IASC to develop a set of criteria against which agencies have their performance evaluated. Such criteria would include many of the standards that have been adopted by agencies in recent years. Under this system, agency operations would be reviewed by an independent external mechanism against these criteria.

### 5.3.5 Improving information flow from the affected population

In previous sections, recommendations have been made for improving information to affected populations. There is also a need to improve flows of information from them to the donor public. Key to improving the quality of the response is to provide the donor population, taxpayers and agencies themselves with information on how well different agencies are performing. One important innovation in the tsunami response has been the large number of surveys of the affected population. Agencies should regularly conduct joint surveys of affected communities to determine whether they are aware of agency plans and are satisfied with the support they are getting. These surveys need to be more structured and methodical, to provide a better measure of progress. The full results of such surveys should be reported on the agency's website. All parties can improve accountability by publishing full evaluation reports of their projects. Where possible, such evaluations should be jointly carried out with other agencies to maximise the potential for learning and minimise 'evaluation fatigue'. Standards for independence and transparency covering all phases of evaluation processes should be developed. These should cover the tasks of both doing and managing evaluations.

## 5.4 Strengthening international funding for disaster response

The term 'donor' is used below to refer to official bilateral or multilateral donor entities.

### **Recommendation 4**

**All actors need to make the current funding system impartial and more efficient, flexible, transparent and better aligned with principles of good donorship.**

#### **5.4.1 Proportionality, impartiality and flexibility**

International agencies should develop mechanisms, similar to those being developed under the GHD initiative, to measure when funding appeals should be terminated. Appeals thresholds should be examined in reference to both assessed need and an agency's capacity to deliver effectively and efficiently. Any future accreditation/certification system (as discussed in the previous section) should include conditions on how money is solicited and reallocated, as well as how and when appeals to the general public are closed down once funding thresholds have been reached.

All appeals for funds should include a tick-box (or a similar option for telephone donations) to allow donors and the public to earmark the funds they donate. An explanatory note should indicate that if they do not mark this option, funds could be reallocated to other populations in similar need. When international agencies appeal for funds they should publicise the possibility that funds could be reallocated for more urgent needs elsewhere. These should be complemented by fundraising standards that limit open-ended appeals to estimates of overall needs versus resources available. Pooling mechanisms should also be explored, in order to facilitate the transfer of surplus funds from one agency to another.

Agencies should also establish clear criteria and a transparent allocation process, based on needs and capacity assessments. These are necessary for both the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)<sup>150</sup> and for any country-level (re-) allocations of pooled funding. The criteria and mechanisms should, among other things, facilitate the early mobilisation of joint assessment teams from governments and international agencies. Related discussions should commence to reach an agreed definition of what 'affected person' means. These could take place in relation to the development of IDRL.

Donors should improve the transition from relief to recovery and development by increasing the flexibility in applying funds from a variety of budgets and instruments, in accordance with needs and realities on the ground. This would require adaptations within donor administrations, such as the early involvement of staff managing development funding to become involved in monitoring and planning recovery responses from the beginning of a disaster. If such flexibility is not feasible the practice by many donors of funding recovery activities under humanitarian instruments, as opposed to development instruments, should be reconsidered.

To complement the CERF and other initiatives,<sup>151</sup> including official donor peer reviews, independent oversight of donor impartiality and performance is necessary. Self-regulation of donors by donors is as incomplete a control as self-regulation is for operational agencies. The OECD/DAC should develop new or improve existing oversight mechanisms to monitor donor adherence to GHD principles. These should include more rigorous reporting standards – not just about budgets, projects, countries and activities, but crucially about how impartially and by exactly whom important funding decisions are made. Greater and more targeted use by the public and media of freedom-of-information laws could also play a role in improving transparency.

Parliament or congress is tasked with monitoring the 'Executive', normally through committee systems and parliamentary debate, and in doing so is supported by specialised oversight bodies.<sup>152</sup> Such mechanisms should be strengthened. This would require more focused education of parliamentary/

150 The new CERF of US\$500mn was already 50 per cent funded by March 2006.

151 ECHO has designed a tool called the Global Index for Humanitarian Needs Assessment. This consists of a set of country-level indicators of need which it has applied in its funding decisions.

152 Such as the US's General Accounts Office or the UK's National Audit Office.

congressional representatives to enable them to understand better the technicalities and complexities of humanitarian funding processes.

In addition to steps to improve the quality of aid, the quantity of aid should also be increased. Official donors through, for example, the OECD/DAC and/or the UN IASC, should consider setting a target that all people affected by disasters should be entitled to a minimum level of humanitarian assistance. Similarly, all donors should set a deadline by which they will reach the (1970) UN Resolution for a minimum ODA target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product.<sup>153</sup> Wealthy nations that are not currently part of the DAC should also shoulder their responsibilities and support a far wider range of development and humanitarian initiatives than their current portfolios demonstrate. As already proposed, donors should consider committing a target percentage of their relief funding to be invested in DRR.

#### **5.4.2 Accountability: quality, tracking and reporting**

Donors should develop mechanisms to measure the relative effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of international agencies, and fund accordingly. They should also inform the tax-paying public of the performance and quality of the agencies they fund through, for example, widely disseminated independent reports. This should act as a counter-balance to the frequent 'spin-doctoring' by international agencies regarding their own performance. Signing up to an accreditation system (as proposed above) should be considered as a requirement for receiving funding. Any such accreditation system should include standards on how money is solicited and reallocated, and how and when appeals are launched and shut down.

Improved mechanisms should be developed to track how the 'humanitarian dollar' flows from the tax-payer or contributing citizen to the beneficiary, documenting each layer, the transaction costs and value added (or subtracted). Common and consistent accounting definitions need to be agreed and applied across the humanitarian sector. A pilot study using a sample of programmes from different agency types (UN, bilateral, NGO and RC Movement) should be commissioned. The OECD/DAC should experiment with a grant-tracking code system to see if it would be possible to track grants from pledge to disbursement. The system should also document local contributions and diaspora remittances. This should include how to extend existing plans for facilitating and recording remittance flows for development purposes to apply to humanitarian situations.

OECD/DAC, in conjunction with other actors and mechanisms (such as the GHD<sup>154</sup> and FTS), should develop a common reporting format through which agencies can simultaneously report to a number of donors. It should develop an integrated financial tracking system that would, for instance, distinguish between

153 International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970, paragraph 43.

154 Common reporting formats are being developed through the GHD group in Geneva. Unfortunately, however, not all major donors are members. The DAC is working on common financial reports and definitions and will report in June 2006.

corporate contributions and the private donations of individuals. This should include common accounting definitions (including of 'commitments', 'disbursements' and 'pledges'). The OECD/DAC should also discount tied aid to 75 per cent of its nominal value in its calculation of the overall value of aid from any donor nation.<sup>155</sup>

### **5.4.3 Donor, public and media education**

Donor, public and media education is necessary to improve understanding of and support for the above lessons and recommendations. Donors should fund mass communication and public educational initiatives on the themes of 'good disaster response'<sup>156</sup> and on 'how to be a principled and effective donor' (as both individual members of the public and official donors). The media should be targeted for such education, to improve the quality of reporting on disasters and funding for disasters. Public education should cover the serious implications of donors not meeting their own commitments to impartiality in global humanitarian funding.

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155 See the conclusion and footnote on this point in the conclusions chapter, regarding funding. That text, which notes that tied aid is worth less to recipients than untied aid, provides background to the recommendation.

156 In order to dispel the many myths around issues such as disease, local capacities, appropriateness of aid and disposal of dead bodies.

# Endnotes

## Chapter 1

**E1** Early in January 2005 a number of ALNAP Full Member agencies began to discuss how to coordinate evaluations of the tsunami response. An interagency and donor meeting was subsequently convened in Geneva on 23 February 2005, for which invitations were extended to the entire ALNAP membership (of over 500) as well as through the DAC Network on Development Evaluation. At that meeting most of the participants agreed to constitute themselves into an 'evaluation coalition' (later named the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, or TEC) guided by a Core Management Group of agencies. It was also agreed that the ALNAP Secretariat would act as the facilitating platform for the initiative. A full history of the TEC can be found on the TEC's website [www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org).

**E2** Some have argued that it is too early to collect credible evidence of the longer term impact of the tsunami response. That said, the IFRC originally intended to undertake an impact study that, as originally envisaged, would have contributed to the TEC evaluation set. Shortly after the IFRC announced its intentions, it partnered with WHO as well as with the Global Consortium at which point the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) also became involved. The necessary coordination, as well as the participatory approach to ensure full ownership of the project by the affected-country governments, took time. Moreover, unexpected staff turnover between September and November 2005 also contributed to delays.

## Chapter 2

**E3** WHO (2005) reported that in Aceh a total of 23,293 injured had been admitted for outpatient or inpatient care by 5 January. The total number of fatalities for Aceh was over 160,000.

**E4** Celebrity survivors included action movie star, Jet Li, former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, former Finnish foreign minister, Sauli Niinistö, and supermodel Petra Nemcova (Wikipedia, 2006).

**E5** The story topics were: Sudan war, Northern Uganda, West Africa, DRC conflict, Chechnya, Haiti, HIV/AIDS, Nepal, Colombia and infectious disease. It has to be acknowledged that these stories are not breaking news stories like the tsunami, but they affect the lives of over 100 million people.

**E6** Estimating the true economic impact of the tsunami will be difficult even with hindsight because of the many confounding factors at the national and international levels.

**E7** The affected countries are not expected to recover until the 2006/2007 winter season (World Tourism Organisation, 2005). However, recovery seems to be more rapid in the Maldives with April 2006 having the highest number of arrivals ever for April (Anon, 2006).

## Chapter 3

### SECTION 3.1

**E8** Tsunamis were responsible for most of the 36,000-plus deaths caused by the eruption (Volcano World, 2005).

**E9** This was certainly the case in the Maldives where the lessons-

learned workshop identified teaching people to swim as one of its response measures (Government of the Maldives and United Nations, 2005). The tsunami also prompted women to learn to swim in Sri Lanka (Parker, 2005). The gender differences in the ability to swim may be one of the reasons why more women than men were killed by the tsunamis. Non-swimmers in Tamil Nadu were twice as likely as swimmers to die (Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis, 2005).

### SECTION 3.2

**E10** In Sweden, Norway and Denmark there was considerable criticism of the response on the consular side and this has led to public apologies by ministers, and sanctions against Foreign Service staff in some counties (Cosgrave, 2005).

**E11** Families of those lost have been very critical in some cases: 'In a statement issued outside the inquest, Mrs Quinn's family, including her parents, John and Daphne Gough, thanked "family, friends and work colleagues" for their support since the tragedy. "Regrettably our expression of gratitude must exclude the UK government", the statement added. "We lost someone who was a wife, daughter and sister in the tsunami and throughout the appalling aftermath of this disaster, our experience of the UK government has been one of ineffective management and poor communication with the families affected by this tragedy. Even at this time, 11 months later, our view of the UK government's performance is unchanged' (Guardian Staff and News Agencies, 2005).

**E12** Pledges are promises made by a donor to provide funding. Pledges may be made at a donor conference, in a press statement or in parliament. A commitment is a more or less binding promise to provide a set amount of funding for a particular sector. Disbursement happens when the donor effectively loses control of the funding.

### SECTION 3.3

**E13** The agreement for the supply of helicopters was signed with DFID only in the week of 16–22 January and the helicopters arrived a week later. DFID has since commissioned a review of the UNHAS deployment.

**E14** Lack of participation by affected communities in assessments has been highlighted as a problem in the Gujarat Earthquake (Humanitarian Initiatives UK et al, 2001, p81) and the Mozambique Floods (Wiles et al, 2005). The need to validate assessments with local communities was highlighted after Hurricane Mitch (Telford et al, 2004, p49).

**E15** The EU commissioner returned to this theme on 15 March 2005 when he pointed out in a speech that: 'The financing decision, which is a sort of initial commitment, is based on an assessment of needs. The Commission's policy is not one of making huge pledges in a kind of donor "beauty contest". We prefer a graduated approach with financing decisions taken as and when information becomes available and financing requests come in from our partners. This makes sure that financial aid is matched to real needs' (Michel, 2005).

**E16** The actual survey response was NGOs, but this grouping includes the Indonesian Red Cross, UNICEF, and WFP, as well as true NGOs.

**E17** Inappropriate clothing is often found to be a problem. This was the case in the Gujarat Earthquake: 'clothes were considered inappropriate in virtually all interventions' (Humanitarian Initiatives UK et al, 2001, p21). Bam managed to avoid a lot of inappropriate assistance, but: 'two IRCs warehouses were found to be full of used clothes, which cannot be used in Bam as they are not deemed acceptable by local people' (Chomilier et al, 2004).



**E18** It was initially expected that there would be a big demand for medical services. In the mid-1990s, tsunamis had a ratio of fatalities to injuries of 0.02:1 to 0.5:1 (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006, p6; citing Alexander, 1996, pp234–235). Therefore it was logical for Jan Egeland to suggest that there could be hundreds of thousands of casualties in his press conference of 29 December 2004, based on the assumption that there were four injured persons for every tsunami fatality (UN News Service, 2004). In the event, there were relatively few injured survivors in Aceh or Sri Lanka.

**E19** Three weeks is really quite fast for a full-scale international response. However, while this sort of timescale is fine for a slow-onset emergency, it is slow for a sudden-onset emergency where peak needs occur immediately after the disaster.

**E20** Project Galle (<http://www.projectgalle2006.org/index.html>) is probably the leading example of such an organisation.

**E21** In the event, no agencies were kicked out. This problem for the agencies is a curious reflection of the problem that affected communities faced with their own planning in the face of uncertainty about what agencies were going to do.

**E22** This same problem was seen in the Rwanda Joint Donor Evaluation: 'In a context of increased competition for funding and visibility and the proliferation of NGOs, it would appear that the pressures are increasing for agencies to highlight the positive aspects of their programmes and play down or obscure the negative aspects' (Borton et al, 1996, p152).

**E23** Global aid flows through NGOs have increased dramatically in the last 15 years. As a share of all ODA, NGO flows have grown from 6 per cent in 1989 to 15 per cent in 2004 (at US\$13bn). The tsunami funding in 2005 will push the NGO share to a new record. (Source: Analysis of OECD/DAC data from the DAC-Online database.)

**E24** UN agencies and secretariat bodies included: UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, OCHA/UNDAC, UNESCO and UNIFEM, to name but a few.

**E25** Paragraph 3 of the UNDAC standard terms of reference states: 'The UNDAC team will assist in the assessment of international relief requirements during the first phase of the emergency and, when necessary, in the coordination of international relief operations at the site of the emergency.'

**E26** 'UNDAC neglected the actual analysis and compilation of information on needs... most of NGO and many UN interlocutors found UNDAC "very weak in the field" (TEC Coordination Report, 2006). 'In all countries, questions arose over the utility of UNDAC as a "common service" for assessment and coordination... The UNDAC team was under-equipped with even the basics for communication, there was no Public Information or Civil-Military liaison officer on the team, and no clear administrative procedures for operating in an environment where quick purchase decisions were required... (in one case) UNDAC SITREPs were actually put together and disseminated by UNDP, further putting into question the added value of the UNDAC' (TEC Needs Assessment Report, 2006).

**E27** UNHCR received cash donations totalling US\$59.3mn against its appeal for US\$78.5mn in the Flash Appeal. (Source: UNCHR (2005) Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami Emergency One-Year Progress Report: January–December 2005.)

**E28** The United States has 12 Carrier Strike Groups but of these only 3 are available at any time; another 3 are in maintenance and the remaining 6 are in pre-deployment training, exercises or post-deployment activities. Carrier Strike Groups are the first line of US power abroad, and they are normally committed only for issues of

the highest concern to national security. 'When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it's no accident that the first question that comes to everyone's lips is: "Where's the nearest carrier?"' (President Bill Clinton on the USS Theodore Roosevelt, 12 March 1993). (Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.)

**E29** The US's tsunami response did improve public perceptions of the US around the world. The US tsunami relief effort led to more favourable views of the US for most of the nations covered by the Pew Survey in 2005 (Pew Research Center, 2005, p4). Positive opinions of the US in Indonesia, which had plummeted to as low as 15 per cent in 2003, rebounded to 38 per cent in 2005. In 2005, 79 per cent of Indonesians said they had a more favourable view of the US as a result of the relief efforts (Pew Research Center, 2005, p2). However, this fell to 30 per cent in 2006 (Pew Research Center, 2006, p1).

**E30** One evaluation of the response to the Mozambique Floods in 2000 found that UK military helicopters cost 3–4 times more per flying hour than did commercial helicopters (Cosgrave et al, 2001, p38).

**E31** Burke (2005) gives the operating cost of the USS Abraham Lincoln, used to support the relief effort in Indonesia, as US\$6 million a day. The General Accounting Office (1998) gives the life-cycle cost of a Nimitz-class carrier as US\$444 million dollars a year for the carrier. Adjusted for US inflation, this gives a figure of US\$540mn per year or US\$1.5mn per day. The air wing on the carrier costs as much as or slightly more than the carrier but only has one third the life and has a higher maintenance cost, so the total cost of the air wing is probably three times the carrier cost, giving a total carrier plus air wing cost of US\$6mn a day. This is very roughly 50 per cent capital cost and 50 per cent operating cost, so the operating cost only of the Abraham Lincoln with its aircraft is probably only US\$3mn a day.

**E32** The most recent initiative of the Special Envoy's Office, launched on 12 April 2006, has a lot of common ground with the TEC. The Special Envoy's initiative is in conjunction with the US NGO umbrella group InterAction and aims to improve performance in five areas: 1) accountability to the beneficiaries of assistance; 2) enhancing local capacity of governmental institutions and the NGO community in affected countries; 3) ensuring high standards of professionalism in the field; 4) communication and coordination among the NGO community; and 5) incorporating human rights principles into recovery operations. The recommendations, which will address both tsunami recovery and future assistance efforts, will be presented to the former President in late 2006 (Office of the Special Envoy, 2006).

**E33** Humanitarian Common Services (HCS) include the Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC), the Humanitarian Air Service (HAS), United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (CM-COORD), Interagency Emergency Telecoms, the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the UN Disaster Assessment Teams (UNDAC). Both of the WFP-hosted common services, the HAS and UNJLC, have been subject to a review since the tsunami, with a view to improving their effectiveness and transparency.

**E34** Surge capacity is the capacity to cope with demand additional to the background level of demand during an emergency.

**E35** To place this figure in context, one of the authors generally estimates that the true cost of properly managing an effective programme in the field is typically of the order of 15 per cent of the total. Other agencies, particularly in the US, claim to have much lower programme-management costs, but such low figures are usually achieved by folding the overall management costs into project budgets. USAID has paid up to 24 per cent of project budgets (19 per cent of the total including the overhead) in one of its Negotiated Indirect Cost Recovery Agreements (NICRA) with one

large US agency, and 17 per cent (14.5 per cent of total budget) to another large US agency. However, one complaint made by local NGOs is that while INGOs may have overhead costs of this magnitude, they are very reluctant to allow local partners more than 5 per cent of the budget for their overhead.

**E36** This is a very rough estimate based on the assumption that INGOs spent about one third of their total tsunami funds in 2005 (true for Oxfam (Oxfam International, 2004) and some of the larger UK agencies (Vaux et al, 2005)), that INGOs got about US\$5.5bn in private funding, and that they will spend about 40 per cent in Indonesia, with 90 per cent of this for Aceh. This gives an estimate of US\$660mn for the first year's INGO spending for Aceh.

### SECTION 3.4

**E37** 'The head of Indonesia's tsunami reconstruction programme threatened on Monday to throw out international aid agencies from the devastated province of Aceh if they didn't submit progress reports by June. Some international aid groups have exaggerated their work in the multi-billion dollar reconstruction programme in Aceh, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the chief of the BRR, the government agency in charge of rebuilding, told Reuters. "There is a German NGO (non government organisation) that has made a report saying they had built more than 100 houses, but they just built three or five houses".' (Reuters, 2006).

**E38** This estimate is based on the differential mortality rates shown in Figure 2.3 applied to the total numbers of dead and missing for each area, with the mortality rate for the nearest area being applied to areas for which no mortality data were available, and population distribution being estimated where area-specific mortality was not available. Strictly speaking, not all were adult women as slightly higher female mortality rates were also seen in the under-15s in some places.

**E39** The *Ceylon Daily News* is the largest-circulation English-language daily in Sri Lanka. It is a conservative, government-owned newspaper. The prevalence of so many negative reports about local government as well as about aid agencies suggests that all was not well with the response. However, as with all press in Sri Lanka, one should bear in mind that one study of the Sri Lankan media concluded that, with one exception, the main focus of newspapers in Sri Lanka was 'to provide propaganda for groups or parties of their choice' (Transparency International Sri Lanka, Jayaratne et al, 2005, p24).

**E40** It was designed by the Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS), with support from the World Bank, to integrate and coordinate local, national and international response initiatives. The blueprint was approved on 16 April 2005.

**E41** The DEC did increase its initial timeframe from 9 months to 3 years, but did not increase it to 5 years as recommended in both the DEC monitoring reports and in the evaluation. The DEC will again consider this issue in September 2006.

**E42** Sphere provides over-arching humanitarian principles and a set of standards and indicators for four 'life-saving' sectors: 1) Water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; 2) Food security, nutrition and food aid; 3) Shelter, settlement and non-food items; 4) Health services; plus a set of standards common to all sectors.

**E43** The eight common Sphere Standards are in: 1) participation; 2) initial assessment; 3) response; 4) targeting; 5) monitoring; 6) evaluation; 7) aid worker competencies and responsibilities; 8) supervision, management and support of personnel. Areas of particular weakness were participation, monitoring, and evaluation.

**E44** Despite their importance, local and national responses are not given a financial value or, as a matter of course, included in reports of disaster response. They include: the resources provided in cash or kind by the affected families and communities themselves; the services provided by national military during the emergency phase; and the contribution of local authorities. These contributions are difficult to value. At least US\$190mn, probably much more, was given by the general public in affected countries. Data are not available on tsunami-related remittances from abroad. They are most likely very important. Even normal levels of remittances to Sri Lanka and Indonesia are significant compared with other inflows such as tourism receipts and direct foreign investment. Finally, it is estimated that governments of affected countries have contributed at least US\$2.6bn of their own resources.

### SECTION 3.6

**E45** The equivalent commitment figure for non-DAC donors was US\$319mn (54 per cent). All the IFI pledges are now loan commitments. By 30 September 2005, DAC donors had disbursed US\$2,061mn (56 per cent of commitments): 97 per cent of humanitarian commitments have been disbursed compared with 20 per cent for reconstruction commitments.

**E46** Despite this example of good practice, MSF still had so much money that, like many other NGOs, it stepped outside the MSF core speciality of emergency medical response. In at least one case, this led to poor-quality work. MSF built 140 fishing boats in Lamno from uncured, illegally logged timber (Indonesia Relief, 2005d). Such boats are not sea-worthy as the seams open up as the timber cures.

**E47** Excluding the Tsunami Flash Appeal, UN Consolidated Appeals for 2005 are 59 per cent funded, which is not significantly lower than the average over the period 2000–2004 (of 59–76 per cent). In the UK, donations from the general public for the DEC Asian Earthquake Appeal have been the second highest ever, albeit still 15 per cent of the equivalent Tsunami Appeal. However, research in the UK found that about 20 per cent of the private donations for the tsunami appeal were made at the cost of other UK charities (Pharoah et al, 2005, p4).

**E48** Debt relief for Iraq in 2005 was nearly US\$14bn, and for Nigeria was just over US\$5bn. Aid by DAC members still increased 8.7 per cent from 2004 to 2005 even when debt relief is subtracted (OECD/DAC, 2006a).

# Annex A: TEC actors, financing and methods

## A0 Introduction

The Introduction to this Synthesis Report outlines the background to the establishment of the TEC and its aims. It also introduces the TEC's management structure. This Annex contains additional information on:

- 1 The TEC Core Management Group
- 2 Membership of the TEC
- 3 TEC finances (expenditure and funders of the core TEC team)
- 4 Structure and management of the TEC thematic evaluations
- 5 Tabulated information on key aspects of the thematic evaluations.

## A1 The TEC Core Management Group

The TEC Core Management Group (CMG) provides general oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Members of the CMG have included representatives from a total of 14 agencies (Table A1), and CMG agencies are also core funders of the TEC.<sup>158</sup>

Donors	UN agencies
Danida	FAO
Sida	OCHA
SDC	UNDP
	UNICEF
	WHO
(I)NGOs/RC Movement	Other
CARE International UK	ALNAP Secretariat
AIDMI	Groupe URD
World Vision International	
IFRC	

Most of these agencies were either nominated or self-selected at the initial meeting of 23 February 2005. Subsequently, efforts were made to involve more (I)NGOs, as these agencies were initially very slow to engage (mostly due to human resource constraints similar to those discussed throughout this report). The TEC learning reviews (see [www.tsunami-evaluation.org](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org)) also acknowledge that the TEC's work would have been enhanced had it included, for example, more representatives from the affected region on the CMG.

## A2 Membership of the TEC

Agencies have been involved in the TEC in two ways:

- 1 **As formal members** Formal members are agencies that have been involved in at least one of the following: the CMG; evaluation Steering Committees; evaluation Working Groups; and/or as funders of components of the TEC process.
- 2 **As wider TEC members** Other agencies have shared their ToRs, lessons and reports with the TEC, as well as contributed to discussions concerning, for example, dissemination and utilisation of TEC findings.

Thus 'membership' of the TEC is much larger if it includes all agencies that have been involved in some part of the TEC process. Moreover, many of these 'wider TEC' members are committed to promoting TEC findings and recommendations, and their individual agency evaluations are included as secondary sources for this Synthesis Report.

From February 2005 until June 2006, formal members of the TEC were those listed in Table A2.

158 Since its inception, the TEC has enjoyed financial support not only from these CMG agencies but also from a much larger range of donors, UN agencies, the Red Cross and INGOs, as well as high-level endorsement from the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator.

**Table A2. Formal members of the TEC**

UN Agencies	Research networks	Donors	NGOs and RC
FAO	ALNAP Secretariat	AusAid (Australia)	ActionAid International
OCHA	DaRa International	BMZ (Germany)	AIDMI
UNDP	Feinstein International Famine Centre	CIDA (Canada)	CAFOD
UNFPA	Groupe URD	Danida (Denmark)	CARE International UK
UNICEF	HPG/ODI	DfA (Ireland)	Cordaid
WFP	ICMH (International Centre for Migration & Health)	DFID (UK)	IFRC
WHO		IOB/MFA (Netherlands)	Oxfam GB
		JICA/MoFA (Japan)	Oxfam NL
		MFA (France)	RedR
		MFA (Luxembourg)	Save the Children – UK
		NORAD (Norway)	Tearfund UK
		NZAid (New Zealand)	World Vision International
		SDC (Switzerland)	World Vision Canada
		Sida (Sweden)	
		USAID (United States)	

## A3 TEC finances

### A3.1 Financing the TEC core in 2005/06 and 2006/07

**Table A3. Expenditure of the TEC Core Team ('Secretariat') in 2005/06**

Item	US\$
Personnel	233,855
ODI service charge	26,127
Travel, accommodation & subsistence	54,755
Other costs (incl. publication, teleconferences & meetings)	46,335
<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$361,072</b>

**Table A4. Total costs of the TEC**

Item	US\$
Coordination evaluation (approx)	494,500
Needs assessment evaluation	215,782
Capacities evaluation	392,672
LRRD evaluation (approx)	588,700
Funding Response evaluation	803,762
TEC Core (2005/06)	361,072
<b>Total (approx)</b>	<b>US\$2,856,488</b>

## A4 Thematic evaluation management and structure

The TEC thematic evaluations have varied in management and structure. For example, three of the five TEC thematic evaluations – on Coordination, Needs Assessment and Capacities – benefited from the management of a multi-agency Steering Committee (SC), while representatives from the evaluation departments of the two respective commissioning agencies for the LRRD and Funding Response studies constituted the SC. These bodies took the major decisions on the evaluations, including the selection of the evaluation teams and signing-off on the final report.

The same three studies employed one overall team each, with different use of national consultants in countries visited. The LRRD study, on the other hand, first employed a senior researcher to undertake a review of current debates in LRRD. This then provided the conceptual framework for the work of the subsequent evaluation, which was undertaken by three separate teams: one looking at the response in Sri Lanka, one in Indonesia, and another undertaking a policy-level analysis that also involved work at HQ. These three studies were then synthesised into the overall TEC LRRD Report.

The Funding Response study was the most complex of the five evaluations. Broken down into eight overall

**Table A5. Contributors to the TEC Core and the TEC's thematic evaluations**

Contributors	TEC Core		TEC thematic evaluation studies					
	Money received 2005/06	Money pledged 2006/07	Coordination	Needs Assessment	Capacities	LRRD	Funding Response	
	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$	euro	
<b>Donors</b>								
AusAid (Australia)	–	–	–	–	–	–	4,200	
BMZ (Germany)	–	–	65,000	23,392	48,780	50,440	45,500	
Cida (Canada)	–	44,582 <sup>c</sup>	–	25,641	–	–	–	
Danida (Denmark)	31,619 <sup>b</sup>	68,628 <sup>c</sup>	–	–	–	–	169,550	
DFA (Ireland)	–	23,502 <sup>c</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	
DFID (UK)	34,796 <sup>b</sup>	–	53,178	86,060	–	–	–	
IOB/MFA (Netherlands)	59,035 <sup>b</sup>	–	65,000	–	–	–	30,500	
JICA/MoFA & JBIC (Japan)	–	–	–	–	–	–	57,000	
MFA (France)	11,877 <sup>b</sup>	–	14,000	–	15,384	–	–	
MFA (Luxembourg)	–	38,318 <sup>c</sup>	–	–	–	–	70,000	
NORAD (Norway)	25,000	32,760 <sup>c</sup>	50,000	–	101,460	–	–	
NZAid (New Zealand)	–	30,923 <sup>c</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	
SDC (Switzerland)	–	–	–	22,000	–	–	–	
Sida (Sweden)	36,808 <sup>b</sup>	27,362 <sup>c</sup>	–	–	8,000	537,000	–	
USAID (United States)	30,000	–	28,555	30,000	30,000	–	–	
<b>UN agencies</b>								
FAO	–	–	–	6,000	–	–	–	
OCHA	25,000	15,000	101,467	–	14,000	–	–	
UNDP	–	25,000	–	–	100,000	–	–	
UNFPA	–	–	10,000	–	–	–	–	
UNICEF	50,000	20,000	50,000	–	50,000	–	–	
WFP	10,000	10,000	–	15,000	–	–	–	
WHO	–	–	–	7,800	–	–	–	
<b>INGOs/RCM/Other</b>								
ActionAid International	–	–	–	–	4,500	–	–	
Cordaid	–	–	–	–	24,444	–	–	
DaRa International	–	20,053	50,000	–	–	–	94,660	
IFRC	20,000	20,586 <sup>c</sup>	20,000	–	–	–	–	
World Vision Canada	–	–	–	–	–	–	17,000	
World Vision International	4,109 <sup>b</sup>	12,000	–	–	–	–	17,000	
<b>Total<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>euro</b>						<b>635,410</b>	
	<b>US\$</b>	<b>338,244</b>	<b>388,713</b>	<b>507,500</b>	<b>215,893</b>	<b>396,568</b>	<b>587,400</b>	<b>803,762</b>

**Note A** For 2005/06 money originally pledged was equal to expenditure. However, currency fluctuations meant less was actually received (see note B below) and so the two totals look different.

**B** These figures reflect the amount received after conversion from the currency in which the money was donated (from GBP to US\$). They are therefore approximate and account for the difference between the total in this table for 2005/06 and the expenditure shown in Table A3 (see note A above).

**C** These figures have also been converted from donating currencies to US\$ for ease of reading in one currency.

study areas, this evaluation consists of 30 sub-studies that have been synthesised into a single report for each of the topics considered. These sub-syntheses were themselves then synthesised into the overall Funding Response Report.

#### **A4.1 Role of the thematic evaluation Steering Committees**

The evaluation Steering Committees (SCs) provided *overall management guidance* for the evaluation, as well as funding. The SCs were chaired by the commissioning agency (or agencies) for each study; and for three of the five evaluations – Coordination, Needs Assessment and Capacities – the SC included a further core group of participating agencies. This information can be found in Table A7. The role of the SCs was to:

- ensure an inclusive process to finalise the ToR
- provide funding for the evaluation and assist in the mobilisation of resources (financial and in-kind)
- participate in the selection of the evaluation team members (identifying the team, and ensuring quality throughout the process)
- participate in teleconferences on key issues regarding this evaluation

- advise their own agencies and staff on this evaluation as well as coordinating agency internal substantive feedback back to the group
- ensure that field representatives were aware of the TEC and fully involved and available to contribute to the evaluation
- participate in any workshop that may be planned once the draft report has been received.

#### **A4.2 Role of the thematic Working Groups**

In addition, the evaluations on Coordination, Needs Assessment and Capacities also benefited from a wider evaluation Working Group (WG). The WG consisted of additional agencies and donors that ‘signed up’ to participate – either in terms of funding or providing substantive input – in the different evaluations but were not in a position to provide active management guidance.

### **A5 The TEC thematic studies at a glance**

The tables starting on p132 provide information on several different aspects of the individual TEC thematic studies.



**Table A6. Coverage, timeframe, interview sources and costs of the thematic evaluations**

	Coordination study	Needs Assessment study	Capacities study	Study on LRRD	Funding Response study <sup>1</sup>
Geographic coverage	Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, (Thailand)	Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand Agency and donor HQ in North America & Europe	Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand	Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand Agency and donor HQ in North America & Europe	Australia, Spain, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, UK, EC, USA, Germany, India, Ireland, Indonesia, Japan, Sri Lanka, Luxembourg, Thailand, Netherlands
Timeframe	<b>Period studied:</b> 26 Dec 2004–30 Nov 2005 (relief through initial recovery period) <b>Of the evaluation:</b> <i>Preparation:</i> 1 week • <i>Fieldwork:</i> 8 weeks (2.5 weeks per key country) • <i>Writing country reports &amp; thematic evaluation report:</i> mid-Nov to end Mar 2006 (including widespread consultation with field and HQ stakeholders)	<b>Period studied:</b> Limited to needs assessments initiated in the first 3 months after the tsunami Evaluation of the decision-making process triggered by needs assessments had no fixed timeframe, and included both immediate and longer term decision-making processes <b>Of the evaluation:</b> <i>Preparation:</i> 1 week • <i>Fieldwork:</i> 2–3 weeks in the major countries; 15-days-worth of visits to agency HQ • <i>Writing thematic evaluation report:</i> early Nov 2005 to Feb 2006	<b>Period studied:</b> First 8 months of response (relief through initial recovery period) <b>Of the evaluation:</b> <i>Preparation</i> (initial desk review, HQ interviews, TEC Inception Workshop, Team briefing): 2 weeks • <i>Fieldwork:</i> 2.5 months (3 weeks Indonesia and Sri Lanka, 10 days Thailand and Maldives) • <i>Writing country reports &amp; thematic evaluation report:</i> mid-Nov 2005 to mid-Apr 2006	<b>Period studied:</b> Phase 1 of the LRRD study: First 9–10 months of the response <b>Of the evaluation:</b> <i>Preparation:</i> Literature review: 3 weeks (Jul–Sep 2005) • <i>Preparation:</i> Country and policy studies: 1–2 weeks • <i>Fieldwork</i> for two country studies: 2–3 weeks each during Oct–Nov 2005 • <i>Fieldwork</i> for policy study: 2 weeks in Oct and Nov 2005 • <i>Writing country and policy reports: Writing synthesis</i> of these reports (the final thematic evaluation): Nov–Dec 2005 (with revisions through Mar 2006)	<b>Period studied:</b> Studied the fundraising and disbursement over the first 6 months following the tsunami More information is contained in the 30 sub-studies of this evaluation. See: <a href="http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org">www.tsunami-evaluation.org</a>
Interview sources	UN (95); affected governments (75); INGOs & RC Movement (70); military linked to the UN, donors/ IFIs & affected governments (42); donors/IFIs (41); local NGOs/CBOs (28) <b>TOTAL:</b> 351	UN agencies (125); donors (54); INGOs (44); local government (43); other (42) <b>TOTAL:</b> 306 Affected individuals/families: IDN: 49 LKA: 86	Local & national NGOs (176); INGOs & RC Movement (140); UN (121); national-level government (55); district-level government (46); Bilaterals (30) <b>TOTAL:</b> 568 Affected individuals/families: IDN: 1000 LKA: 1155	Affected individuals/families: IDN: 1227 LKA: 915	Information in each of the 30 sub-studies. See: <a href="http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org">www.tsunami-evaluation.org</a>
Cost of the evaluation <sup>2</sup>	Approximately <b>US\$494,500</b>	<b>US\$215,782</b>	<b>US\$392,672</b>	Approximately <b>US\$588,700</b>	<b>Total: euro635,410</b> (US\$803,762; FXConverter. 16 Jun 2006: euro1=US\$1.265) <sup>3</sup>
<b>Notes</b> IDN: Indonesia, LKA: Sri Lanka 1 The funding study involved separate studies for each key donor country and the four most affected countries. Within the donor countries, there were separate studies for NGO funding, government funding and general public funding. There was an additional study of overall UN funding flows and one on Red Cross/Crescent flows, making 30 separate studies in all. 2 Please note that not all evaluations had finalised their accounts at the time of writing this report. 3 For a cost breakdown of the individual funding sub-studies, please see the Funding Response Report (2006).					

**Table A7. Research methods, limitations and constraints for the TEC evaluation**

	Research methods employed	Limitations and constraints
Coordination study	Desk review & literature search • Multi-stakeholder consultation workshops/debriefings in IDN, LKA & MDV • Semi-structured interviews with key actors; supplementary written inputs • Group interviews • Phone interviews • Insertion of questions into TEC Capacities Study surveys in IDN & LKA • Collection of written data from the field • Evaluation exit stakeholder meetings in the field • Evaluation Steering Committee & TEC team advice & inputs • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies.	Lack of time for planning & desk review of documents prior to fieldwork • Selection of interviewees dependent on who was present in each country (absence of key informants given time of evaluation) • Evaluation burden on interviewees • Lack of coherence & coordination between TEC teams in the field (despite best efforts) • Lack of agreed benchmark standards for coordination against which to assess its efficiency, effectiveness, etc (study based on observations of experienced people about what worked & what did not).
Needs Assessment study	Desk review & literature search, including review & inventory of assessments in IDN, LKA, IND, MDV • Multi-stakeholder consultation workshops/debriefings in IDN, LKA & MDV • Observations/field visits to five sites in three countries (3 in IDN; 2 in LKA; 1 in THA) • Semi-structured interviews with humanitarian personnel – using a snowball approach with saturation coverage • Interviews with affected individuals • Insertion of questions into TEC Capacities Study surveys in IDN & LKA • Constant triangulation • Dissemination of initial drafts to over 250 interviewees for validity check & feedback • Evaluation Steering Committee & TEC team advice & inputs • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies.	Lack of time for planning & desk review of documents prior to fieldwork • Field visits nine months after the onset meant key staff turnover limited the number of interviewees there in the first three months. This was offset by systematically tracing key individuals & locating them in HQ offices • Restricted access to assessment reports • Lack of ownership of the TEC evaluation: a few senior officials, particularly in the UN, did not see the need for an evaluation not directly mandated by one of their key donors • Evaluation fatigue found to have 'absolutely no influence' on the findings of the report.
Capacities study	Desk review & literature search • Multi-stakeholder consultation workshops/ debriefings in IDN, LKA & MDV • Two combined qualitative & quantitative surveys with claim-holders in IDN & LKA • Qualitative interviews with institutional stakeholders • Evaluation exit stakeholder meetings in the field • Evaluation Steering Committee & TEC team advice & inputs • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies.	Lack of time for planning & desk review of documents prior to fieldwork • Lack of time in the field (& reduction of overall time due to illness & accident in the evaluation team) • Month of Ramadan.
Study on LRRD	<b>LRRD Synthesis Report</b> Qualitative analysis of the constituent reports • Evaluation exit stakeholder meetings in the field • TEC team advice & inputs • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies • <b>All three empirical studies</b> Inception reports • Semi-structured interviews • Telephone interviews • Focus group discussions • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies • <b>Country studies</b> Quantitative surveys.	Varied approaches in the three empirical studies meant data collected are not fully comparable, thus full use of survey data not possible • Findings are indicative rather than conclusive: (1) because assessment of LRRD requires longitudinal data & this is not yet available; (2) because responding agencies are learning & many of the issues in this study may be addressed by the agencies • There will be a Phase II LRRD study in early 2007, at which point more definitive conclusions may be possible • <b>All three empirical studies</b> Evaluation fatigue. Difficulty identifying who to interview due to complexity of LRRD concept.
Funding Response study	Analysis of financial records of donors and aid agencies • Structured interviews with aid officials • Focus group interviews and structured individual interviews with beneficiary communities • Horizontal coordination with other TEC teams & studies • TEC team advice & inputs.	Many agencies do not keep financial information in a format that makes it easily available to outside investigators • It was not always clear, particularly with local funding flows, how much were new funds and how much were redirected old funds • Funding is not 'tagged' as it flows from Donor to UN to NGO etc, so there may be some double counting. However, the study has done its best to eliminate this • Little information was available during the evaluation period to allow the study to compile a good picture of overall end-point disbursement to beneficiaries.
	<b>Note</b> IDN: Indonesia, LKA: Sri Lanka, THA: Thailand; MDV: Maldives.	



**Table A8. TEC evaluation team members, researchers and management**

	Coordination study	Needs Assessment study	Capacities study	Study on LRRD	Funding Response study
<b>Evaluation team: core team members</b>	Jon Bennett (team leader; UK) • William Bertrand (USA) • Clare Harkin (civil–military issues; UK) • Stanley Samarasinghe (USA/ Sri Lanka) • Hemantha Wickramatillake (NGOs in Sri Lanka)	Claude de Ville de Goyet (team leader; Belgium) • Leslie C. Morinière (France)	Arjuna Parakrama (team leader; Sri Lanka) • Smruti Patel (India) • Elisabeth Scheper (Netherlands)	<b>LRRD Synthesis Report</b> Author & LRRD Advisor: Ian Christoplos <b>LRRD Policy Study</b> Hugh Goyder (team leader; UK); Cowan Coventry; Jerry Adams (UK); Tania Kaiser (UK); Susanne Williams; Ian Smillie (Canada) <b>LRRD Sri Lanka Case Study</b> Bjorn Ternstrom (team leader); Ellen Girerd-Barclay; Darini Rajasingham <b>LRRD Indonesia Case Study</b> Emery Brusset (team leader); Anne Davies; Susanne Pedersen	<b>Funding Synthesis Report</b> Michael Flint (UK) • Hugh Goyder (UK)  For all other studies, please see <b>Table A9</b>
<b>Additional researchers</b>	Michael Adhikara Budi (Indonesia); Dr Achmad Harjadi (Indonesia); Bryan Heal (Canada); Akhmad Hidayatno (Indonesia); Christina Lopriore (Italy); Dr Ernie Widianty Rahardjo (Indonesia)	Abdur Rofi (Indonesia); Sudarshana Gunawardana (Sri Lanka); Janey Lawry White (UK)	<b>LRRD: A Review of the Debate</b> Margie Buchanan Smith (UK) & Paola Fabbri (Italy) (background document that informed conceptual frameworks of the three empirical studies)		

**Table A8. TEC evaluation team members, researchers and management** continued

	Coordination study	Needs Assessment study	Capacities study	Study on LRRD	Funding Response study
Steering Committees	<b>Steering Committee</b> OCHA (lead) IFRC Save the Children – UK UNDP UNFPA UNICEF USAID  In addition, substantive input was received from: RC/HC office, Sri Lanka; RC/HC office, Maldives; RC/HC office, Indonesia; UNORC, Banda Aceh; UNHCR, Sri Lanka; IFRC, all countries; Oxfam; World Vision; Muslim Aid; Islamic Relief; and CRS	<b>Steering Committee</b> FAO (joint lead) SDC (joint lead) WHO (joint lead)  To assist these agencies with implementation of the evaluation, the International Centre for Migration and Health (ICMH) was contracted to facilitate administrative and logistical support.  In addition, substantive input was received at various stages during the project: Cida; Groupe URD; CICR; DaRa International; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; HAP-I; Sphere; University of Westminster; USAID/OFDA; WFP	<b>Steering Committee</b> UNDP (joint lead) DMI (joint lead) ActionAid International Cordaid UNICEF  <b>Working Group</b> NORAD FAO Tearfund (UK) HPG/ODI Oxfam (GB/ NL) ICMH SDC RedR WHO Independent consultant (Ian Christoplos)	<b>Steering Committee</b> Sida (lead)  Advised by Ian Christoplos (independent)	<b>Steering Committee</b> Danida (lead)  Advised by Peter Walker (Feinstein International Famine Centre)

**Table A9. Team members for the funding response constituent studies**

Global Flows, RC and Local Response	Donor Government Studies	Private Funding Studies
<p><b>Global Flows and UN/CAP</b> Judith Randel Tony German Tasneem Mowjee Lydia Baker</p> <p><b>Red Cross/Red Crescent</b> Christian Bugnion Silvia Hidalgo Lucía Fernández</p> <p><b>Local Response</b> Overview: Earl Kessler, ADPC</p> <p>Indonesia Liliana Marulanda (Forum LSM Aceh, team leader) and Syamsul Rizal/Syiah Kuala University</p> <p>India: Balachandran (team leader) and Haran Sowmya, principal researcher; Environmental Planning Collaborative</p> <p>Sri Lanka: Anoja Wickramasinghe, Peradenia University (team leader) and Kamalini Fernando (principal researcher)</p> <p>Thailand: Dr Seree, Rangsit University (team leader) and Khun Montri of the Royal Thai Government/Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation</p>	<p>Synthesis: Silvia Hidalgo (team leader), Ricardo Solé and Achim Engelhardt</p> <p>Australia: Bernard Broughton and Philip Fradd</p> <p>Canada: Liz Satow</p> <p>Denmark: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>ECHO: Silvia Hidalgo, Ricardo Solé and Kim Wuyts</p> <p>Germany: Peter Wolff</p> <p>Ireland: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>Japan: Tomoko Honda and Yuki Todoroki</p> <p>Netherlands: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>Spain: Silvia Hidalgo, Velina Stoianova and Lucía Fernández</p> <p>Achim Engelhardt, Julia Flores</p> <p>Sweden: Paula San Pedro, Silvia Hidalgo and Virginia Tortella</p> <p>UK: Silvia Hidalgo and Achim Engelhardt</p> <p>USA: Liz Satow</p> <p>UK: Julia Flores</p>	<p><b>NGOs</b> Denmark: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>Ireland: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>Japan: Tomoko Honda and Yuki Todoroki</p> <p>Netherlands: Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen</p> <p>Spain: Augustín Moya</p> <p><b>General Public</b> Germany: Dagmar Bär, Burkhard Wilke, Christel Neff, Tanja Ibrahim</p> <p>Spain: Gilles Gasser, Ricardo Solé</p> <p><b>Corporate Sector</b> Gilles Gasser, Ricardo Solé</p>

# Annex B: TEC synthesis terms of reference

## B1 Background

Early in January 2005, in recognition of the added value joint evaluations bring to the humanitarian sector, a number of ALNAP members began to discuss how best to coordinate evaluations of tsunami response. The intention was twofold:

- 1 To promote a sector-wide approach to evaluations of the tsunami response in order to optimise sector-wide learning.
- 2 To develop, test and validate procedures or the future timely establishment of such an evaluation coordination (coalition) mechanism that could facilitate such an approach.

An interagency and donor meeting was held in Geneva on 23 February 2005 to discuss how best to develop this approach. At that meeting participants agreed to constitute an 'evaluation coalition' (now called the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, or TEC), guided by a Core Management Group (CMG). It was also agreed that the ALNAP Secretariat would act as the facilitating platform for the initiative.

## B2 The Synthesis Report

It is intended that the TEC Synthesis Report will be the primary joint output of the TEC. The report will draw not only from the six joint thematic evaluations within the TEC framework, but also from other learning from the crisis including any evaluations conducted by the TEC members.

### B2.1 The overall objective of the TEC Synthesis Report

The Synthesis Report is intended to promote beneficial change in the humanitarian sector by distilling the learning from all of the evaluations on the response to the earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004. This learning includes not only the TEC's joint thematic evaluations but also evaluations and studies from agencies that are part of the wider TEC network.

The report will present a concise overview of the learning from the response. It is intended that the

Synthesis Report will improve policy and performance within the humanitarian sector by:

- providing the humanitarian sector with the means to reflect on its performance in the tsunami response, identifying generic strengths and weaknesses through a synthesis of the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations made available to the TEC
- commenting on the overall coherence of the TEC evaluation effort, including any examples of duplication or major gaps between the component evaluations.

The Synthesis Report will also highlight issues for ongoing TEC studies.

- The Consultant will ensure that the conclusions of the report focus on lessons learned from the experiences of the evaluations. Concentrating on the tsunami-affected regions but framed by the broader context, the conclusions will also provide some indications for evaluators as to specific themes to focus on when carrying out evaluations of similar situations in the future. The conclusions will also provide an input for agencies' ongoing planning in the region.
- The Synthesis Report should advocate for any necessary change in policy and practices in the humanitarian sector by clearly showing where such change is necessary, and supporting this with examples and reasoned argument.

## B3 Reporting lines

The Consultant will report directly to the Head of ALNAP and will work in close cooperation with the Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator (EAC) and the Researcher and Deputy Coordinator (RDC). The EAC and RDC will be subsidiary authors for the report and will draft material in accordance with the outline agreed between the Consultant and Head of ALNAP. The Consultant will act as the team leader for the Synthesis Report writing team.

## B4 Timeframe

A maximum of 30 person-days have been allocated to complete the consultancy. All main parties will be in regular contact to review progress. A provisional schedule is shown in Figure B4.

**Figure B4. A provisional schedule**

Date	Action
<b>November 2005</b>	Consultant attends the one-day workshop with the evaluation teams to understand what the key messages are likely to be.
<b>December 2005</b>	Consultant reads the initial draft thematic evaluations, comments on the apparent key messages, and attends the workshop with the evaluation teams and CMG in Brussels on 10 December. Consultant comments on the draft of the key-messages report prepared by the EAC.
<b>January 2006</b>	Consultant reads other available evaluations.
<b>Mid-January 2006</b>	Consultant visits ALNAP Secretariat to discuss progress and agree on the outline of the Synthesis Report.
<b>Mid-February 2006</b>	Consultant submits first draft to ALNAP Secretariat for review.
<b>Late February 2006</b>	Modifications and redrafting, including a meeting between the Consultant and the CMG, probably in London.
<b>1 March 2006</b>	Consultant submits final draft of report and summary sheet to Project Leader. Report summarised and submitted to academic journals.

## B5 Outputs

The Consultant will be responsible for the following outputs:

- 1** the Synthesis Report, expected to be 15,000 to 20,000 words in length, exclusive of annexes
- 2** a short summary of the Synthesis Report of no more than 1,200 words
- 3** a condensed version of the Synthesis Report suitable for publication in academic journals.

## B6 Selection process

The selection process for the Consultant is as follows:

- 1** Candidates are requested to submit their CV together with three samples of their work to the ALNAP Secretariat as early as possible but no later than 1700 British Summer Time, 15 August 2005. One of the work samples submitted should be a recent example of a synthesis report that they have written. No application is required other than a brief cover note confirming their interest in the consultancy and outlining any prior commitments.
- 2** Selection of the shortlisted candidates will be based primarily on their writing samples, but also on their CV.
- 3** Telephone interviews will be held on 18 August for the shortlisted candidates. The interview panel will consist of three members of the TEC Core Management Group.

# Annex C: Biographies

## C1 Synthesis and TEC team

### **John Telford, Synthesis Team Leader and Co-author, Synthesis Report**

John Telford is a consultant in international humanitarian and development aid. Over the last 20 years he has worked as a practitioner, trainer, analyst and evaluator worldwide, especially in Latin America, covering both natural disaster and conflict-related programmes. He has served as National Director of Amnesty International, Ireland; as a teacher and journalist in Colombia for six years; and for six years with UNHCR, including as a Senior Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer. He has subsequently worked with a wide range of international humanitarian organisations (UN, NGO and donor agencies) and with affected governments and communities. John has lectured in universities in Ireland, Central American countries and Colombia. He has contributed to a variety of publications, including specialised reviews, textbooks and news media.

### **John Cosgrave, TEC Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator (July 2005–April 2006) and Co-author, Synthesis Report**

John Cosgrave is an independent Irish consultant with nearly 30 years work experience in 50 countries on the management and operation of relief and development programmes. John has worked as an independent consultant since 1997, having spent most of his previous professional life managing NGO projects and programmes. Most of John's work now consists of evaluating programmes in the field to identify how they can be improved. He has undertaken evaluations for the EC, ECHO, and for the aid departments of the Danish, Norwegian, US and Irish governments, as well as for NGOs including Oxfam, CARE, the Danish Refugee Council, and the DEC in the UK.

John has also worked for UNHCR, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), and WFP. He has developed and delivered training in over a dozen countries, principally in the area of emergency preparedness, emergency management and NGO

security. John is an engineer by training, and holds two masters degrees.

### **Rachel Houghton, TEC Researcher/ Deputy Coordinator (May 2005 – April 2006); Coordinator (May 2006 – present) and Contributing Author, Synthesis Report**

Rachel Houghton has spent most of her professional life working in development and humanitarian NGOs and research institutes. Recent roles have included consultancies for an international women's organisation in Bosnia, where she was responsible for designing a multi-country participatory M & E framework, and work for the UK's national Charities Evaluation Service. Prior to this Rachel held predominantly communications and advocacy roles in a variety of NGOs and community development organisations in South Africa and the US, before joining ODI as the Deputy Coordinator of the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) in 1999. She left this role to pursue a masters degree in Advanced Social Research Methods and Social Policy (distinction) before re-joining ODI, this time with ALNAP, to coordinate the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

Rachel has contributed to a variety of publications, including editing three out of five volumes of ALNAP's annual *Review of Humanitarian Action*. She sits on the Policy and Programmes Committee of Womankind Worldwide, and is currently advising the agency on how to conduct a learning review.

### **Sherylin Thompson, Media Specialist**

Sherylin Thompson is a media consultant specialising in the not-for-profit sector. Her background in press and media relations has been gained largely within the UK voluntary sector. Over the past eight years she has worked for national organisations including Help the Aged, the Royal National Institute for Deaf and Hard of Hearing People (RNID) and National Children's Homes (NCH). Within these organisations Sherylin has developed media strategies supporting lobbying work and initiatives extending into overseas development, such as children's homes in Zimbabwe.

### **TEC Administrators**

The TEC has had three Administrators: **Laura Kitchin** (September 2005–March 2006); **Charlotte Woodhill** (April 2006–May 2006); and **Chinwe Ozugha** (May 2006–present).

## **C2 Synthesis peer reviewers**

### **Yasemin Aysan, Independent Consultant**

Dr Yasemin Aysan has been working in the humanitarian and development fields for more than 25 years in over 20 countries. She was the director of the Disaster Management Centre at Oxford Brookes University (1989–1993) where she previously served in various positions (1979–1989) related to training, national capacity building and research in disaster management. She worked as a senior policy advisor and subsequently as the director of the Disaster Preparedness Department at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (1993–1999). At the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP, she served as the senior policy adviser and director for the Disaster Reduction Unit (1999–2004).

Since 2005 she has been working as an independent consultant in disaster risk management and recovery planning. She served as a member of the World Bank recovery assessment teams to Sri Lanka, after the tsunami, and to Pakistan, following the earthquake.

### **Dr David, Disaster Mitigation Institute**

Dr David joined the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in 1966 and worked in various fields including district administration, rural development (encompassing development and poverty alleviation), management of government-owned corporations and agriculture. Dr David has an MSc in Social Planning in Developing Countries and a PhD in Commerce and Business Management. He currently works with the Disaster Mitigation Institute in India where his field of specialty is in food security in emergency situations. He has also been involved in assessing work undertaken by various actors in tsunami relief in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Dr David is also a consultant on rural development with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

### **Will Day, Special Advisor to UNDP**

Will Day has spent the past 20 years working with a range of relief and development NGOs, including Save

the Children, Oxfam, the Opportunity Trust and CARE International, in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. He has worked for the BBC World Service for Africa, and was responsible for setting up Comic Relief's grant-making programme for Africa. Will sits on the Boards of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and BBC Children in Need; he is the external member of the BBC's CSR Board; and is an independent assessor for the public appointments process of the DCMS.

Will is currently Special Advisor to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in which capacity he is involved with the UN's Growing Sustainable Business initiative. As a Senior Associate of the University of Cambridge Programme for Industry he is a regular faculty member of the Prince of Wales Business and Environment Programme at Madingly Hall. He has recently been appointed Chair of Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP), a non-profit company bringing together private-sector and NGO member organisations to pursue the Millennium Development Goal for water and sanitation in the poorest parts of the world.

### **Andrea Woodhouse**

Andrea Woodhouse worked in Aceh as adviser to the Indonesian cabinet minister in charge of tsunami relief and reconstruction during the emergency phase of the tsunami response. She has worked for the World Bank and the United Nations in Indonesia and East Timor, focusing on issues of corruption, conflict and community development. She has a masters degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics, and has lived in Burma, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Indonesia and the United States.

## **C3 Members of the Core Management Group**

### **Mihir Bhatt, AIDMI**

Mihir R Bhatt studied and practised architecture and city planning in Ahmedabad and Delhi, India, and later Cambridge and Washington DC, USA. On returning to India in 1989 he initiated a project on disaster risk mitigation with a team of 3, which is now the 78-member and 14-activity-centre All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI). AIDMI works on both direct action and community learning.

Mihir has also studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He received the Russell E



Train Institutional Fellowship from the World Wildlife Fund, USA (1997), the Eisenhower Fellowship, USA (2000), and recently the Ashoka International Fellowship, USA (2004). He has set up a disaster insurance and mitigation programme for the 12,000 micro-enterprise beneficiaries of the Livelihood Relief Fund of AIDMI in three states of India. Currently, he is evaluating the work of UN and international agencies on tsunami relief and rehabilitation activities in coastal areas of South India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

**Tijana Bojanic, IFRC (replaced on the CMG by Margaret Stansberry, January 2006)**

Tijana Bojanic is currently a temporary officer in the Monitoring and Evaluation Department at the IFRC, where she has worked for over five years. Just prior to this she was Acting Head of Department. In her former roles at the IFRC before she was Acting Head, Tijana designed and managed two rounds of evaluations of the IFRC tsunami operation, participating in the development of an impact-assessment system. She has designed and taken a lead role in the process of improving the implementation of the 'Strategy of the Movement'. Tijana is currently working for a Doctorate of Philosophy in International Economics.

**Amy Cavender, World Vision International (replaced on the CMG by Jamo Huddle, March 2006)**

Amy Cavender has spent most of her professional life working for humanitarian aid and development NGOs in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the UK. Most recently, she joined World Vision International (WVI) to focus on assessment, design, monitoring and evaluation in the policy and advocacy arena. From January 2005, she led World Vision UK's coordination of the tsunami response, overseeing programme design in the four worst affected countries, as well as representing DEC agencies and WVI on the TEC CMG.

Prior to this, Amy was Head of Monitoring and Evaluation at BESO, responsible for impact-review processes in both economic and social sectors for 60 countries. Previously, Amy managed a variety of NGO projects and programmes over 10 years, working for organisations including The Gaia Foundation, World Vision, LICC and at the grassroots with CBOs in East Africa. Amy holds a masters degree in Environment and Development.

**Niels Dabelstein, Danida**

Niels Dabelstein has been head of Evaluation in Danida since 1988. He was Chair of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation from 1997 to 2002 and Vice-chair in 1996 and from 2002 to 2005. He has been a pioneer in several aspects of development evaluation. For example, he was instrumental in drafting the DAC Principles for Aid Evaluation in 1990, the DAC Guidelines for Evaluating Humanitarian assistance in 1998 and the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards in 2006. In 1994 he initiated and led the first major joint evaluation of humanitarian aid – of the International Response to the Genocide in Rwanda. In Danida and in his work for the DAC he has pioneered joint evaluations and evaluation capacity building.

**Stefan Dahlgren, Sida**

Stefan Dahlgren is a senior evaluator at Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit and has, during the last three years, worked largely with evaluations in the humanitarian area. Before rejoining the evaluation department in late 2003 he was head of Sida's office in Afghanistan, and spent four years for Sida in Vietnam, working on governance and legal-sector issues, as well as support to culture and media. Stefan joined Sida in 1987 and worked with evaluations for several years before becoming head of Sida's evaluation unit from 1991 to 1993. Before joining Sida he worked in housing and planning research, mainly in Sweden but also in Tanzania.

**Susanne Frueh, Chair, TEC CMG**

Susanne is an international development professional with over 20 years experience in the evaluation, planning, design, appraisal, and management of development and humanitarian programmes. She has extensive international experience working for several UN agencies on programmes and initiatives in Africa, Asia and Latin America, combining hands-on operational know-how with corporate policy, evaluation and results-based management expertise. Currently Susanne heads the Evaluation and Studies Unit of OCHA, with the aim to strengthen OCHA's effectiveness and accountability in the coordination of humanitarian assistance.

**André Griekspoor, WHO (replaced on the CMG by Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin, April 2006)**

André Griekspoor is a medical doctor with a masters degree in international public health. He joined the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2000, based in the then Emergency and Humanitarian Action Department



(EHA), now Health Action in Crises (HAC). His main responsibilities as an evaluation expert have been to develop the evaluation function of WHO in emergencies. He has managed and participated in several evaluations of WHO's performance. André was extensively involved in assessments and formulating strategies within the interagency Consolidated Appeal Process. In March 2006 he joined the Evaluation and Performance Audit unit of Internal Oversight Services at WHO.

Previously, André worked for nine years with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), as a field doctor and medical coordinator in South Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Liberia, and was health advisor and later the head of monitoring and evaluation for MSF in Amsterdam. Since 1997 he's been a full member of the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), and also served on its steering committee.

#### **François Grünewald, Groupe URD**

Francois Grünewald is an engineer in agricultural science, specialising in rural economy, and is Associate Professor at Paris XII University. He spent 25 years in development, emergency and post-disaster rehabilitation projects in Africa, Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand), Central Europe and Central Latin America, as well as at HQ levels. He has worked with NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC. For five years he ran the Agricultural Rehabilitation Unit of ICRC. In 1997, he became chairman of a French research, evaluation and training institute, Groupe URD (Urgence-Rehabilitation-Developpement), doing research and evaluation work for the EU, the UN and NGOs.

Professor Grünewald has written several books and articles on complex emergencies and the management of socio-natural disasters. He has been team leader for the evaluation of the UN food security response to Bar el Ghazal Famine in 1998, the Post-Mitch inter-NGO evaluation process from 1999 to 2004; the DFID--UNICEF evaluation of the response to the Darfur crisis, and the evaluation of the French response to the tsunami.

#### **Jamo Huddle**

Based in Singapore, Jamo Huddle is the Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager for World Vision's Asia Tsunami Response Team (ATRT). Prior to joining ATRT in 2005, Jamo worked for C-SAFE (a consortium of international NGOs – World Vision, CARE and Catholic Relief Service) as the M&E Regional Technical Advisor, operating in Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe to support vulnerable communities facing the southern

Africa regional food crisis. From 1997 to 2002 Jamo worked as a Senior Nutritionist and Team Leader for the World Vision Canada Nutrition Team. During this time she organised the CIDA-funded international Micronutrient Conference, in Hull, Canada. From May 1993 to June 1994, Jamo worked as Field Research Manager for Guelph-Malawi Nutrition Project in Malawi, Africa. Her responsibility included all phases of research project: implementation, collection and analysis of data. This research was funded by the International Development Research Centre. Jamo holds a Ph.D. in Applied Human Nutrition from University of Guelph.

#### **Christoph Jakob, SDC**

Christoph Jakob has worked for humanitarian and development agencies for the last 15 years, and has a masters degree in humanitarian action. Since 2003 he has been responsible for evaluation in the humanitarian aid department of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Previously he worked for NGOs and UN agencies, combating the trafficking of children and women in Southeast Asia, and managing relief and development programmes in other parts of the world.

#### **Simon Lawry White, UNICEF (replaced on the CMG by J Wayne MacDonald, September 2005)**

Simon Lawry-White has masters degrees in agricultural engineering and in business administration, and has worked in relief and development for 25 years. His former positions include: Programme Services Director of Oxfam GB; management consultant to government, the UN and NGOs; and manager of multiple evaluations of humanitarian programmes. Currently, he is Senior Programme Officer in the UNICEF Evaluation Office, responsible for evaluations of institutional performance.

#### **J Wayne MacDonald, UNICEF (from October 2005)**

J Wayne MacDonald is currently Senior Project Officer with UNICEF's Evaluation Office in New York, and responsible for leading the evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. From 1981 to 1998, Wayne held various managerial positions in the Canadian International Development Agency, related to humanitarian and NGO programming and evaluation. He is a former senior manager at the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva (1999–2003), where he was Head of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. As a consultant he has worked with various NGOs and UN agencies on strengthening organisational performance. From 2000 to 2002, he was Chair of the

Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).

#### **John Mitchell, ALNAP Secretariat**

John Mitchell is currently the Head of ALNAP (the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action), an interagency organisation aimed at improving accountability and performance in humanitarian action. John has worked in the humanitarian sector for 20 years, beginning his career with the British Government and the United Nations in Ethiopia (1984–86), where he worked as a UN field monitor.

In 1989 John set up a consultancy company specialising in participatory evaluations in humanitarian crises, and worked for a wide range of UN, donor and NGO clients in Africa and Asia. John has also worked in a number of advisory roles including on food security for ActionAid, disaster preparedness for the IFRC, and for six years as senior humanitarian adviser for the British Red Cross. He has published widely in journals and books.

#### **Miles Murray, CARE (left in Spring 2006)**

Miles Murray has until recently held the position of Emergency Programme Officer at CARE International UK, focusing solely on those areas affected by the tsunami. Over the last 10 years he has worked on both development and relief programmes in Southern Africa and Asia. He has worked for several periods in Zambia, most recently coordinating CARE's response to the 2002/3 drought. Miles has particular experience of food security and nutrition, and, having worked in the aftermath of the Gujarat earthquake, knowledge of shelter and reconstruction. He is currently investigating the possibility of marketing sorghum to promote crop diversification and therefore food security in Zambia.

#### **Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan, UNDP**

Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan is an Evaluation Advisor in the Evaluation Office of UNDP, and leads the Strategic and Thematic Evaluation Group. He co-managed the TEC thematic evaluation on Capacities. Prior to joining the UNDP Evaluation Office, he was part of the Harvard University research team studying global health inequalities. He did his PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and MPA (Public Policy) at Harvard University.

#### **Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin, FAO (from May 2006)**

Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin is a staff member of the FAO Evaluation Service. Over the past 20 years she has worked for multilateral agencies in the fields of rural development, food security and vulnerability information, analysis and policy, and disaster preparedness. She manages, supervises and leads evaluations, in particular on FAO's work in emergencies and rehabilitation. This has included an evaluation of FAO's programme in Afghanistan. She is currently overseeing the real-time evaluation of FAO's work in post-tsunami rehabilitation. She has undertaken several evaluation missions, on programmes related to food aid, in collaboration with WFP. Rachel's background is in economics, and she holds a post-masters diploma in international development economics from the University of Paris X Nanterre.

#### **Margaret Stansberry, IFRC (from January 2006)**

Margaret Stansberry joined the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva in February 2006. For the previous three years, she was an independent consultant conducting evaluations and needs assessments, setting up monitoring systems and developing planning systems for clients including Care International, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, Winrock International, and the World Initiative for Soy in Human Health.

She has a masters degree in international relations from the State University of New York at Buffalo. She has worked in both conflict and natural-disaster settings for more than 10 years, covering more than 25 countries. From 1994 to 2003 she worked for the American Red Cross International Services, creating their planning, monitoring and evaluation department, and providing technical assistance to country delegations around the world.

## **C4 Thematic Evaluation Team Leaders**

#### **Jon Bennett (Coordination Report)**

Jon Bennet has had 30 years' experience in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe including Country Representative/Field Director posts and independent consultancies for development agencies – ranging from the UN, EU and NGOs. He is a socioeconomist and specialist in food security, rural development, relief, evaluation and NGO training. He was Executive Director of ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) from 1990–92, and founding Director of the Global IDP Project (1995–98).

From 2004–05 he held a D1 post as UN Team Leader, Joint Assessment Mission, Sudan. He has five published books and has been a Research Associate at the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University (1994–2000). He is a board member for Forced Migration Review and is currently Director of Oxford Development Consultants.

#### **Michael Flint (Funding Response Report)**

Michael Flint is an economist with 24 years postgraduate experience of international development programmes, the last 17 years as an independent evaluation consultant. His areas of expertise include: social and economic analysis; monitoring and evaluation; project and programme design and appraisal; rural and environmental issues; and performance assessment systems. Michael has been team leader/ lead author of over 20 major impact-evaluation studies, including 8 evaluation synthesis reports. The latter include DFID's first Development Effectiveness Report and the first three Annual Reports on Results and Impact for IFAD. He has designed, led and conducted several Country Programme Evaluations for DFID.

#### **Ian Christoplos (LRRD Report)**

Ian Christoplos is a researcher at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and an independent consultant. His research engagements focus on risk, recovery, rural development and agricultural services. He has worked as a researcher and practitioner in both development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. He is the co-author, together with Catherine Longley and Tom Slaymaker, of *Agricultural Rehabilitation: Mapping the Linkages between Humanitarian Relief, Social Protection and Development*, published by the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (2006) and co-editor, together with John Farrington, of *Poverty, Vulnerability, and Agricultural Extension: Policy Reforms in an Era of Globalization*, published by Oxford University Press in 2004.

#### **Dr Claude de Ville de Goyet (Needs Assessment Report)**

A Belgian national, Dr de Ville de Goyet graduated as a doctor of medicine from the University of Louvain, Belgium in 1965, and completed postgraduate studies in tropical medicine and public health. He also holds a BSc in Operational Research and Computer Sciences from the University of South Africa.

Following six years of public-health work in Africa, Dr de Ville de Goyet joined the Disaster Epidemiology Research Centre (CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium) as Executive Director (1973–1977). He is the author of numerous articles and publications, including the WHO manual, 'Management of Nutritional Emergencies in Large Populations'. For 25 years (1977–2002), he was Director of the Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief Coordination Program of the Pan American Health Organisation, regional office for the Americas of the World Health Organisation (PAHO/WHO). PAHO is a recognised leader in promoting health preparedness.

Since his retirement from PAHO in 2002, he has been a senior consultant to UN agencies and national governments, specialising in evaluation of preparedness and response projects across the world, including health response to complex emergencies in Bosnia and Kosovo and to cyclones in the Caribbean. He has regularly visited the tsunami-affected countries before this mission. In 2005, he received a certificate of distinction from the UN Sasakawa award.

#### **Professor Arjuna Parakrama (Capacities Report)**

Dr Parakrama currently teaches cultural studies and discourse analysis at the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. He has worked for the past 14 years as a consultant in the community development sector, specialising in capacity strengthening and working on conflict, notably with Oxfam Australia, and has been UNDP Peace & Development Advisor in Nepal. He has participated in evaluations of UNDP programmes in the Philippines, Macedonia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

# Annex D: TEC reports on CD-ROM

This Synthesis Report is published alongside the TEC's five thematic joint evaluations. An accompanying reference CD contains this report, all five of the thematic evaluations as well as all the sub-studies linked to these five reports. These sub-studies are listed in Table D1.

**Table D1. List of Thematic Report Sub-studies on accompanying CD-ROM**

Name of sub-report	Author(s)	Name of sub-report	Author(s)
<b>TEC Synthesis Report</b>		<b>Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response <i>continued</i></b>	
Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report	John Telford, John Cosgrave & Rachel Houghton	LRRD: Sri Lanka Case Study	Björn Ternström (team leader), Ellen Girard-Barclay, Darini Rajasingham, Yashwant Deshmukh, Susanne B Pedersen
<b>TEC Thematic Evaluations</b>		<b>Funding the Tsunami Response</b>	
Funding the tsunami response	Michael Flint & Hugh Goyder	Overall Funding Flows	Tony German, Judith Randel, Tasneem Mowjee, Lydia Baker
Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response	Ian Christopolos	Government Funding/Synthesis	Achim Engelhardt, Silvia Hidalgo, Ricardo Sole
Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities	Betty Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama & Smruti Patel	Government Funding/Australia	Bernard Broughton, Philip Fradd
Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries	Jon Bennett, William Bertrand, Clare Harkin, Stanley Samarasinghe & Hementha Wickramatillake	Government Funding/Canada	Liz Satow
The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response	Claude de Ville de Goyet & Lezlie Morinière	Government Funding/Denmark	Rie Andersen, Marina Buch Kristensen
<b>Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response</b>		Government Funding/European Commission	Silvia Hidalgo, Ricardo Sole, Kim Wuyts
LRRD: A Review of the Debate	Margie Buchanan-Smith & Paola Fabbri	Government Funding/Germany	Peter Wolff
LRRD: Indonesia Case Study	Mr Emery Brusset (team leader), Wartini Pramana, Anne Davies, Yashwant Deshmukh, Susanne B Pedersen. In cooperation with Team C Voter, Mr Robin Davies	Government Funding/Ireland	Rie Andersen & Marina Buch Kristensen
LRRD: The Policy Study	Hugh Goyder (team leader), with Cowan Coventry, Jerry Adams, Tania Kaiser, Suzanne Williams, Ian Smillie	Government Funding/Japan	Tomoko Honda & Yuki Todoroki
		Government Funding/The Netherlands	Rie Andersen and Marina Buch Kristensen
		Government Funding/Spain	Achim Engelhardt, Silvia Hidalgo, Velina Stoianova, Lucá Fernández, Julia Flores
		Government Funding/Sweden	Paula San Pedro, Silvia Hidalgo, Virginia Tortella
		Government Funding/UK	Achim Engelhardt & Silvia Hidalgo

**Table D1. List of Thematic Report Sub-studies on accompanying CD-ROM** *continued*

Name of sub-report	Author(s)	Name of sub-report	Author(s)
<b>Funding the Tsunami Response</b> <i>continued</i>		<b>The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response</b>	
Government Funding/US	Liz Satow	Desk review on Needs Assessments in Food Security/Food Aid	Cristina Lopriore
United Nations and Funding	Tony German, Judith Randel, Tasneem Mowjee, Lydia Baker	<b>Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-Affected Countries</b>	
IFRC and ICRC Funding	Christian Bugnion, Silvia Hidalgo, Lucía Fernández	Indonesia Case Study	Jon Bennett (team leader), Clare Harkin (civil-military issues), Stanley Samarasinghe
NGO Funding/Ireland	Rie Andersen & Marina Buch Kristensen	Sri Lanka Case Study	Jon Bennett – team leader, William Bertrand, Clare Harkin (civil-military issues), Stanley Samarasinghe, Hemantha Wickramatillake (NGOs in Sri Lanka)
NGO Funding/The Netherlands	Rie Andersen & Marina Buch Kristensen	The Maldives Case Study	Jon Bennett (team leader), Clare Harkin (civil-military issues), Stanley Samarasinghe
NGO Funding/Japan	Tomoko Honda & Yuki Todoroki	Civil-Military Aspects of the International Response	Clare Harkin
NGO Funding/Spain	Agustín Moya	<b>Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities</b>	
NGO Funding/UK	Julia Flores	Indonesia Country Report (Aceh and Nias)	Elizabeth Scheper (with contributions from Smruti Patel and Arjuna Parakrama)
Funding from the General Public/Germany	Dagmar Bär, Burkhard Wilke, Christel Neff, Tanja Ibrahim	Maldives Country Report	Smruti Patel (with contributions from Janey Lawry White)
Funding from the General Public/Spain	Gilles Gasser & Ricardo Solé	Sri Lanka Country Report	Arjuna Parakrama (with contributions from Elisabeth Scheper and Sudarshana Gunawardena)
Local Response/Overview	Earl Kessler	Thailand Country Report	Elizabeth Scheper (with contributions from Smruti Patel)
Local Response/India	Balachandran Haran Sowmya		
Local Response/Indonesia	Liliana Marulanda & Syamsul Rizal		
Local Response/Thailand	Dr Seree & Khun Montri		
Funding the Tsunami Response/Local Response/Sri Lanka	Anoja Wickramasinghe & Kamalini Fernando		
Corporate Funding/Spain	Gilles Gasser & Ricardo Solé		

# Annex E: Recommendations by aid actor

The following is based on Section 5 which sets out the report recommendations. It breaks down the recommendations into tasks by disaster response actor. The term 'donor' is used below to refer to official bilateral or multilateral donor entities.

These recommendations should be read in conjunction with those in both Section 5 and the TEC Thematic Reports. The underlying logic for the recommendations is presented in Section 4, 'Conclusions'.

## Recommendations for all actors

All actors should enter into sector-wide discussions to close the gap between international practices and international policies regarding the principle of local and national ownership of disaster response. (See additional guidance at the beginning of Section 5.)

All actors should strive towards sustainable disaster risk reduction (DRR) and increased disaster response capacities at community, national, and international levels, within the framework of local development processes and plans. Multi-year investments and technical support are required by national institutions and local civil society organisations including poorer, marginalised and specific groups (such as women's associations).

All actors should promote the development of International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) as a means of clarifying and strengthening the respective responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities of affected states and international agencies, including bilateral actors, such as international military forces.

All actors should commence discussions to reach an agreed definition of what 'affected person' means. These could take place in relation to the development of IDRL.

## Recommendations for potentially affected states

Comprehensive, multi-year risk reduction and preparedness programmes and national funding targets should be established in all risk-prone countries, on a

scale commensurate with the risks faced – be they natural disasters, conflict or other factors.

If appealing for disaster response funding, potentially affected states should design appeals to include funding for long-term DRR strategies and not just short- or medium-term relief and recovery. They should also boost their response capacity by, for example, pre-identifying key emergency response staff and establishing rosters for rapidly augmenting capacity at any disaster-affected location.

States should set standards and procedures for inviting, receiving and regulating international assistance, including accountability and transparency standards for all agencies responding to natural disasters in their countries. Such standards should cover the publication in accessible languages of assessments, budgets, audits and independent evaluations within a reasonable period from the commencement of operations. All standards and procedures should be commensurate with definitions of roles, responsibilities and authority being considered under the development of IDRL.

Where appropriate, and with the support of multilateral agencies, states should establish, and international agencies should be prepared to work through, common mechanisms such as consortia and trust funds.

## Recommendations for institutional donors

All donors should make the international funding system impartial and proportionate. Measures are needed to make it more efficient, flexible, transparent and better aligned with principles of good donorship. As an important step they should establish independent oversight of donor impartiality and performance.

Donors should support the development of surge capacity within agencies by funding such development *between* emergencies. This could include investment to increase the international emergency staff 'pool' by supporting *full-time* standby emergency response mechanisms and funding research into additional means to improve surge capacity. They should also fund pre-



disaster preparation in high-risk countries, including the establishment of regional rosters of experts.

Beyond the initial days (at most weeks) of a disaster, donors should make funding for follow-on activities conditional on the application of a comprehensive joint assessment.

Donors should improve the transition from relief to recovery and development by increasing flexibility in applying funds from a variety of budgets and instruments, in accordance with needs and realities on the ground. If such flexibility is not feasible, the practice by many donors of funding longer term *recovery* activities under humanitarian instruments, as opposed to development instruments, should be reconsidered.

Donor governments and IFIs should consider committing a target percentage of their disaster response funding to be invested in DRR. They should also, through for example the OECD/DAC and/or the UN IASC, consider setting a target that all people affected by disasters be entitled to a minimum level of humanitarian assistance.

Industrialised countries should honour the undertaking given in 1970 to increase ODA to 0.7 percent of their GDP. In light of the growing importance of private charitable flows, it might be appropriate for such flows (not counting remittances) to be included in the calculation of any donor nation's total effort. In addition, wealthy nations which are not currently part of the DAC should shoulder their responsibilities as rich countries and support a far wider range of development initiatives than their current portfolios demonstrate.

Donors should develop mechanisms to measure the relative effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of international agencies, and fund accordingly. They should also inform the tax-paying public of the performance and quality of the agencies they fund through, for example, widely disseminated independent reports. Signing up to an accreditation system (see Section 5) should be considered as a requirement for agencies receiving funding. Donors and agencies should also agree on a common and consistent disaster response resource tracking system, including accounting definitions. The system should also document local contributions and diaspora remittances.

Governments of donor countries should support regulation of the aid sector by making tax-exempt status dependent on agencies meeting accountability requirements, such as those required in the US, as well as demanding regular published audits and independent evaluations.

Donors should fund mass communication and public educational initiatives on the themes of 'good disaster response' and on 'how to be a principled and effective donor' (regarding the donor roles of both individual members of the public and official donors). The media should be targeted for such education.

## **Recommendations for the OECD/DAC**

The OECD/DAC should develop new or improved oversight mechanisms to monitor donor adherence to GHD principles, especially regarding impartiality.

The OECD/DAC, in conjunction with other actors and mechanisms (such as the GHD and FTS), should develop a common reporting format through which agencies can simultaneously report to a number of donors.

The OECD/DAC should resume efforts to have all donors untie their aid and should discount tied aid to 75 per cent of its nominal value in its calculation of the overall value of aid from any donor nation.

The OECD/DAC should continue to monitor pledges as well as commitments and disbursements for major emergencies.

## **Recommendations for donors and agencies**

International donors and agencies should respect, promote and support (including through funding) national coordination of all response activities. International coordination should be conducted as a component of national coordination.

All agencies and donors should commit formally to publishing full independent evaluation reports of their programmes and projects.

## **Recommendations for all international agencies**

The international relief system should advance formal discussions with a view to establishing an accreditation and certification system (See section 5 for options).

International agencies should make their systems and practices suitable for maximum participation by local people, starting with information management. This requires appropriate assessment, planning, intervention and communication methods, in line with those set out in the respective recommendation in Section 5 of this report. As an example, agencies should give greater consideration to the judicious use of mechanisms such as cash distribution that allow affected populations to set

their own priorities. They should recognise that appropriate approaches are less to do with over-arching policies than with methodologies and capacities, especially personnel skills, knowledge, attitudes and tools.

During their responses, agencies should regularly conduct joint surveys of affected communities to determine whether they are aware of agency plans and are satisfied with the support they are getting. The full results of such surveys should be reported on agency websites and made available locally.

International agencies should 'map' and support both host-authority and local capacities, including the establishment or strengthening of a national/sub-national institution to manage disaster preparedness and response. This should be conducted prior to any disaster event and updated during the response. It requires long-term commitment and presence on the part of international agencies in high-risk countries.

International agencies with a development mandate are best placed for providing such support. Support for joint national-international information services should include preparedness for the rapid deployment of initial joint national-international assessments. These should foresee the establishment of a single set of jointly managed databases of all affected people and resources provided to assist them. (The UNDP DAD might be a model from which experience could be drawn.) This would require an agreed definition of 'affected person' (see above).

All international agencies should review periodically their disaster response capacities (for example, after each major disaster). These agency-specific reviews should cover as a minimum: the capacity for rapid deployment of sufficient experienced managers and specialised personnel; rapid and effective assessments; logistical, administrative and financial management support; and coordination capacities. In addition to full-time standby personnel, agencies need to develop or improve response rosters to allow the training and rapid deployment of 'regular' (non-fulltime emergency) personnel in emergencies. Staff members from countries and regions most likely to be affected by disasters should be given priority for such training.

All agencies need to reduce the high rates of turnover commonly seen in emergencies by providing contracts and conditions of employment that encourage staff to remain in post.

All agencies should, as a principle, commit explicitly to sharing assessment reports.

All international agencies need to review (and improve accordingly) their 'recovery' approaches, methods and capacities (see Section 5 for guidance). Donors and agencies should continue to invest in national-international participatory assessments of livelihood recovery. International agencies should treat recovery activities as longer term development interventions rather than as extensions to relief operations.

International agencies should develop mechanisms to determine when funding appeals should be terminated. Any future agency accreditation system should include conditions on how money is solicited and reallocated as well as how and when appeals to the general public are closed down once funding thresholds have been reached. Pooling mechanisms and criteria should also be explored, in order to facilitate the transfer of surplus funds from one organisation to another. (For further details, including using 'tick boxes', see Section 5).

Aid agencies should, together with academic institutions and training providers, set up a professional body with transparent admission criteria and standards for the achievement of 'certified professional' or 'chartered' status for aid workers. As an initial step, the IASC or a major donor could host discussions on what the requirements for such professional status would be.

## Recommendations for the United Nations

The UN should develop a coordination model that supports national coordination efforts. It should establish, in line with the recommendations of the UN's Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), a field coordination system for international disaster response actors built around the IASC model, which should mesh fully with national coordination initiatives.

The UN should support such coordination mechanisms through a variety of steps, including: increased training for coordinators; improved 'coordinator' rosters; the deployment of senior personnel beyond capitals to support provincial and local coordination; and greater involvement of NGOs. Where appropriate, integrated geographic coordination mechanisms (not just sectoral or 'cluster'-based models) should be considered. In addition, to improve joint advocacy, UN RC/HC's need to develop a cross-agency consensus on sensitive issues before raising them with national authorities.

The UN should integrate all assessment-support components of its response (UNDAC, HIC and UNJLC) into one knowledge management programme, with a greater capacity to analyse data (including remote



sensing data) in conjunction with local and national authorities.

The UN should consider whether the interests of the affected populations are best served by the current large number of UN entities that respond to disasters, and whether a reduction in the number of agencies would lead to greater efficiency.

The UN, via the IASC, should instigate discussions on a protocol to promote common needs assessments by the UN, Red Cross Movement and NGOs to be carried out jointly with national and local entities.

### **Recommendations for the Red Cross and United Nations**

The Red Cross and the UN system, in particular, should enter into discussions on how to establish a capacity to conduct high quality joint assessments with affected states (in line with the recommendations of the TEC Needs Assessment Report).

### **Recommendations for the European Commission**

The European Commission should introduce a directive to ensure that NGOs in the European Union are obliged to be as transparent about their finances and expenditures as are NGOs in the US (regarding financial reporting regulations).

### **Recommendations for all agencies and the military**

Civilian relief agencies and the military need to undertake joint training and exercises so that they are more aware of each other's procedures and approaches.

The military needs to develop 'lean' approaches to humanitarian operations to allow them to provide support (such as air-lift capacities) at considerably lower costs than is currently the norm.

### **Recommendations for the ProVention Consortium**

The ProVention Consortium should conduct research to identify principles for recovery programmes including adapting existing DAC poverty reduction criteria to recovery scenarios.

### **Recommendations for humanitarian quality initiatives**

Humanitarian quality initiatives should consider how the quality standards they espouse could be enforced under a regulatory framework.

Sphere, HAP-I and ALNAP should develop standards and indicators regarding transparency and accountability to support the over-arching principle of the affected population's right to know and aid agencies' and authorities' responsibility to inform.

HAP-I should develop guidance materials targeted directly at affected communities to assist them in demanding accountability from 'duty-bearers' (both states and international agencies).

ALNAP should promote, support and develop guidance on joint evaluations.

ALNAP should develop standards and guidance on the independence and transparency of evaluations. These should be aimed at both evaluators and those funding and managing evaluations.

### **Recommendation for political representatives in donor countries**

Parliamentary and Congressional oversight bodies should strengthen their monitoring of governments' commitments to impartial and proportional funding.


Parliamentary and Congressional oversight bodies should pay particular attention to the relative effectiveness of the different components of the ODA budget, including disaster response aid. They should monitor more closely the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of different instruments regarding, for instance, in-kind food aid or 'tied' grants versus unearmarked aid or budget support.

### **Recommendation for the media**

Media organisations should appoint journalists with an interest in and knowledge of the sector as specialised 'aid correspondents'.

The media in donor countries should use freedom-of-information laws to improve transparency of donor decision making (regarding, for instance, by whom and on what criteria major funding decisions are made).

# Annex F: The military logistics contribution



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- AUS Australia
- AUT Austria
- BGD Bangladesh
- BRN Brunei
- CAN Canada
- CHE Switzerland
- DEU Germany
- FRA France
- GBR United Kingdom
- IND Indonesia
- JPN Japan
- KOR South Korea
- LKA Sri Lanka
- MYS Malaysia
- NOR Norway
- NZL New Zealand
- PAK Pakistan
- SGP Singapore
- THA Thailand
- USA United States

- Abbreviations**
- helo(s) helicopter(s)
  - eng engineer
  - med medical
  - hosp hospital

**Notes**

This map shows principal logistics assets on multiple missions in the region from the onset of the tsunami until March 2005. It is based on United States Pacific Command (2005, #313) with changes to remove some military acronyms. The map does not show other military deployments, such as the Danish military's transport of a field hospital to Indonesia.

A total of 13 military contingents are referred to as operating in Aceh on Indonesia-Relief, including Australia, France, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Japan, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Denmark also had a military contingent in Aceh. There may also have been others carrying out one-time missions.

# Annex G: Data and sources for figures and tables

## G1 Sources for figures

### Sources for Figure 2.1: Changes in death toll (including missing) over the first month

The principal sources for this table are the media (as figures given in official UN agency reports often lagged the media by a day or so).

Date	000's	Source
26 December 2004	12	BBC, 2005d
27 December 2004	27	Ditto
28 December 2004	50	Ditto
29 December 2004	77	Ditto
30 December 2004	114	Ditto
31 December 2004	124	Ditto
03 January 2005	140	Ditto
06 January 2005	146	Channelnewsasia.com, 2005
07 January 2005	153	Ditto
08 January 2005	156	Ditto
16 January 2005	168	Ditto
19 January 2005	215	Ditto
23 January 2005	227	Ditto
25 January 2005	280	Ditto
31 January 2005	286	Morella, 2005
06 January 2005	283	
Source: By calculation from AFP (2005a), which sets the overall toll for 8 April of 247,244 plus 2,932 missing in Thailand and 5,637 missing in Sri Lanka, giving a total of 225,810. AFP (2006) makes it clear that the Indonesian authorities changed the total on 7 April, and Aglionby (2005c) gives the total change as a net reduction of 57,221.		
07 April 2005	226	
Source: By calculation from AFP (2005a; 2006).		
18 April 2006	228	
Source: AFP (2005d): 1,800 added to the toll in Indonesia.		

### Sources for Figure 2.2: Age-specific tsunami mortality at five locations (plus one historic disaster)

The sources for the first four of the sub-graphs in this figure, and the sixth one, are as follows.

Age group	Mortality (%)	Number in sample	Number dead/missing
<i>Place: Aceh, Indonesia. Source: Doocy et al, 2006a, p3.</i>			
0–14	17.4	585	102
15–49	10.4	1,259	131
50+	22.7	255	58
<i>Place: Ampara, Sri Lanka. Source: Nishikiori et al, 2006.</i>			
0–14	21.1	1,143	241
15–49	7.9	2,030	161
50+	15.3	360	55
<i>Place: Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. Source: Birkmann et al, 2006.</i>			
0–10	8.4	427	36
11–60	2.7	1,730	47
>60	10.8	102	11
<b>Note</b> change in age grouping.			
<i>Place: Tamil Nadu, India. Source: Guha-Sapir et al, 2006.</i>			
0–14	11.9		
15–49	4.1		
50+	10.4		
<i>Place: Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh). Source: Chowdhury et al, 1993.</i>			
0–14	15.5		
15–49	4.0		
50+	13.4		
<b>Note</b> non-tsunami mortality.			

*continued overleaf*

**Sources for Figure 2.2: continued**

The data for the Maldives sub-graph essentially compare a population pyramid with a tsunami-mortality pyramid. The tsunami mortality data are calculated from the full list of the deceased and missing (ages were available for only 104 of the 108 casualties) (National Disaster Management Center, 2006).

The population pyramid was calculated from the age distribution from the 2000 Census of the Maldives (Government of the Maldives, 2004). The data were not corrected for 2004 as this would be a very complex procedure that would produce relatively little change in the pyramid, despite the falling birth rates in the Maldives.

These data were summarised to give the data presented for Maldives in Figure 2.2.

Age group (years)	Age group as percentage of population	Age group as percentage of victims	Relative mortality
0–4	11.5	30.8	2.7
5–9	14.1	14.4	1.0
10–14	15.3	7.7	0.5
15–19	12.4	3.8	0.3
20–24	8.7	3.8	0.4
25–29	7.5	2.9	0.4
30–34	6.8	1.0	0.1
35–39	5.8	1.9	0.3
40–44	4.6	2.9	0.6
45–49	2.8	4.8	1.7
50–54	2.2	1.9	0.9
55–59	2.2	1.0	0.4
60–64	2.3	5.8	2.5
65–69	1.7	5.8	3.4
70–74	1.1	7.7	7.2
75–79	0.5	1.9	3.7
80+	0.4	1.9	4.6

**Sources for Figure 2.3: Tsunami mortality risk for females compared with males**

Place	Female relative risk	Based on • Source
<b>Indonesia</b>		
Banda Aceh	1.24	16,609 deaths reported by sub-district heads <i>Source</i> Women Studies Centre, 2005
Banda Aceh	1.20	Cluster survey of 478 households <i>Source</i> Doocy et al, 2006b
Aceh, W coast	1.60	Cluster survey of 387 households <i>Source</i> Doocy et al, 2006b
Aceh Barat	2.06	2,217 deaths reported by sub-district heads <i>Source</i> Women Studies Centre, 2005
Meulaboh	2.10	Cluster survey of 388 households <i>Source</i> Doocy et al, 2006b
Aceh, E coast	1.50	Cluster survey of 400 households <i>Source</i> Doocy et al, 2006b
Other Aceh	1.20	6,671 deaths reported by sub-district heads <i>Source</i> Women Studies Centre, 2005
<b>Sri Lanka</b>		
Ampara District	2.13	Survey of 899 households (457 dead/injured) <i>Source</i> Nishikiori et al, 2006
Galle	1.86	Survey of 502 households <i>Source</i> Birkmann et al, 2006
Batticaloa	1.27	Survey of 532 households (94 deaths) <i>Source</i> Birkmann et al, 2006
<b>India</b>		
Tamil Nadu	1.43	Survey of 651 households (231 deaths) <i>Source</i> (Guha-Sapir et al, 2006)

**Sources for Figure 2.4: Tsunami press citations**

The data for this figure are drawn from the survey of press coverage of the tsunami published by AlertNet (Jones, 2005).

Topic	Number of press citations	As percentage of total
Tsunami (6 weeks)	34,992	51
Sudan War	7,661	11
Northern Uganda	5,209	8
West Africa	4,804	7
DRC conflict	3,119	5
Chechnya	2,886	4
Haiti	2,669	4
HIV/AIDS	2,623	4
Nepal	2,287	3
Colombia	1,441	2
Infectious disease	924	1
Total citations reviewed	68,615	100

**Sources for Figure 3.2: National and international capacities in Aceh**

The data used to generate this chart are illustrative only and drawn from general sources about the relative roles of different capacities in the response.

**Sources for Figure 3.3: Comparison of UK aid and UK expenditure on consular services**

Item	US\$m	Source
Consular costs to end 2005	77.45	National Audit Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2005
Aid pledges	96	OECD/DAC, 2006b
Aid commitments	149	OECD/DAC, 2006b
Aid disbursements to September 2005	130	OECD/DAC, 2006b

**Note** Consular cost converted at the rate of 1.82238 US\$/£, this being the average exchange rate for the period 26 December 2004 to 31 December 2005 (www.oanda.com).

**Source for Figure 3.4: Number of registered INGOs in Banda Aceh**

In the following table the first number given is the number used for the graph, and the second number is the number given in the text. The difference comes from some reports not distinguishing INGOs from other international organisations.

**Sources for Figure 3.4: continued**

Date	Number in graph	Source	Number in text
12 Jan 2005	50	AFP	50
		More than 50 aid organisations have been working with foreign military task forces to bring relief to many areas isolated by destroyed roads and rugged mountains.	
19 Jan 2005	100	Reuters	100
		United Nations figures show at least 100 'non-governmental organisations,' or NGOs, flooded into Aceh following the December 26 wave that killed at least 115,000 people in Indonesia and left a half-million more homeless.	
03 Mar 2005	140	DPA	140
		No less than 140 NGOs from 83 foreign countries are operating in Aceh'	
03 Mar 2005	140	AFP	140
		The chief of the foreigners' registration taskforce, Police Brigadier General Ashikin Husein, said after two weeks of registrations 820 foreign civilians from 82 countries were working under 140 organisations.	
21 Mar 2005	153	Xinhua	160
		Some 160 NGOs have been involved in the emergency relief efforts in Aceh, since the earthquake-caused tsunami on December 26, 2004 took away the lives of some 200,000 people in Indonesia and made another 10,000 homeless in the province.	
21 Mar 2005	153	Reuters	160
		He said some 160 organisations, including UN agencies, were operating in the province and had been given 30 days to fill out questionnaires.	
22 Mar 2005	153	AFP	160
		Paperwork will be sent to 160 private non-governmental groups and UN agencies that will determine whether their work fits in with a government blueprint to rebuild the region, Welfare Minister Alwi Shihab told reporters.	
23 Mar 2005	153	Laksamana.net	160
		More than 380 humanitarian organizations have registered in Aceh since the disaster, and 160 groups are still operating there.	
26 Mar 2005	153	Reuters	153
		153 non-governmental organisations are providing relief, along with UN and foreign government aid agencies.	
01 Jun 2005	180	Reuters	180
		Indonesia has since mainly weeded out non-professionals among the 180 NGOs operating in Aceh, which since 2003 has been closed to foreigners because of a military campaign against rebels.	
18 Dec 2005	124	Observer	124
		124 international non-governmental organisations, 430 local NGOs, dozens of donor and UN agencies.	
17 Jan 2006	124	The Times	124
		In Indonesia 124 international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 430 local NGOs, 30 national or multilateral donors, and more than a dozen UN agencies are involved, managing more than US\$7bn (GB£4.02bn) in aid in a state of political unrest and widespread corruption.	

continued next column

### Sources for Figure 3.5: Global spending on the military

Data for development aid are from the OECD DAC Table 1 (net disbursements) consulted on 14 June 2006. Data on military expenditure are abstracted from the graph presented in SIPRI (2005). Dollar values for 2003 were translated to 2004 values using the DAC deflator for 2003 to 2004.

Year	Military spending (US\$bn, 2003 values)	Military spending (US\$bn, 2004 values)	ODA (US\$bn, 2004 values)	Relief aid (US\$bn, 2004 values)
1994	789	838	71	5
1995	772	820	65	4
1996	775	823	65	4
1997	766	813	62	4
1998	774	822	67	4
1999	775	823	65	6
2000	805	855	70	5
2001	820	870	73	5
2002	865	918	78	5
2003	926	983	80	7
2004	975	1,035	84	8

### Sources for Figure 3.6: DAC donor commitments and disbursements against pledges

The data for this chart are drawn from OECD/DAC (2006c) and the associated tables.

*continued next column*

### Sources for Figure 3.6: continued

	Pledged	Committed	Disbursed	Percentage committed	Percentage disbursed
	(US\$m, 2004 values)			(%)	(%)
Germany	634	313	82	49	13
Spain	114	114	17	100	15
EU	600	311	135	52	23
France	444	243	109	55	25
Austria	63	28	16	44	25
Netherlands	312	156	82	50	26
Australia	431	193	117	45	27
Italy	139	94	42	68	30
United States	902	792	277	88	31
Canada	343	176	131	51	38
Sweden	86	86	35	100	41
Finland	63	44	30	70	48
Denmark	77	41	41	53	53
Portugal	13	13	7	100	54
Belgium	34	30	20	88	59
Luxembourg	11	11	7	100	64
Switzerland	29	29	20	100	69
Norway	172	139	132	81	77
New Zealand	48	37	37	77	77
United Kingdom	149	149	130	100	87
Ireland	26	26	23	100	88
Japan	601	601	539	100	90
Greece	33	33	33	100	100
DAC total	5,324	3,659	2,062	69%	39%

### Sources for Figure 3.7: Tsunami fundraising in the UK

This chart is based on data from the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in the UK (DEC, 2005). The DEC is a fundraising structure with (then) 13 member agencies. The average conversion rate for the period of the appeal is used for conversion of £ to US\$.

Date	£mn	\$mn	Event
28 Dec 2004	5.3	10.0	DEC appeal goes live
29 Dec 2004	20	37.7	First TV and radio appeals
31 Dec 2004	32	60.4	World record for online giving
01 Jan 2005	60	113.2	£10mn raised on New Years Day
04 Jan 2005	76	143.3	Appeal becomes largest ever DEC appeal
06 Jan 2005	109	205.6	
07 Jan 2005	138	260.3	
11 Jan 2005	180	339.5	
14 Jan 2005	200	377.2	
26 Feb 2005	300	565.8	Appeal closes

### Source for Figure 3.8: Funding channel by donor type

This is based on information in the TEC Funding Response Report (2006). Values are in percentages of funding by channel.

Channel	Official	Private
NGO	24	59
UN	34	9
RC	14	32
Affected governments and others	29	0
Total %	100	100

### Source for Figure 3.9: Institutional donor support for UN and intergovernmental agencies

This is based on information presented in the TEC Funding Response/Government Funding Synthesis Report (2006). Values in the table are percentages of aid given via the UN from each donor.

Donor	OCHA	WFP	UNICEF	WHO	UNDP	Others	Total%
US	1	77	12	1	0	9	100
UK	36	11	20	11	14	8	100
Sweden	2	7	15	27	29	20	100
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	100	100
Japan	2	26	31	3	11	27	100
Ireland	15	15	15	13	17	25	100
Germany	1	25	0	2	42	30	100
ECHO	9	18	15	4	3	51	100
Denmark	6	32	32	17	0	13	100
Canada	2	26	46	4	8	14	100
Australia	3	37	22	3	20	15	100

### Source for Figure 3.10: Sectoral allocations by some institutional donors

This is based on information presented in the TEC Funding Response/Government Funding Synthesis Report (2006). Values in the table are percentages of aid from each donor.

	Australia	Denmark	ECHO	Germany	Ireland	UK	US
Food and non-food	36	8	20	26	18	14	23
Health	22	14	10	12	6	11	14
Water and sanitation	0	21	20	0	2	13	20
Shelter	8	4	7	7	2	1	14
Initial rehabilitation	0	0	4	12	24	14	17
Preparedness	0	0	0	27	3	0	0
Coordination	25	4	3	1	6	34	0
Multisector	0	43	7	0	32	5	0
Others	9	6	29	15	7	8	12
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

### Source for Figure 3.11: Balance between reconstruction and relief for different donors

This is based on information presented in the TEC Funding Response/Government Funding Synthesis Report (2006).

Donor	Tsunami relief aid (%)	Tsunami reconstruction aid (%)
USA (USAID)	16	84
Spain	16	84
Germany	30	70
Sweden	36	64
EC	41	59
Denmark (pledges)	47	53
Australia	49	51
UK	54	46
Netherlands	83	17
Japan	83	17
Canada (CIDA)	87	13
Ireland	100	0



**Source for Figure 3.12: Allocation of funding by affected country**

This chart is based on information gathered by the TEC Funding Response Study (2006).

Country	Percentage of total funding
Indonesia	37.20
Sri Lanka	23.50
Unspecified	22.70
India	13.20
Maldives	2.50
Thailand	0.70
Myanmar	0.10
Somalia	0.10
Seychelles	0.04
Malaysia	0.01
Total	100.05

The additional 0.05% is a rounding error and can be ignored.

**Source for Figure 3.13: Net relief disbursements as a percentage of all net ODA disbursement**

This table is drawn from the OECD/DAC development statistics online, Table 1 (consulted on 14 June 2006). World economy data, (which shows that the world economy grew 13 fold against a three-fold increase in ODA) is from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database, April 2006, consulted on 6 July 2006. World economy data is not included in the figure to avoid confusion.

Year	Relief as percentage of ODA	ODA (US\$bn, 2004 values)	World Economy (US\$bn, current values; year not given)
1970	0.1	37.0	3,402.4
1971	1.0	38.1	3,736.9
1972	1.5	40.9	4,198.5
1973	1.2	36.9	5,151.6
1974	0.9	43.0	5,701.5
1975	1.1	44.7	6,284.9
1976	0.9	42.7	6,791.2
1977	1.2	44.3	7,622.9
1978	1.1	49.6	9,112.9
1979	1.5	51.8	10,501.4
1980	1.3	56.2	11,788.8
1981	1.3	56.2	11,983.3
1982	0.9	61.2	11,840.1
1983	1.0	60.9	12,130.1
1984	1.1	65.6	12,516.1
1985	2.5	66.0	12,919.0
1986	2.0	67.3	15,243.9
1987	1.7	65.7	17,475.9
1988	1.6	72.0	19,552.2
1989	1.6	70.6	20,534.0
1990	2.1	74.4	22,710.5
1991	5.2	82.1	23,903.7
1992	4.3	81.4	24,090.6
1993	6.3	75.5	24,653.9
1994	6.9	76.3	26,462.1
1995	6.0	69.1	29,356.9
1996	5.8	68.7	30,042.9
1997	5.6	65.5	29,895.7
1998	5.7	70.8	29,655.8
1999	8.9	71.1	30,759.8
2000	7.2	75.4	31,623.5
2001	6.5	78.3	31,461.5
2002	6.5	83.9	32,728.6
2003	8.6	87.2	36,757.7
2004	9.1	92.0	41,253.2
2005	12.1	115.1	44,433.0



## G2 Sources for tables

### Sources for Table 2.1: Numbers of people lost (dead or missing)

The table gives totals for killed and missing as a single figure for losses. It should be remembered that all such data are subject to error, as data on missing persons especially are not always as good as one might wish (INET, 2006; News24.com, 2005).

#### Table entry Data source

**Indonesia** BRR (2005), quoting Satkorlak Report, 10–16 October 2005. Indonesia figures include just under 1,000 killed in the earthquake of 28 March 2005.

**Sri Lanka** Government of Sri Lanka (2005). One Sri Lankan woman was among the dead in the Maldives (National Disaster Management Center, 2006).

**India** Sharma (2005). In addition, 13 Indians were killed in Sri Lanka, and one in the Maldives (Government of India, 2005), but the Maldives casualty list includes no Indians (National Disaster Management Center, 2006). It may be that one of those identified as Sri Lankan was an Indian passport-holder.

**Thailand** Bagai et al (2005, p14), quoting DDPM website, October 2005. The same source gives 2,448 tourists from 37 countries dead in Thailand. However, this figure exceeds the fairly solid data for tourist deaths presented in the Table of Tourist Deaths.

**Somalia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Tanzania, Seychelles and Kenya** UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (2006), quoting 'OCHA–UNDP, Brief on Tsunami Response in Six Less Affected Countries, November 2005'.

**Maldives** National Disaster Management Center (2006). Of those killed, 3 were from the UK, 2 from Sri Lanka, and 1 from Bangladesh.

**Bangladesh** AFP (2005a). One Bangladeshi was also killed in the Maldives (National Disaster Management Center, 2006).

**Yemen** IRIN (2005).

**South Africa** Dickson (2004). 11 South African tourists were killed in Thailand and 4 are missing presumed killed (Cohen, 2005).

### Sources for Table 2.2: Demographic and economic impact of the tsunami

The principal source for this table is BRR and World Bank (2005), but with mortality data as for Table 2.1 and remittance data from World Bank (2005c).

### Sources for Table 3.1: Numbers killed and missing from outside the affected countries

The data in this table are drawn mainly from the tables presented in the Wikipedia page on the countries affected by the tsunami (Wikipedia, 2006). The figures given on this site were found to be as accurate as those obtained directly from official sources.

Additional sources checked included:

Country	Source
Austria	Government of Austria (2005)
Denmark	Danish Police (2005)
Germany	Bundeskriminalamt (2005)
Hong Kong	Government of Hong Kong (2005)
Sweden	Swedish Police (2006)
UK	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2005)

Some changes have been made where it was clear that some of the numbers included non-national residents. However, not all countries have identified how many of those included in the 'national' death tolls are non-nationals. Because some people are nationals of one country and resident in another, or hold multiple nationalities, it may be that there is some double counting in the table.

The numbers quoted in the table reflect a significant fall from the data available at the end of January, when over 3,500 foreigners were listed as killed or missing (news.telegraph, 2005). However, a number of reports suggested that, while such figures as are presented in this table are accurate, the global figures should be treated with caution (News24.com, 2005).

**Sources for Table 3.2: Varying estimates of the number of IDPs with host families in Aceh**

The principal source for this table is UNORC (2006b), with additional data from Morris (2005).

**Sources for Table 3.3: Timeline for selected elements of international assistance in Aceh**

The source of data for the US military is United States Pacific Command (2005). Data on the Australian Ship come from Australian Department of Defence (2005). Information on the ICRC hospital is from IFRC (2005a), and on the Danish hospital from *Copenhagen Post* (2005).

**Sources for Table 3.4: Press coverage of the tsunami in Sri Lanka**

The data presented here are drawn from the TEC Capacities Sri Lanka Report (2006).

**Sources for Table 3.5: Funding for the tsunami response**

The data in this table are drawn from the TEC Funding Study (2006).

**Sources for Table 3.6: Per-capita international funding for different disasters**

Data in this table are drawn from a variety of sources including ReliefWeb and the OCHA FTS.

**Sources for Table 3.7: UK official funding for the tsunami**

The data in this table are drawn from Beeston (2005).

# Annex H: What caused the tsunami?<sup>1</sup>


The crust of the Earth is in relative terms as thin as the skin of an apple. The crust is divided into tectonic plates that move relative to each other at very slow speeds. It is thought that this movement is driven by the circulation of molten rock (magma) within the Earth.

In some places, plates are moving apart and new crust is being created (as in the mid-Atlantic ridge). Elsewhere, plates are sliding alongside each other (as in California), or pushing against each other. When plates push against each other one plate generally sinks below the other (subducts) and is turned back into molten rock.

This US Geological Survey image<sup>2</sup> shows the location of the tectonic plates in the region of the tsunami. The Burma plate is a micro-plate that runs from south of Simeulue to the tip of Burma. The India plate dips down into the Sunda Trench to subduct under the Burma plate, as shown by the saw teeth on the Sunda Trench in the image.

The India plate is moving at about 60mm per year in relation to the Burma sub-plate. For comparison, this is faster than the rate of fingernail growth but slower than the rate of hair growth.<sup>3</sup>

The earthquake that caused the 2004 tsunami happened under the Burma plate at the junction of the India and Australia plates.




1 Principal sources are: Pararas-Carayannis (2005, p234); USGS (2005b, p2); Atwater (2005, p250).


2 Downloaded from Geology.Com (2005, p249).

3 Suzy's World (2002, p248).


This diagram shows the India plate sinking or subducting below the overriding Burma sub-plate. Tectonic plates do not always move smoothly and sometimes get stuck.<sup>4</sup>




The result of stuck plates is local deformation in the overriding plate. This distortion stores up energy as rock is compressed. This process went on for centuries under the Burma sub-plate.



Eventually the stuck area ruptures, which allows the overriding plate to move. As happened on 26 December 2004, the energy stored in the deformed rock was released, lifting the seabed by a few metres over a huge area, possibly an area over 1,200km long.



The sudden raising of the seabed displaced billions of tonnes of seawater, creating the train of tsunamis that rushed away in both directions from the plate boundary. The tsunamis travel as shallow waves at high speed across the deep ocean, but slow down and grow in height as they start to reach the shallows near land.



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### The TEC's thematic evaluations

Reference in this report	Full reference
TEC Funding Response Report (2006)	Flint, M and H Goyder (2006) <i>Funding the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC LRRD Report (2006)	Christoplos, I (2006) <i>Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TEC Capacities Report (2006)	Scheper B, A Parakrama and S Patel (2006) <i>Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
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TEC Needs Assessment Report (2006)	de Ville de Goyet, C and L Morinière (2006) <i>The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response</i> . London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

This Synthesis Report synthesises the TEC's five thematic evaluations, their sub-studies and other materials relating to the tsunami response. The five thematic studies consider: coordination of the international humanitarian response; the role of needs assessment in the tsunami response; the impact of the response on local and national capacities; links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRAD), and the funding response to the tsunami.

Information on the management and funding of this evaluation can be found in the report. Since its inception, the TEC has been funded by the agencies listed below.

#### Funders of the TEC


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