INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)

REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE PHILIPPINES HAIYAN RESPONSE

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COMMISSIONED BY IFRC AND THE UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL PROGRAMME SERVICES DIVISION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
CHF	Swiss Francs
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DM	Disaster Management
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EMT	Evaluation Management Team
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FFA	Framework for Action
HEOps	Heads of Emergency Operations
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
HR	Human Resources
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Infrmation Management
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia
PNS	Participating National Society
PRC	Philippine Red Cross
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	United States Dollars
WFP	World Food Programme

KEY TERMINOLOGY

IFRC Secretariat: Refers to the entire IFRC Secretariat structure (Geneva, Zone, Regional and Country offices).
Geneva Office: Refers to the Secretariat office in Geneva.
IFRC: Refers to the IFRC Secretariat, plus its member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Zone: Refers to the combined IFRC Secretariat structure at national, regional and zonal level.
Zone Office: Refers to the IFRC Secretariat structure in each of the Zones.
Movement: Refers to all parts of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement – the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the IFRC Secretariat, plus its member Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies and can be abbreviated as RCM or RCRC.

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the author(s). Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by the IFRC of the opinions expressed.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) was the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines and made landfall on November 8th, 2013. The humanitarian impact of the typhoon was massive, due to the deadly combination of powerful winds, heavy rain and tsunami-like storm surges which wiped out a number of coastal towns and cities, most notably Tacloban and communities along the coast south of Tacloban on Eastern Leyte. A total of 3.4 million families (16 million people) were estimated to be directly affected by Typhoon Haiyan in 12,122 barangays (villages) across 44 provinces in 591 municipalities and 57 cities. IFRC mobilized the full resources of its global network in support of the Philippine Red Cross in response to this devastating typhoon.

METHODOLOGY & APPROACH[1]

An IFRC Real Time Evaluation (RTE) was conducted from February to March 2014. The RTE team (composed of one external evaluator and three Red Cross and Red Crescent staff) used a rigorous participatory and analytical approach that involved collection and review of existing secondary data (quantitative and qualitative), direct observation, semi-structured key informant interviews, focus groups, workshops and a survey. The team conducted three weeks of fieldwork during March 2014 that included data collection and workshops in the Philippines (Tacloban, Cebu, Iloilo and Manila), Kuala Lumpur and Geneva. The RTE divided its findings into four major areas that arose during the data collection process: (a) *Response Services & Tools* (b) *Coordination*

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[1] Please note that the full methodology and approach section of this RTE Report is described in *Annex 1*.

(c) *Organizational Roles, Responsibilities & Structure* (d) *Planning & Learning*. The workshops conducted at all IFRC levels were conducted in real-time to test findings and seek input to recommendations through Frameworks for Action (see *Annex 3*). More than 200 key stakeholders (see *Annex 2*) participated as a part of this RTE process.

FINDINGS

The findings from this RTE are based on an extensive data collection process (please see Annex 1 for additional details). These findings represent key IFRC Haiyan response successes and challenges that emerged, from amongst many potential topics, through the RTE process. Thus, these findings are a result of a multi-layered RTE data collection and analysis process and do not attempt to necessarily cover every aspect of the IFRC response. The RTE findings are summarized as follows:

(a) Response Services & Tools

IFRC RESPONSE IS PERCEIVED EXTERNALLY TO BE ROBUST AND RAPID. RED CROSS RESPONSE TRULY LED BY PRC, A NATIONAL SOCIETY THAT HAS MOBILIZED AN IMPRESSIVE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE. IFRC and PRC delivered relevant services and support to more than the targeted 100,000 disaster affected families over a disperse geographic area and in a timely manner.

CASH PROGRAMMING HIGHLIGHTED AS A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION THAT WAS RELATIVELY RAPID AND DELIVERED AT SCALE (57,000 FAMILIES). For the first time ever in response to a major humanitarian catastrophe, IFRC delivered unconditional cash

support in a timely manner and at scale (to over 57,000[2] families).

PRC AND IFRC RECOVERY SHELTER PROGRAMMING IS A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT. The recovery plan of the PRC, and supported by IFRC, calls for a very significant shelter recovery operation that provides new shelters to 50,000 families and supports 100,000 families with repair and reconstruction of existing shelters.

LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMMING (TARGETING 55,500 FAMILIES) IS A KEY PART OF FUTURE IFRC PROGRAMMING YET CURRENTLY LACKING PROGRAMMING DIRECTION. It is not clear what specifically this livelihood programming will entail, how it will be delivered at scale and from where the technical skills, experience and pledged funding for this type of programming will come from.

FACT VIEWED AS A WESTERN TOOL. FACT TOOL CAMOUFLAGED FOR DEPLOYMENT WHICH COMPROMISES THE INTEGRITY OF THE GLOBAL TOOL. Instead of a standard FACT deployment, a "FACT-like" team was deployed without following standard protocol.

EXPECTATION THAT FACT WILL MEET ALL FIELD OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OVER WIDE GEOGRAPHIC AREA IS UNREALISTIC AND LIMITED DUE TO LACK OF FIELD LEADERSHIP IN INITIAL RESPONSE. It is unrealistic to expect that a FACT, particularly without a FACT Team Leader, as it was configured as a single entity would be able to cover a wide geographic area, operational set-up, assessments and coordination functions.

RDRT TOOL IS MARGINALIZED AND UNDERUTILIZED. The RDRT was deployed too late to be immediately relevant and was not truly considered as a key tool for the IFRC initial response.

ERUS SPEED AND STANDARDIZATION ENSURED IFRC OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE AND CONSISTENCY. QUESTIONS RAISED REGARDING THE ABILITY OF TOOLS TO ADAPT TO CONTEXT AND EXCLUSIVE NATURE OF ERUS. The ERUs were consistently highlighted throughout the RTE as a key foundational IFRC contribution to the Philippines response. 12 ERUs were deployed composed of staff from 18 different national societies.

IFRC LEGAL STATUS ISSUE IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL RISK. HOWEVER, LACK OF LEGAL STATUS ALSO MAY ENSURE A CLOSER IFRC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH PRC. IFRC does not have recognized legal status in the Philippines. IFRC is entirely reliant on the PRC and its legal status. While this may ensure a closer working relationship between IFRC and PRC, it is also an organizational and operational risk.

INCONSISTENT SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES PARTICULARLY RELATED TO HIRING NATIONAL STAFF, CONTRACTS, VOLUNTEER PAYMENTS AND PROPOSALS. IFRC systems and processes have not always matched with PRC systems and processes which is particularly problematic in areas such as contracting and payments to volunteers.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MIXED REVIEWS WITH APPRECIATION AT GLOBAL AND FIELD (IFRC MANILA AND TACLOBAN) LEVEL BUT WITH RELATIVELY LOWER APPRECIATION AT ZONE AND PRC LEVEL. LACKING ANALYSIS AND USE IN DECISION-MAKING. The performance of the information management function within the Haiyan response operation varied depending on the respondent (or IM audience). Despite successes related to IM

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[2] Case Study of the Unconditional Cash Transfers component of the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Response, Philippines.

output, there remain challenges in the distribution of information and the creation of products to assist and guide decision-making.

LACK OF CLARITY AS TO WHAT THE HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY FUNCTION ENTAILS AND HOW IT CONTRIBUTES. It has not been established as to what this function is and how this function complements or overlaps with key operational leadership positions (particularly the Head of Delegation, Operations Managers and Movement Coordinators).

(b) Coordination

PRC LEAD ROLE CHALLENGED TRADITIONAL IFRC COORDINATION APPROACHES. IFRC needed to adjust its approaches and tools to the working reality of having a capable and functional PRC to work with. This was a challenge for this operation given the leadership role of the PRC.

COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES RELATED TO DELEGATE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY PROBLEMATIC FOR PRC. PERCEPTION OF SOME ERUS OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY. More than 350 international delegates have deployed as a part of the IFRC Haiyan response. This was particularly problematic for the PRC who were unaware in the initial response phase as to how many delegates were involved and where they were working.

EXCELLENT COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH ICRC INCORPORATING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS DISASTERS. IFRC, ICRC and the Philippines Red Cross rapidly signed an agreement clarifying for the Movement and external actors the division of responsibilities and areas of coverage amongst the three Movement components. This avoided confusion and frustration that otherwise could have resulted from an unclear division of responsibilities.

PRC AND IFRC EXTERNAL COORDINATION BEYOND THE MOVEMENT LIMITED. While some efforts were made at external coordination beyond the Movement during the Haiyan response, the perception by many external actors is that of an IFRC that is removed and disengaged from the wider external humanitarian community.

IFRC SUPPORT TO SHELTER CLUSTER COORDINATION SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY RELEVANT. CONCERNS RELATED TO ENSURING MAXIMUM IFRC UTILITY, RESOURCING AND ENGAGEMENT. IFRC is making an important silent contribution to the humanitarian community and the wider Haiyan response. However, the direct benefits of this approach to IFRC are not fully recognized which could be a future threat.

EMERGENCE OF CONSORTIA APPROACH IN ADDITION TO MULTI-LATERAL AND BI-LATERAL APPROACHES. The emergence of the consortia and bi-lateral approaches, divergent from the IFRC multi-lateral approach, brings into question the role of IFRC and how that role relates to some of these other programming approaches.

EMERGING REGIONAL NATIONAL SOCIETIES WERE NOT FULLY ENGAGED WITH THE IFRC RESPONSE. OFTEN RESULTED IN UNSOLICITED GOODS AND SERVICES SOMETIMES BELOW IFRC STANDARDS. Emerging national societies not fully engaged with IFRC in a meaningful way so that their contributions could be channeled through multi-lateral IFRC channels ensuring coordinated and standardized inputs. Several emerging national societies mobilised resources outside of the IFRC mobilisation process bi-laterally with the PRC. This often resulted in unsolicited goods and services sometimes below IFRC standards.

(c) Organizational Role, Responsibilities & Structure

SIGNIFICANT EFFORT, GOOD TEAMWORK AND DEDICATION OF HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL IFRC STAFF WERE THE FOUNDATION FOR IFRC RESPONSE SUCCESSESS. Despite the challenges inherent in a complex and challenging disaster environment, the IFRC team put forward significant effort, exhibited strong teamwork and high levels of professionalism.

IFRC ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING WAS PARTICULARLY CONVOLUTED IN THE INITIAL RESPONSE. There was a lack of understanding as to who made the operational decisions that were needed on an hourly and daily basis. Stakeholders that participated in the RTE cited issues around IFRC organizational clarity as the most ineffective aspect of the IFRC initial response.

INADEQUATE IFRC FIELD LEADERSHIP CAPACITY IN INITIAL RESPONSE TO MEET CONTEXTUAL REQUIREMENTS. INITIAL RESPONSE TEAMS COMPOSED OF HIGH PERCENTAGE OF STAFF ON 1ST TIME DEPLOYMENTS. IFRC field leadership capacity was strained to try and meet the reality of working in a dispersed field context that required operational hubs in multiple locations. A FACT Team Leader was never identified or deployed. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many FACT team members who were serving on their first FACT deployments.

PREVIOUS IFRC LEADERSHIP WERE CONSUMED WITH ADJUSTING TO THE NEEDS OF PRC LEADERHSHIP IN MANILA WHILE NEGOTIATING CENTRALIZED PRC DECISION-MAKING. This likely reduced focus on operational field based requirements and led to bottlenecks at the Manila level.

APPROVED AND FUNCTIONAL SOPs AND PROTOCOLS FOR IFRC GLOBAL DISASTER RESPONSE DO NOT EXIST. ZONE OFFICE AND GENEVA OFFICE IMPASSE REGARDING GLOBAL SOPs WEAKENS THE IFRC RESPONSE AND RESULTS IN FRAGMENTATION. Lines of authority (particularly between the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office and Geneva Office) were not clear particularly with respect to the mobilization and utilization of global resources. As a result, IFRC organizational roles, responsibilities and structure were nebulous and unclear for those involved. Inevitably this led to confusion and frustration amongst leadership and also affected operational staff.

SCALING UP AND SCALING DOWN OF MASSIVE RECOVERY OPERATION IS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR IFRC AND PRC. The scaling up of a massive recovery operation such as the IFRC Haiyan response is a significant challenge particularly regarding human resource requirements, procurement and maintaining financial accountability. There is also the need to simultaneously consider requirements related to scaling down.

KEY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (ADMIN, FINANCE, HR) UNDER RESOURCED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE IFRC OPERATION. The lack of sufficient key support functions, particularly administration, finance and human resources, was an impediment to operational effectiveness.

LOGISTICS HUB IN CEBU OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE. DECISION IN INITIAL RESPONSE NOT TO MORE RAPIDLY PLACE IFRC OPERATIONAL COORDINATION FUNCTION ALSO IN TACLOBAN WAS QUESTIONABLE. Given Cebu's position as a logistics hub in the Visayas region of the Philippines, this was a good decision that has proven to be operationally effective. However, the decision to also base the IFRC field coordination center in Cebu with the logistics hub, instead of in Tacloban, was questionable.

(d) Planning & Learning

MISSED OPPORTUNITY RELATED TO PRE-DISASTER AGREEMENTS WITH PRC AND PRE-POSITIONING OF IFRC GLOBAL SUPPORT RESOURCES. There is little evidence that IFRC took proactive pre-disaster readiness actions that could have enabled an even more effective IFRC response in support of PRC.

HIGH-LEVEL MISSIONS WELCOMED BUT THEY ARE RESOURCE INTENSIVE AND MANY OPERATIONAL STAFF INVOLVED QUESTION VALUE-ADD, TIMING AND COST-BENEFIT. High-level missions were welcomed by the PRC, however field staff already burdened with significant operational requirements spent valuable time and effort on resource intensive missions that had no clear outcome or tangible benefit to the operation.

CONTEXTUAL AND TACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF IFRC PHILIPPINES PERMANENT STAFF LOST IN SURGE WAVE. When a large wave of IFRC support staff flowed into the response, IFRC permanent staff were asked to return to their work in support of other IFRC programs. As such, the Haiyan operation went without knowledge and experience that could have proven quite valuable to IFRC surge staff many of whom were working in the Philippines for the first time.

UNEVEN COMMITMENT TO LEARNING, INCONSISTENT LEARNING SYSTEMS AND ACTION BASED ON LEARNING. LIMITED INNOVATION. There is little evidence to suggest that IFRC has established an organizational culture of learning that celebrates both successes and failures as a key part of constant improvement and innovation. Some of the same findings and recommendations from RTEs and other reviews are made again and again without action.

RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY

The recommendations that follow are from the RTE team and based in part on results from the RTE workshops conducted in the Philippines (with both IFRC & PRC staff), Kuala Lumpur and Geneva. They are prioritized based on the Frameworks for Future Action (see Annex 3) as developed by the RTE workshop participants. An IFRC management response should eventually be attached to this RTE final report specifying how and by whom specific recommendations will be addressed by IFRC.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

S1. FINALIZE AND APPROVE GLOBAL SOPS, GUIDANCE, PROCESSES AND ENFORCEMENT RELATED TO IFRC GLOBAL RESPONSES.

S2. ESTABLISH A STANDARD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, WITH RELATED JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND REPORTING LINES, AND ADJUST THAT STRUCTURE TO MATCH FUTURE RESPONSE CONTEXTUAL REQUIREMENTS.

S3. COMBINE FACT AND RDRT TO CREATE ONE GLOBAL RC/RC DISASTER RESPONSE TEAM. ENSURE THIS TEAM HAS ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE AND HUMAN RESOURES FUNCTIONS IMBEDDED IN THE TEAM OR FROM A NEW ERU.

S4. INCREASE INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL LEADERS TO FILL KEY IFRC OPERATIONAL FIELD FUNCTIONS.

S5. ENABLE, THROUGH SUSTAINED EFFORTS, ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL TOOLS BY EMERGING DONOR NATIONAL SOCIETIES. MAINTAIN THE CURRENT ERUS WHILE ENCOURAGING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND MODULAR CAPACITY FOR BETTER CONTEXUALIZATION. IDENTIFY AND SUSTAINBLE SUPPORT THROUGH POOLED IFRC RESOURCES ERU CAPABILITIES FROM EMERGING NATIONAL SOCIETIES.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

T1. IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND UPDATE THE RDRT DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES AND OPTIMIZE FOR FUTURE UTILIZATION. INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL PRC STAFF FROM THIS OPERATION INTO THE ASIA PACIFIC ZONE RDRT.

T2. DEDICATE ADDITIONAL EFFORT AND RESOURCING TO ADVANCE IFRC LEGAL STATUS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

T3. HARMONIZE IFRC AND PHILIPPINE RED CROSS WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON CONTRACTING AND SALARY LEVELS.

T4. INTENTIONALLY LINK INFORMATION MANAGEMENT WITH IMPROVED OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING.

T5. IFRC SHOULD ALWAYS HAVE THE CAPACITY FOR MULTIPLE OPERATIONAL COORDINATION HUBS WHERE THE KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION IS TAKING PLACE.

T6. BUILD UPON CASH PROGRAMMING SUCCESS AND LEARNING IN THE PHILIPPINES.

T7. ESTABLISH TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PROTOCOLS FOR HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP VISITS.

T8. CLARIFY THE WAYS IN WHICH THE HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY FUNCTION WILL BE INTEGRATED AT THE FIELD LEVEL.

T9. REVIEW THE IFRC SHELTER CLUSTER "FIREWALL" APPROACH TO DETERMINE ADJUSTMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE TO ENSURE IFRC DIRECT BENEFITS, ENGAGEMENT AND VISIBILITY.

T10. CONDUCT AFTER ACTION REVIEWS AND A META EVALUATION OF PAST IFRC RTES AND RELATED RESPONSE REVIEWS CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS.

1. BACKGROUND

Context

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda), the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines, made landfall in Central Philippines on Friday, November 8th 2013, with winds of up to 235 kph and gusts reaching 275 kph. Affected areas include the hardest-hit Tacloban City in Leyte province; Guiuan (Eastern Samar) where the storm first made landfall; the northern tip of Cebu and Bantayan Island; Negros Occidental and Oriental; Panay, and Palawan. Other affected areas include, but are not limited to, the provinces of Northern Samar, Samar, Southern Leyte, Bohol, Guimaras, Masbate, Biliran, Romblon and Mindoro.

The humanitarian impact of the typhoon was massive, due to the deadly combination of powerful winds, heavy rain and tsunami-like storm surges which wiped out a number of coastal towns and cities, most notably Tacloban and communities along the coast south of Tacloban on Eastern Leyte. Although the actual impact of the typhoon varies from one affected area to another, the overall effect has been the same: families torn apart, buildings and infrastructure destroyed, livelihoods and crops ruined, and whole communities disrupted. The massive storm surge (up to 7m) caused damage in the eastern seaboard, while in other areas there was widespread wind damage. According to the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) reports of December 13th 2013, a total of 3.4 million families (16 million people) were directly affected by Typhoon Haiyan in 12,122 barangays (villages) across 44 provinces in 591 municipalities and 57 cities. Given the scope of the disaster and the corresponding intervention required, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Proclamation No 682 on November 11th 2013, declaring a state of national calamity, and indicated that the country would accept international assistance.

The main IFRC support actions undertaken in the first month were:

- Allocated CHF 475,495 from DREF (on November 8th, 2013) to support the National Society in undertaking needs assessments and delivering immediate assistance to affected people.
- Launched an Emergency Appeal on a preliminary basis (on November 12th, 2013) for CHF 72,323,259 to assist 100,000 families (500,000 people) within 18 months. A revised appeal was launched on 16th January 2014 for CHF 121,463,172 to support the Philippine Red Cross to assist up to 100,000 families (500,000 people) for 24 months (to be completed by 31st October 2015).
- Deployed surge capacity in the form of FACT, ERU's and HEOps.
- Issued 3 Operations Updates based on numerous 21 FACT updates and info graphics.

Typhoon Haiyan was the fourth typhoon to hit the Philippines in 2013, and the country was hit by an earthquake just a few weeks before Haiyan made landfall.

The RTE findings and recommendations that follow cover the response timeframe from when IFRC first responded to Typhoon Hiayan (November 8, 2013) up until when the RTE departed from the Philippines (March 10, 2014). The following IFRC map (November 12, 2013) shows the path of Typhoon Haiyan across the Philippines and the geographic location of affected communities.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge
Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y de la Media Luna Roja
الاتحاد الدولي لجمعيات الصليب الأحمر والهلال الأحمر

Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)

The maps used do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or National Societies concerning the legal status of a territory or of its authorities. Map data sources: ESRI, DEVINFO, International Federation, NDRRMC, UNISYS, EAMDRPH014.mxd - Map created by DCM/GVA

Important cities
Affected municipalities
Haiyan's path

2. FINDINGS

The findings that follow represent key IFRC Haiyan response successes and challenges that emerged, from amongst many possible topics through the RTE process. Thus, these findings are a result of a multi-layered RTE data collection and analysis process and do not attempt to necessarily cover every aspect of the IFRC response.

2.1. Response Services & Tools

FINDING 2.1.1	IFRC RESPONSE IS PERCEIVED EXTERNALLY TO BE ROBUST AND RAPID. RED CROSS RESPONSE TRULY LED BY PRC, A NATIONAL SOCIETY THAT HAS MOBILIZED AN IMPRESSIVE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE.

The IFRC response to Typhoon Haiyan is generally perceived, particularly externally, to be robust and rapid. Despite significant operational constraints, particularly with regard to internal IFRC organizational challenges (see subsequent findings) and the strain from managing multiple previous response operations (e.g. Bohol earthquake, Zamboanga seige) even before typhoon Haiyan struck, IFRC and PRC delivered relevant services and support to more than the targeted 100,000 disaster affected families over a disperse geographic area and in a timely manner.

While the IFRC response to the operation certainly contributed positively to the performance of the response, the perceived success of the response is directly related to the impressive disaster response mobilized by the PRC. PRC took the leading role in the response and actively sought to manage and coordinate the Movement response to Typhoon Haiyan. IFRC was particularly fortunate to have strong PRC middle management counterparts (in Manila and in the field operational locations) and active PRC chapters to work with. Of particular note, was the high number of volunteers, particularly youth volunteers[3], and their commitment to the response in their communities. There has also been continued positive technical engagement[4] between PRC and IFRC at multiple levels throughout the operation.

FINDING 2.1.2	CASH PROGRAMMING HIGHLIGHTED AS A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION THAT WAS RELATIVELY RAPID AND DELIVERED AT SCALE (50,000 FAMILIES).

For the first time ever in response to a major humanitarian catastrophe, IFRC delivered unconditional cash support in a timely manner and at scale (to over 57,000[5] families). Critically, the PRC had previous experience in cash programming, some cash programming preparedness took place prior to the disaster specifically identifying distribution vendors and the general operating environment and the context (particularly the market conditions) was permissible for this intervention. Substantive beneficiary monitoring systems established as a part of the system identified high levels of beneficiary satisfaction

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[3] Volunteerism was the highest rated principle according to the IFRC Field Staff Exist Survey.
[4] The Field Staff Exist Survey and RTE interveiws highlighted PRC technical capacity strengths related to community relationships as well as the application of global and national standards.
[5] Case Study of the Unconditional Cash Transfers component of the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Response, Philippines.

with the unconditional cash grants provided and there were no security or beneficiary incidents that took place. This joint cash programming effort[6] of the IFRC, PRC, the American Red Cross, British Red Cross and Danish Red Cross is a clear success that can and should be built upon in the future[7] with consideration for how emergency cash distributions interact with existing traditional relief operations and support the longer term recovery process.

FINDING 2.1.3	**PRC AND IFRC SHELTER PROGRAMMING IS A SIGNIFICANT RECOVERY PROGRAMMING COMMITMENT (CURRENT PLAN FOR 50,000 FAMILY SHELTERS AND 100,000 FAMILIES SUPPORTED WITH REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION).**

The recovery plan of the PRC, and supported by IFRC, calls for a very significant shelter recovery operation that provides new shelters to 50,000 families and supports 100,000 families with repair and reconstruction of existing shelters. IFRC knows from previous large-scale shelter programs that this type of program requires a significant and sustained investment of programming resources and staff effort. Specific questions were raised during the RTE process regarding recovery program resourcing requirements, programming linkages (e.g. how shelter programming links with livelihood and WASH programming) and the potential programming impact that the 2014 typhoon season may have.

FINDING 2.1.4	**LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMMING (TARGETED FOR 55,500 FAMILIES) IS A KEY PART OF CURRENT/FUTURE PROGRAMING YET CURRENTLY LACKING PROGRAMMING DIRECTION.**

The current IFRC revised emergency appeal calls for livelihood programming support to 55,500 families. Yet, at this time it is not clear in the evolution of the recovery operation what specifically this will entail in terms of livelihood programming, how it will be delivered at scale and from where the technical skills, experience and pledged funding for this type of programming will come from.

FINDING 2.1.5	**FACT VIEWED AS A WESTERN TOOL. FACT TOOL CAMOUFLAGED FOR DEPLOYMENT WHICH COMPROMISES INTEGRITY OF THE GLOBAL TOOL.**

On November 7th, 2013 a FACT alert for Typhoon Haiyan was issued. On November 9, 2014 the request from the Zone Office to the Geneva Office was for a "FACT-like" deployment of some of the key positions that would normally be on a FACT[8] but without a FACT Team Leader[9]. Instead of a standard

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[6] Two permanent PRC Staff (including a PRC Cash Focal Point), 18 international delegates from FACT/ERU/Cash Roster deployment, 8 PRC Chapter Administrators, 50 Cash Team volunteers, 140 PRC youth volunteers. Case Study of the Unconditional Cash Transfers component of the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Response, Philippines.

[7] PRC anticipates further streamlining cash procedures for the current response and future responses based on their Haiyan cash experience.

[8] Five FACT team members were requested on November 9th and deployed November 10th with an estimated total of 25 FACT delegates deployed during the response. Some of the FACT positions were filled by FACT trained Zone delegates. It was noted that a small number of FACT team members deployed were not FACT trained.

FACT deployment, a "FACT-like" team was deployed without following standard protocol for FACT deployments. It was suggested that a previous poor experience with the FACT in the Philippines in 2009[10] made PRC initial acceptance of the FACT for the Haiyan response a challenge. Thus, the Zone Office request for a "FACT-like" deployment for the immediate response which was viewed at the time as being operationally preferable to the possibility that PRC would reject the FACT entirely. The term "western" tool was utilized primarily by the PRC[11] in reference to the FACT suggesting a negative connotation (e.g. that the tool would not be appropriate in a non-western context) and some degree of discrimination. Some respondents noted that the initial FACT team members appear to have been selected based on their current or previous connection and acceptance with key Zone staff instead of being selected through a more objective[12] team composition process. This compromised the integrity of the FACT team selection process particularly given that no Team Leader, a standard position on a FACT, was deployed. The IFRC Philippines response utilization of the FACT global tool was particularly problematic related to IFRC team composition, response management, situation analysis, representation and coordination with potential long-term negative repercussions related to future IFRC responses.

FINDING 2.1.6	THE EXPECTATION THAT FACT WILL MEET ALL FIELD OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (IFRC OPERATIONS SET-UP AND ASSESSMENTS AND COORDINATION) OVER A WIDE GEOGRAPHIC AREA IS UNREALISTIC AND LIMITED DUE TO LACK OF FIELD LEADERSHIP IN INITIAL RESPONSE.

The context of the Philippines Haiyan response was complicated by significant geographic coverage requirements over a wide geographic area necessitating IFRC field operational coordination presence in Manila, Tacloban, Cebu, Roxas and other key operational areas. There were no IFRC field operations hubs previously in any of these locations (beyond the permanent delegation in Manila). The FACT team needed to have the ability to set-up IFRC coordination hubs in multiple field locations (Tacloban, Cebu and Roxas) so as to conduct field assessments throughout the Visayas region and to establish coordination activities. It is unrealistic to expect that a FACT, particularly without a FACT Team Leader, as it was configured as a single entity would be able to cover a wide geographic area, operational set-up, assessments and coordination. Setting up multiple operational hubs requires at a minimum a management and coordination function, administration, finances and logistical support. Comprehensive assessments require technical coordinators to work with the national society to access field environments and determine the impact of the disaster. Assessments should be on-going with constant refinements of assessment data so that there is a continuous understanding as to how the humanitarian context is evolving, where the gaps are and how best to target IFRC humanitarian services and resources. It is important to note that the RTE was unable to identify a comprehensive FACT assessment

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[9] The first Head of Emergency Operations (HEOps) was deployed on November 11th. Another HEOps was subsequently deployed to Tacloban as the IFRC Field Operations Coordinator in January 2014.

[10] 2009 IFRC response to the Philippines was for typhoons Ketsana and Parma.

[11] This term and its use came from the PRC description and was repeated by the Zone Office to the Geneva Office to reflect the perspective of the PRC.

[12] In the selection of a FACT team there is always some level of subjectivity that goes into that selection process. In a global response such as this, maintaining the greatest level of objectivity possible considering the full range of national, regional and international implications is desirable.

report for the IFRC response[13]. The lack of an assessment report suggests that prioritizing the assessment element of the FACT was a challenge in this context. Challenges related to assessments and situation analysis (combined with coordination challenges between Manila, Zone Office and Geneva offices) undercut one of the major institutional advantages of the Red Cross – the ability to represent and respond to the needs of vulnerable people from local to global levels. Lastly and probably most importantly, the FACT has responsibility for internal Movement coordination and external coordination within the humanitarian community. As noted later in this report, there were also coordination challenges faced on this operation particularly with respect to external coordination burdens. Given the above, it is extremely unlikely that the FACT can work optimally and fully deliver on this range of responsibilities without sufficient allocation of resources and effective management.

Despite these challenges, the IFRC staff[14] deployed made the best of difficult circumstances and led the IFRC response at the field level often taking on de facto leadership roles and performing multiple functions within the FACT team when requested.

FINDING 2.1.7	**RDRT TOOL IS MARGINALIZED AND UNDERUTILIZED.**

The RDRT was deployed too late in the initial response phase to be immediately relevant. The RDRT tool was not truly considered as a key tool for the IFRC initial response despite being an IFRC tool that is designed and intended for that very purpose. Even though there was a stated desire by the Zone and PRC to have more staff from the Asia region involved in the IFRC response operation, the main pool of regionally deployable trained and experienced regional staff was not tapped to the extent possible or in a timely manner. Further, when finally deployed there were different levels of support and equipment available for the RDRTs as compared to other delegates (particularly ERU delegates) adding to the perception that the RDRTs are marginalized as compared to other global tools. A further complication is that RDRTs are managed by IFRC Regional Offices but these offices do not have a formal role in large-scale catastrophic emergencies.

The RDRT delegates that did deploy on the response were valuable and left some of the most significant positive impressions of any delegates that served as a part of the IFRC international response operation team. Respondents noted the high quality of the RDRT delegates and how easily they were embedded into IFRC structures. As many RDRTs had trained with PRC staff[15] previously, they were familiar with each other and used many of the same processes.

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[13] Field Staff Exit Survey Question 12, 11% of all comments were related to assessment improvements.
[14] Of particularly note was the inclusion of Information Management and Cash Delegates. Both were highly appreciated by IFRC and PRC.
[15] PRC has 14 RDRT trained staff, some of which are RDRT trainers/facilitators.

ERUS SPEED AND STANDARDIZATION ENSURED IFRC OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE AND CONSISTENCY. QUESTIONS RAISED REGARDING ABILITY OF TOOLS TO ADAPT TO CONTEXT AND EXCLUSIVE NATURE OF ERUS.

The first ERU Alert was on November 7th and the first deployment order for Logistics and IT on November 9.[16] The ERUs were consistently highlighted throughout the RTE as a key foundational IFRC contribution to the Philippines response. 12 ERUs were deployed composed of staff from 18 different national societies. Standardized services directly applicable to the Haiyan response were mobilized relatively rapidly. More than two hundred and sixty ERU delegates (see *Figure 1* below) were deployed to the Philippines entailing four rotations of the ERU staff. International supplies were facilitated by the Logistics ERUs for in-country distribution by the Relief ERUs and PRC. Water and sanitation services were provided in difficult areas affected by the typhoon. Health services were targeted in affected areas. The base camp was deployed to Tacloban making that a key IFRC operational coordination hub in the most affected area. Having telecommunications systems that are required for well-functional field operations enabled IFRC response operation coordination. For the first time ever, a significant (9 person) cash team was deployed as a part of the IFRC surge support team. All combined, the ERUs were a tangible, effective and critical contribution from the Movement in support of the PRC field response.

Figure 1:

	ERU	NS	1st team	2nd team	3rd team	4th team
1	LOGS	British RC	7	4	7	6
2		Finnish/Danish RC	6	5	5	4
3	IT & TELEC	Danish/American / NZ RC	8	4	5	3
4	BHC	Japanese RC + Hong Kong, Australia	15	10	10	0
5		Canadian/Norwegian RC + H Kong, Australia	27	13	4	2
6	WATSAN M15	Spanish RC	6	6	6	3
7	MSM 20	Swedish/Austrian RC	5	5	0	0
8		German/Austrian RC	5	6	4	0
9-11	RELIEF	American RC	5	4	4	4
		French RC	5	5	5	5
		BeNeLux RCs	5	5	6	4
	Cash HR	American RC	4	3	2	0
12	BASE CAMP	Danish RC	7	3	0	0
	HR per month:		105	73	58	31
	Total HR ERU:		267			

While there were challenges related to the deployment and functionality of the ERUs (particularly regarding geographic placement of particular ERUs), these challenges are mostly expected in this type of context. For example, the Relief and Logistics ERUs struggled to operate optimally and there was a lack of consistency between how the various Relief ERUs were providing relief support. There were also noted challenges related the placement of the some of the Health ERUs. However, given the complexity of the crisis and the scale of the ERU response, these challenges are not unexpected. It is likely that they

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[16] DMIS: British RC please deploy a Logs ERU to Manilla. 9 November @ 19:28

were exacerbated by the lack of a FACT Team Leader, as well as gaps in assessment and analysis, to assist in key decision-making challenges related to ERU coordination that invariable arose.

Despite the excellent services and support provided by the ERUs, questions were raised throughout the RTE process regarding the ability of the ERUs to adapt to the context, flexibility of the ERU modules and the exclusive nature of the ERUs. For example, IFRC relief, logistics and procurement remain focused on a specific and limited number of international commodities without the ability to rapidly identify and integrate national procurement. Multiple base-camp modules (though smaller in scale) could have been deployed to other field locations in addition to having one large-scale base-camp in Tacloban.

FINDING 2.1.9	IFRC LEGAL STATUS ISSUE IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL RISK. HOWEVER, LACK OF STATUS ALSO MAY ENSURE A CLOSER IFRC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH PRC.

IFRC does not have recognized legal status in the Philippines per the Government of the Philippines. IFRC is entirely reliant on the PRC and its legal status which is particularly relevant to contracting, procurement, human resources and IFRC legal liability in the Philippines. There were mixed responses from key stakeholders regarding the need for IFRC legal status. Some noted that without IFRC legal status, there is a closer working relationship between IFRC and PRC. Most noted the increased organizational and operational risk for both IFRC and PRC[17] related to a lack of IFRC legal status. Key aspects of the IFRC operation, such as employment contracts, procurement, and liability coverage related to construction of shelters, are liabilities that PRC assumes. There can also be operational administrative burdens for PRC that in turn cause delays for IFRC. This creates an IFRC organizational and operational risk particularly if there are any issues related to the PRC that might make it difficult for PRC to function. Further, IFRC and other national societies operational in the Philippines are also placing additional liabilities (financial and legal) on the PRC without corresponding protections. The current arrangement allows for operational functionality at this time but circumstances can rapidly change that would jeopardize the IFRC ability to continue delivering and operating on its significant commitments related to the Haiyan recovery operation. An IFRC status agreement should better protect the PRC from IFRC and sister National Societies obligations and liabilities. While IFRC does not have legal status in all other countries where there have been large-scale IFRC operations (e.g. Haiti, Pakistan), PRC leadership has recently stated their agreement and support for IFRC obtaining legal status in the Philippines. To date, IFRC and PRC have not taken all of the necessary steps needed to secure legal status.

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[17] Philippines Principles and Rules Case Study.

<table>
<tr><td>FINDING 2.1.10</td><td>INCONSISTENT SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES PARTICULARLY AS RELATED TO HIRING NATIONAL STAFF, CONTRACTS, VOLUNTEER PAYMENTS AND PROPOSALS.</td></tr>
</table>

During the response and still today in some respects, IFRC systems and processes have not always matched with PRC systems and processes. This is the case particularly with respect to the hiring of national staff, contracting and volunteer payments. PRC does not offer any per diems or form of payments to its volunteers. During the response operation IFRC and other national societies have reportedly provided PRC volunteers with payments of varying amounts[18]. IFRC is currently unable to contract national staff on longer-term contracts and instead is contracting national staff on very short-term contracts, which may diverge from national laws and create liabilities. Pay rates sometimes vary by location and the hiring entity.

Furthermore, Red Cross resource mobilization systems stumbled momentarily during the response when a completed Red Cross proposal to ECHO for a second tranche of funding missed a critical deadline by one day. A second tranche of funding from ECHO to the Red Cross was never released. Some respondents noted a slow IFRC early warning and response system. However, the response timeline shows a reasonable level of early warning and efforts made for early action[19] particularly when considering the government alert levels[20]. Lastly, in the initial response there were inconsistent operational delegate induction processes (particularly with respect to briefings in Manila) and consistency in the briefing materials used.

<table>
<tr><td>FINDING 2.1.11</td><td>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MIXED REVIEWS WITH APPRECIATION AT GLOBAL AND FIELD (IFRC MANILA AND TACLOBAN) LEVEL BUT WITH RELATIVELY LOWER APPRECIATION AT ZONE AND PRC LEVELS. LACKING ANALYSIS AND USE IN DECISION-MAKING.</td></tr>
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The performance of the information management function within the Haiyan response operation varied depending on the respondent (or IM audience). At the global and field (IFRC Manila and Tacloban) levels there were high levels of appreciation for the output and quality of information created. A stronger IFRC focus on IM, particularly with remote IM support from the American Red Cross and British Red Cross, likely positively influenced IM products created, by the IFRC operation. However, there was a relatively lower level of appreciation for the IM products at the Zone and PRC[21] levels. Some stakeholders from those entities noted that the information products were too long, less useful (particularly with respect to situational analysis) or were not distributed to those who should have received the information. This suggests that there remain challenges in the distribution of information and the ability of IFRC to condense the information into manageable guidance to assist and guide decision-making. It is probable

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[18] Some PNS paid volunteers rates or P300 and others at a rate of P500.
[19] Coordination meetings were held at government (Nov 6) and Movement levels (Nov 4, 6, 7). Attempts were made to pre-position stock (ICRC) and staff (PRC) ahead of landfall. First PRC assessment teams were in the field within 24 hours.
[20] PAGASA Storm Warning 1 (low) Nov 6, PAGASA Storm Warning 4 (highest) Nov 7.
[21] Some PRC respondents did note that IM is not necessarily an a PRC operational strength thus IFRC support, particularly regarding mapping and post distribution surveys (specifically from cash programming) was highlighted with particular appreciation.

that the focus to date is more on the output of high quality information products[22]. While this is of high utility and importance to the Movement, decision-makers also require easy to access real-time information and a condensed analysis of that information to support the decision-making process.

FINDING 2.1.12	LACK OF CLARITY AS TO WHAT THE HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY FUNCTION ENTAILS AND HOW IT CONTRIBUTES.

For the IFRC Haiyan response it remains unclear as to the role of the Humanitarian Diplomacy[23] function and what it entails within IFRC field operations. Key stakeholders involved in the response are doubtful as to how HD contributes to organizational activities. Importantly, it has not been established as to how this function complements or overlaps with key operational leadership positions (particularly the Head of Delegation, Operations Managers and Movement Coordinators). The HD function was described as being a mix of advocacy, communications, capacity building, resource mobilization, disaster law and coordination. While all of those functionalities are indeed valuable to a response such as this, it also crosses over into activities also handled by other operational staff. To date, no full-time HD delegates have deployed to the operation, which is likely a result of the lack of clarity related to this function, and how this function will integrate into field operations.

2.2. Coordination

FINDING 2.2.1	PRC LEAD ROLE CHALLENGED TRADITIONAL IFRC COORDINATION APPROACHES.

In many IFRC operational responses that require a global mobilization of Movement resources, the national society is completely overwhelmed requiring a robust mobilization of the global tools to support and in some cases IFRC even replaces response functions that otherwise would be led and managed by the affected national society. However, in the case of the Philippine Red Cross the national society assumed a leadership role from the outset and was able, in most circumstances, to fulfill its leadership role. On November 12th, 2013 the PRC, IFRC and ICRC signed a joint Movement response statement clearly placing PRC in the lead role. [24]

As such, IFRC is truly in a support role to the PRC. The PRC are leading the Haiyan operation, including Movement coordination, and have done so since the very beginning of the response. This is as it should be and an acknowledged positive aspect of the Haiyan response. As such, IFRC has needed to adjust its

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[22] The definition of IM is not always clear within the IFRC response system. For example, information management may have been interpreted by some in PRC as being media communications. Comments from PRC highlighted the professionalism and value of media communication support provided by IFRC. These same positive comments regarding IFRC media communications were also noted in the Philippines Principles and Rules Case Study.

[24] Joint Movement Response Statement: "The PRC will remain responsible for implementation of the disaster response operations and the Movement Partners shall support and augment the efforts of the PRC …"

traditional coordination approaches and tools to this working reality of having a capable and functional PRC to work with. In some ways, particularly during the initial response phase, IFRC and the delegates deployed struggled to recognize this balance of roles and how best to support the PRC. This is particularly true of some the global tools, specifically the ERUs, which require large numbers of delegates and multiple rotations of staff making it a challenge to ensure that those delegates know how best to work through, in coordination with and in support of the PRC. The lack of a disaster pre-agreement between PRC and IFRC influenced the ability to rapidly clarify roles and responsibilities. The lack of pre-agreements has been raised before in previous RTEs[25] and was specifically highlighted by the IFRC Haiyan high-level mission as a being critical for operational success.

This is less of an issue within the current recovery operation with IFRC playing a strong supportive role to PRC while enabling PRC to step forward into its coordination role. Of particular interest is the IFRC decision to imbed IFRC specific positions with PRC counterparts during the recovery operation. The results from this approach of imbedding IFRC staff within the national society operations should be evaluated for possible replication in other IFRC responses.

FINDING 2.2.2	COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES RELATED TO DELEGATE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS PARTICULARLY PROBLEMATIC FOR PRC. PERCEPTION OF SOME ERUs OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY.

More than 350 international delegates have deployed as a part of the IFRC Haiyan response. Invariably the movement of that many delegates into an operation creates challenges. It was particularly problematic for the PRC who were somehow unaware in the initial response phase as to how many delegates and ERUs were deployed, to where[26] in the affected region they were deployed and at what cost. PRC confusion related to how many delegates were deployed and where they were working led to disagreements, frustration and consternation between IFRC and PRC. While currently there is a common understanding of how many IFRC delegates are working on the operation and where they are working, the repercussions of these challenges from the initial response phase are still felt in the existing operation.

The PRC frustration, particularly at the Manila level, regarding delegate numbers and locations was also linked to the perception that some ERUs were operating independently of the PRC and in some cases even coordinating separately with government departments without the PRC. Many ERU staff, and particularly ERU Team Leaders, did not brief or debrief in Manila limiting interaction with PRC Manila. Some PRC staff noted that incoming delegates did not ask for PRC procedures suggesting a lack of integration with PRC systems and processes. It is likely that the ERUs were working at the field level with PRC staff and volunteers. However, it is probable that there was both a lack of effective communication on this key topic between IFRC and PRC as well as PRC field staff at the chapter levels communicating information to Manila. Regardless, at some point along the communication chain there

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[25] RTE 2009, 2010, Philippines Principles & Rules Case Study
[26] Also noted as an issue in the Philippines Movement Coordination Case Study.

was a breakdown in communication that led to tensions and frustration. Further, questions were raised subsequently at the Movement Summit and on other occasions by PRC and other regional national societies regarding the cost versus benefit of the international global tools. Another related issue that emerged was a sense that traditional donor national societies willing to "play by the rules" and proactively participate in a multi-lateral IFRC response were sometimes at a disadvantage related to the deployment of staff and teams as compared to other national societies that worked bi-laterally with the PRC.

| FINDING 2.2.3 | **EXCELLENT COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH ICRC INCORPORATING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS DISASTERS.** |

Prior to Typhoon Haiyan even making landfall in the Philippines, IFRC, ICRC and the Philippines Red Cross had met and prepared a draft agreement clarifying for the Movement and external actors the division of responsibilities and areas of coverage amongst the three Movement components. This agreement was signed on November 12th 2013 by all three Movement components soon after it became clear as to the magnitude of the disaster with ICRC given responsibility in support of the PRC for conflict and typhoon related areas (Samar) while IFRC in all other non-conflict disaster affected areas (Leyte and Panay). In doing so, the Movement established clear lines of responsibility while avoiding confusion and frustration that otherwise could have resulted from an unclear division of responsibilities.

Importantly, this proactive action taken by these three Movement components represented action based on lessons learned. Previously disasters in the Philippines (particularly the typhoon Bopha response in conflict affected Mindanao) had recently resulted in frustration and heightened tensions particularly between PRC, IFRC and ICRC. Fortunately this scenario was avoided in the case of the Haiyan response due to proactive steps taken by all three components of the Movement operational in the Philippines to act to upon recommendations made based on lessons learned[27].

| FINDING 2.2.4 | **PRC AND IFRC EXTERNAL COORDINATION BEYOND THE MOVEMENT LIMITED.** |

While some efforts were made at external coordination beyond the Movement during the Haiyan response, the perception by many external actors is that of a PRC and IFRC[28] that is removed and disengaged from the wider external humanitarian community (including the IFRC convened Shelter Cluster). It is important to note that external entities have a great deal of respect and appreciation for the leading work done by PRC and IFRC. However, they do not recognize PRC or IFRC as a leader within the external humanitarian coordination apparatus. This can be considered a lost opportunity for IFRC in

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[27] Philippines Movement Coordination Case Study.
[28] The PRC is the lead for external humanitarian coordination and supported by IFRC.

terms of strategically influencing and engaging with external humanitarian community actors to the benefit of IFRC operations and the communities IFRC services with the PRC.

The reasoning behind the limited involvement of PRC and IFRC in external coordination is likely due to the high level of effort required for internal Movement coordination and the time requirements related to participating in external coordination mechanisms. Participation takes a significant commitment of time from PRC and IFRC operational staff who are already burdened with technical response requirements and internal Movement coordination. Given time constraints, PRC and IFRC operational staff choose to focus on meeting operational requirements and managing internal Movement coordination needs and then participating in external humanitarian coordination with whatever time may remain. Long and multiple cluster and government meetings were noted as a reason for not participating in external coordination. This was particularly challenging given significant internal Movement coordination responsibilities, a limited number of delegates and that both PRC and IFRC were struggling to manage not just this operation but the other previous disaster recovery operations still underway.

FINDING 2.2.5	**IFRC SUPPORT TO SHELTER CLUSTER COORDINATION SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY RELEVANT. CONCERNS RELATED TO ENSURING MAXIMUM IFRC UTILITY, RESOURCING AND ENGAGEMENT.**

While this RTE did not evaluate the performance of the Shelter Cluster, the RTE did consider the interaction between the IFRC response operation and the Shelter Cluster. The Shelter Cluster for the Haiyan response is convened by IFRC. This IFRC convener role commitment entails the provision of IFRC staff, technical resources, financial resources, logistical and administrative support so that the Shelter Cluster can be operational and contribute substantially to humanitarian community coordination. This significant commitment of resources, estimated at over $2 million USD in value for the Haiyan response, fulfills IFRC responsibilities in its Shelter Cluster convening role within the IASC system. Thus, IFRC contributions to the shelter cluster are a significant input to humanitarian coordination.

Yet, it is not always clear to many stakeholders involved both internally and externally to IFRC as to the extent of the IFRC commitment to the Shelter Cluster. There is a "firewall" that has been intentionally established so that the Shelter Cluster can operate independently from the IFRC operation thereby ensuring that IFRC carries out its convening role in support of all humanitarian agencies involved in the response. Though the Shelter Cluster relies upon IFRC resourcing, it is not managed by the IFRC response operation instead operating, as agreed per the IFRC global commitment in its role as the Shelter Cluster convenor, as an IASC coordination mechanism (that are mostly led by the UN agencies for the Haiyan response). This leads to questions raised by IFRC staff as to the utility or benefit of this significant investment to IFRC field response operations. While this firewall serves an important function, there is less recognition than possible from the wider humanitarian community and internally within IFRC as to the IFRC contribution made to the very active IASC Shelter Cluster in the Philippines. To maintain the independence of the Shelter Cluster, staff have no clear outward facing signage or communication indicating that they are IFRC staff. The allocation of IFRC shelter delegate resources to the Shelter

Cluster vis-à-vis the IFRC shelter programming is perceived by some IFRC operations staff, despite clear efforts made by the Shelter Cluster coordination function in the Geneva Office to fairly manage the distribution of IFRC shelter delegates, to be unbalanced. Despite this perception by some, all requests for shelter surge capacity for the IFRC shelter operation were reported as being fulfilled. More Shelter Cluster staff were requested and deployed than IFRC shelter operation delegates but this is a result of a lower level[29] of demand from IFRC shelter operations as compared to a higher level[30] of demand from the Shelter Cluster. The lack of connectivity between the IFRC operations and the Shelter Cluster was evident with the IFRC operation having limited participation in the Shelter Cluster, as well as with other clusters. This is potential lost opportunity for IFRC.

The result is that IFRC is making an important silent contribution to the humanitarian community and the wider Haiyan response. However, the direct benefits of the IFRC support to the Shelter Cluster to IFRC are not fully understood for the IFRC Haiyan response, which could be a future threat to this approach.

FINDING 2.2.6	EMERGENCE OF CONSORTIA APPROACH IN ADDITION TO MULTI-LATERAL AND BI-LATERAL APPROACHES.

In the Philippines a consortia approach to pooling and coordinating international national societies' programming is being established for the first time in this context. Lead international national societies with permanent delegations (German Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Spanish Red Cross) that were in place prior to typhoon Haiyan are to lead and manage consortia of other national societies that will have recovery programs in support to the PRC. While this consortium approach is used in other parts of the world it has not yet been used in the Philippines until this time. It essentially is an alternative to working multi-laterally through IFRC, ICRC or bi-laterally with the PRC and is an approved mechanism of the PRC and IFRC.

This approach brings into question the role of IFRC. At the time of this RTE the IFRC revised appeal (at just over $100 million) was still not fully funded despite it being estimated that national societies have raised a total of $300 million for the Haiyan response. Thus, the question arises as to why it is that IFRC is not receiving more support from international national societies? Why do participating national societies feel the need to work outside of the IFRC multi-lateral approach? For some large donor national societies the response to that question appears to be a matter of risk management. For others, there is both an implicit and explicit challenge as to the value of IFRC coordination leadership in a multi-lateral response and recovery operation such as this. This brings into question the efficacy of the IFRC coordination role and how that role relates, in terms of effectiveness and cost efficiency, to other programming approaches.

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[29] Approximately 6 IFRC shelter operations delegates were deployed as requested.
[30] Approximately 15 Shelter Cluster staff were on average deployed at a given time n the Philippines to support the Shelter Cluster.

<table>
<tr><td>**FINDING 2.2.7**</td><td>**EMERGING REGIONAL NATIONAL SOCIETIES WERE NOT FULLY ENGAGED WITH THE IFRC RESPONSE. OFTEN RESULTED IN UNSOLICITED GOODS AND SERVICES SOMETIMES BELOW IFRC STANDARDS.**</td></tr>
</table>

Asia is economically and politically one of the most dynamic and fastest growing and powerful regions in the world. Countries such as China, India, South Korea and Indonesia now play a leading role in the region and throughout the world. As the economic and political importance of these nations continues to grow within the global community, so do their Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies. It should have come as no surprise to anyone within IFRC that the Red Cross Society of China, Pelang Merah Indonesia (PMI), Malaysian Red Crescent, Singapore Red Cross or Korean Red Cross wanted to play a key role during the Haiyan response. These emerging national societies sometimes sought ways that they could multi-laterally, bi-laterally and even unilaterally provide support during the Haiyan response.

Yet, they were not fully engaged with the initial IFRC response. There appeared to be few IFRC mechanisms that they could directly contribute to the response via the multi-lateral IFRC approach beyond a financial donation to the IFRC appeal. While those financial donations to the IFRC appeal were made, these emerging national societies sought more tangible and visible ways to contribute to the response. It is important to these national societies that their communities (particularly Filipino diaspora) could see the response and how it contributed. They chose not to fully engaged[31] with IFRC in a meaningful way so that those contributions could be channeled through multi-lateral IFRC channels ensuring coordinated and standardized inputs.

National societies decided to go outside of the IFRC multi-lateral approach. PRC has strong bi-lateral partnerships with many other sister National Societies both within the region and beyond. These bi-lateral partnerships were used to make contributions directly to PRC bypassing the IFRC system despite some IFRC staff efforts to engage and channel these resources. This often resulted in unsolicited goods and services sometimes below IFRC standards. Food was shipped in non-standard quantities and some food was not appropriate for the national context. Right-hand drive vehicles were sent that cannot be used in the Philippines. Some tents that arrived were so full of mold that they are inhabitable. Many containers of bottled water were shipped sometimes incurring demurrage charges. Many items will need to be either destroyed or donated to other organizations[32]. All of this creates a significant financial, logistics and administrative burden on the PRC and is in contradiction to the Principles and Rules recently ratified at the General Assembly in Sydney. In general, better adherence to the Principles and Rules for RCRC Humanitarian Assistance would have been beneficial for the Philippines response and may have helped to address some of the challenges identified in this finding and throughout this final report.

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[31] IFRC did make efforts to engage with some sister National Societies particularly regarding the mobilisation process. It is noted that some NS decided to still send supplies despite explanations that they may not be required, appropriate or meet standard specifications. Other sister National Societies likely chose not to be directly engaged in the IFRC mobilisation process.
[32] Per the Principles & Rules, the PRC has the right to destroy and charge donor NSs for related costs however it is doubtful that this will occur.

2.3. Organisational Roles, Structure & Staffing

FINDING 2.3.1	SIGNIFICANT EFFORT, GOOD TEAMWORK AND DEDICATION OF HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL IFRC STAFF WERE THE FOUNDATION FOR IFRC RESPONSE SUCCESSES.

Despite the challenges inherent in a complex and challenging disaster environment, the IFRC team at all levels (Philippines, Asia Pacific Zone Office and Geneva Office levels) put forward significant effort, exhibited strong teamwork and high levels of professionalism. The successes related to the IFRC response can be directly attributed to the commitment of work of the IFRC delegates that served in the Philippines. Given the large number of international delegates who worked on this operation, it is remarkable that there was no need for disciplinary actions taken by IFRC against any delegates.

FINDING 2.3.2	IFRC ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING WAS PARTICULARLY CONVOLUTED IN THE INITIAL RESPONSE.

The IFRC initial response to typhoon Haiyan was hindered by a lack of clear organizational roles structure and decision-making[33]. Most critically given this emergency context, there was a lack of understanding as to who made the operational decisions that were needed on an hourly and daily basis. Key decisions requested by field operational staff were not addressed and field staff did not always know whom they should approach for a decision to be made. The organization of the IFRC team[34] was convoluted and that had a deleterious effect on the field operations. An IFRC table of organization for the entire IFRC Haiyan response operation has still never been approved[35] and disseminated[36]. The convoluted nature of the operational structure and decision-making was particularly problematic at the Manila level where a high number of leadership personnel stood in contrast to the field level where there was sometimes a notable absence of field operations leadership. More than five persons took on high-level IFRC operational management leadership roles in Manila during the first two months of the response. This might have been manageable if there was a clear communication as to the transfer of leadership function from one person to another but that did not happen. This situation was further complicated by IFRC leadership staff visiting during high-level missions that further confused the decision-making process while those individuals were in the Philippines. Stakeholders that participated in the RTE cited issues around IFRC organizational clarity, particularly in the initial response phase, as the most ineffective aspect of the IFRC response.

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[33] Issues related to a lack of IFRC organizational clarity were also highlighted in the IFRC 2009 Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines and the West Sumatra Earthquake in Indonesia also recommended the importance of establishing pre-agreements.

[34] There were mixed opinions through the RTE regarding the effectiveness of the support functions played by both the Zone Office and the Geneva Office.

[35] Draft tables of organization for the entire IFRC operation were created but there is no evidence of an approved and disseminated IFRC table of organization.

[36] An IFRC table of organization for IFRC operations in Tacloban was identified by the RTE.

FINDING 2.3.3	INADEQUATE **IFRC** FIELD LEADERSHIP CAPACITY IN INITIAL RESPONSE TO MEET CONTEXTUAL REQUIREMENTS. INITIAL RESPONSE TEAMS COMPOSED OF HIGH PERCENTAGE OF STAFF ON 1ST TIME DEPLOYMENTS.

In contrast to the Manila level, IFRC field leadership capacity was strained to try and meet the reality of working in a dispersed field context that required operational hubs in multiple locations. A FACT Team Leader was never deployed. The first HEOps[37] deployed sought to fill the void but also was pulled into the Manila leadership function as well reflecting indecision in the initial response as to where to base operational leadership functions. FACT Coordinators sought to fill the field leadership function but were challenged by trying to manage their sector coordination responsibilities as well as that significant management function. The situation was exacerbated by having many FACT team members who were serving on their first FACT deployments[38]. They desired more guidance and direction from leadership in the initial response phase which was not always possible given the geographic spread of the operation and the limited number of field leaders initially available within the IFRC operation.

FINDING 2.3.4	PREVIOUS **IFRC** LEADERSHIP WERE CONSUMED WITH ADJUSTING TO THE NEEDS OF **PRC** LEADERSHIP IN MANILA WHILE NEGOTIATING CENTRALIZED **PRC** DECISION-MAKING. REDUCED FOCUS ON OPERATIONAL FIELD BASED REQUIREMENTS AND LED TO BOTTLENECKS.

From the very beginning of the Haiyan response, IFRC leadership were consumed with adjusting to PRC leadership in Manila. To a certain extent, this is as it should be given the importance of the PRC and the IFRC support function to the PRC. However, PRC leadership in Manila operates in a highly centralized manner. This style of management heavily influenced IFRC leadership in the initial response phase and resulted in a reduced focus on field-based requirements and led to bottlenecks at the Manila level. IFRC leadership was highly preoccupied with PRC leadership, thus time, effort and focus needed for managing and supporting IFRC field operations was diminished.

FINDING 2.3.5	APPROVED AND FUNCTIONAL INTERNAL **SOP**S AND PROTOCOLS FOR **IFRC** GLOBAL DISASTER RESPONSE DO NOT EXIST. ZONE OFFICE AND GENEVA OFFICE IMPASSE REGARDING GLOBAL **SOP**S WEAKENS THE **IFRC** RESPONSE AND RESULTS IN FRAGMENTATION.

For the past several years IFRC has been working to finalize and approve global standard operating procedures (SOPs), protocols and guidance for the IFRC global disaster response system. Existing draft

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[37] Two HEOps were deployed from IFRC at different points in the IFRC Haiyan response operation.
[38] The IFRC Field Staff Exit Survey noted that 25.7% of respondents (most of whom were delegates from FACT and ERU missions) had less than 1 year of experience. An additional 12.8% of respondents had 1-3 years of experience.

documents exist, have been reviewed at multiple levels of IFRC and yet still are not approved. When typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines these critical tools that can clarify how the IFRC global response is managed were not available. As such, lines of authority (particularly between the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office and Geneva Office) were not clear particularly with respect to the mobilization and utilization of global resources. There are Zone SOPs that were referenced in this response operation, however those Zone SOPs do not yet match with any drafted global SOPs, protocols and guidance that remain unapproved.

As a result, IFRC organizational roles, responsibilities and structure were nebulous and unclear for those IFRC staff involved. Invariably this led to confusion and frustration amongst leadership that then affected operational staff. Tensions between the Zone Office and Geneva Office, suggested as being also related to the decentralization process, were exacerbated in this emergency context when stress levels are high, people are working very long hours and the situation is very fluid.

The reason that the global SOPs, protocols and guidance are not approved is not immediately clear though there are suggestions that it is related to an impasse between the Zone and Geneva Office regarding control and lines of authority during a catastrophic emergency that requires a global mobilization of resources. Currently there appears to be no resolution to the impasse regarding the approval of the global SOPs, protocols and guidance.

| FINDING 2.3.6 | SCALING UP AND SCALING DOWN OF A MASSIVE RECOVERY OPERATION IS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR IFRC AND PRC (PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RESOURCES, PROCUREMENT AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY). |

The scaling up of a massive recovery operation such as the IFRC Haiyan response is always a significant challenge particularly regarding human resource requirements, procurement and maintaining financial accountability. Lessons learned from past large-scale IFRC humanitarian response operations suggest that an equally daunting task is to have the foresight and planning needed to simultaneously consider requirements related to scaling down the operation. This is particularly relevant during recovery operations where funding is only available for 1-2 years of significant programming but cannot be sustained at that same scale over the long-term. Given the time that it takes to scale up an operation of this size the challenge will be to simultaneously be able to also have in place the plan needed to scale down the operation in a responsible manner. This is particularly relevant to IFRC human resources needed which have been a challenge to mobilise for this response and recovery operation.

| FINDING 2.3.7 | KEY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (ADMIN, FINANCE, HR) WERE UNDER RESOURCED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE IFRC OPERATION. |

The lack of sufficient key support functions, particularly administration, finance and human resources, was an impediment to operational effectiveness. These functions were under resourced and led to challenges for a range of IFRC staff and particularly FACT team members. IFRC field operational staff

often did not have the funds needed to start-up operations and the funds they did have were handled on their persons raising security concerns. Better prepared ERU team members tried to fill these administration and finance gaps with ERU funds and support to IFRC which was neither their responsibility or optimal. The lack of IFRC investment in this key area is consistent with other previous large-scale emergencies when focus is paid to sector areas of work but not the operational foundational roles necessary and critical to well functioning operations.

When administration, finance and human resource functional positions[39] were deployed they were deemed to be highly relevant to the overall IFRC operation and respected for their work.

| FINDING 2.3.8 | LOGISTICS HUB IN CEBU OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE. DECISION IN INITIAL RESPONSE NOT TO MORE RAPIDLY PLACE IFRC OPERATIONAL COORDINATION FUNCTION ALSO IN TACLOBAN WAS QUESTIONABLE. |

PRC and IFRC immediately made the strategic and operational decision to establish a joint logistics hub at a previously unused PRC warehouse in Cebu. Given Cebu's position as a logistics hub in the Visayas region of the Philippines, this was a good decision that has proven to be operationally effective. However, the initial decision to also base the IFRC field coordination center in Cebu with the logistics hub, instead of more rapidly establishing a robust coordination center in Tacloban, is questionable. This is given that the majority of the field coordination takes place in the worst affected city of Tacloban[40] and that Tacloban is a launching point for accessing many of the worst affected communities. As a coordination center for the entire humanitarian community, Tacloban was and still remains the center of the relief operation. After some time in the initial response IFRC adjusted and shifted operations to Tacloban with a concerted presence particularly when the base camp was established in Tacloban. However, this move to Tacloban from Cebu could have been more rapid and likely resulted in operational inefficiencies during the initial response phase particularly with respect to coordination and support to the PRC chapter in Tacloban.

2.4. Planning & Learning

| FINDING 2.4.1 | MISSED OPPORTUNITY RELATED TO PRE-DISASTER AGREEMENTS WITH PRC AND PRE-POSITIONING OF IFRC GLOBAL SUPPORT RESOURCES. |

Pre-disaster preparations can enable effective emergency response operations. In this regard, the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office sought to make funds available from DREF for pre-typhoon Haiyan preparations and resource mobilization in advance of the typhoon making landfall in the Philippines. It unfortunately

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[39] A legal support position was also deployed as a support function based in Manila during the initial response phase.
[40] All aspects of the Tacloban infrastructure (housing, water, sanitation, transportation, fuel, telecommunications, food, electricity etc.) were incapacitated raising significant challenges related to having IFRC coordination operations based in Tacloban. PRC were reported to initially be resistant to an IFRC coordination presence in Tacloban.

appears that the funds were not available in advance and when approved, on the day of the event, they were not used as expeditiously as possible.

This sequence of events raises the question as to if more could and should have been done by IFRC to pre-position IFRC global support services and reach pre-disaster agreements[41] with the PRC in advance of this disaster. There was adequate time to prepare for the typhoon[42] and estimates were provided well in advance as to the likely destruction that typhoon of this magnitude would cause. Other humanitarian agencies, notably the UNDAC team[43], pre-deployed teams to the Philippines in advance of the typhoon. There is little evidence that IFRC took proactive pre-disaster[44] readiness actions that could have enabled an even more effective IFRC response in support of PRC. Importantly, this action may have also prompted PRC to take even more proactive steps with their teams and resources that would have also likely been beneficial to the PRC response operation.

| FINDING 2.4.2 | HIGH-LEVEL MISSION WELCOMED BUT THEY ARE RESOURCE INTENSIVE AND MANY OPERATIONAL STAFF INVOLVED QUESTION VALUE-ADD, TIMING AND COST-BENEFIT. |

The timing of Typhoon Haiyan corresponded with Federation General Assembly meetings taking place in Sydney, Australia. All of the top leadership within the Federation were very close to the Philippines and following the Sydney meetings a large delegation of IFRC leadership (including the Secretary General, and Undersecretary General for the Programme Support Division) and National Societies Presidents and Secretary Generals visited the Philippines on a high-level mission. Other high-level missions were also made by various national societies to the Philippines during the initial response phase. While these high-level missions were welcomed by the PRC, IFRC field staff question the value-added, specific timing of the mission relatively early in the initial response phase and the cost versus benefit of the mission. At a point in time a component of the FACT team was pulled from the field back to Manila in order to assist with preparations related to the high-level mission from Sydney. Field staff already burdened with significant operational requirements spent valuable time and effort on a resource intensive high-level mission that had no clear outcome or tangible benefit to the operation.

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[41] The IFRC 2009 Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines and the West Sumatra Earthquake in Indonesia along with the IFRC 2011 Pakistan RTE also recommended the importance of establishing pre-agreements. The Philippines Principles & Rules Case Study also highlights this key issue.

[42] IFRC pre-positioned stocks were already depleted due to previous response operations. This issue was raised in advance of the typhoon hitting landfall with options explored regarding IFRC utilization of ICRC stocks. Movement coordination meetings did take place in advance of Typhoon Haiyan. The first PRC assessment teams were in the affected areas as of November 9th.

[43] UNDAC deployment was on November 7th.

[44] The Principles & Rules also establish the basis for international readiness actions prior to an imminent disaster on the basis of reliable scientific forecasts and early warning information.

FINDING 2.4.3	CONTEXTUAL AND TACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF IFRC PHILIPPINES PERMANENT STAFF LOST IN SURGE WAVE.

In the first hours and days after Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, IFRC permanent delegation staff played a critical and responsive role in the IFRC response. However, in the subsequent weeks and months that followed when a large wave of IFRC support staff flowed into the response, these permanent staff were asked to return to their work in support of other IFRC programs and responses. Thus, the permanent staff were "firewalled" from the Haiyan operation so that the other IFRC programs previously in progress did not suffer from a lack of attention and management. While this is indeed a sensible approach, it also meant that IFRC's most knowledgeable staff regarding the PRC and the Philippines context were not consistently engaged in the Haiyan operation. As such, the Haiyan operation went without some knowledge and experience that could have proven quite valuable to IFRC surge staff many of whom were working in the Philippines for the first time.

FINDING 2.4.4	UNEVEN COMMITMENT TO LEARNING, INCONSISTENT LEARNING SYSTEMS AND ACTION BASED ON LEARNING. LIMITED INNOVATION.

There is little evidence to suggest that IFRC has established an organizational culture of learning that celebrates both successes and failures as a key part of constant improvement and innovation. Some of the findings in this RTE have been identified in other previous RTEs, reviews or program evaluations of other IFRC responses. The fact that IFRC continues to be faced with some of the same issues from one operation to the next shows that the commitment to learning is uneven and that there is inconsistent action based on learning taken by management. It is not simply enough to collect the lessons learned. Learning is an action to be taken and applied in order for the organization to improve and to foster innovation.

With respect to this RTE, there is a high level of doubt by IFRC staff that the findings and recommendations contained herein will be addressed in any meaningful way by IFRC management. The RTE members sincerely hope that IFRC senior management prove their own staff wrong and demonstrate that IFRC can indeed be a learning organization that takes an action learning approach.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations that follow are from the RTE team and based in part on results from the RTE workshops conducted in the Philippines (with both IFRC & PRC staff), Kuala Lumpur and Geneva. They are prioritized based on the Frameworks for Future Action (see *Annex 3*) as developed by the RTE workshop participants. An IFRC management response should eventually be attached to this RTE final report specifying how and by whom specific recommendations will be addressed by IFRC.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

REC #S1	**FINALIZE AND APPROVE GLOBAL SOPS, GUIDANCE, PROCESSES AND ENFORCEMENT RELATED TO IFRC GLOBAL RESPONSES.**

IFRC has a respected and privileged position globally as a leading humanitarian response agency. It cannot afford in the current global context and given the rapidly evolving humanitarian community, to be perceived internally or externally as convoluted, disorganized and inefficient in its humanitarian responses to the most significant crises globally. Yet, for many years IFRC has persisted in a state of confusion and ambiguity regarding roles, responsibilities and authority during major global catastrophic responses that require a global mobilization of Red Cross and Red Crescent resources and services.

Global standard operating procedures, processes and guidance are needed to provide clarity and establish lines of authority (which are particularly important in the emergency response operations) for all of the various global entities involved in a massive global response (such as in the case of the Philippines response). These global SOPs, processes and guidance particularly need to address the lines of authority, roles and responsibility between the country delegation and/or field response team, Zone and Geneva Office. The IFRC global SOPs, processes and guidance should reflect a determination as to those functions and operational components that must be centralized and those which should be decentralized according to the scope and severity of the crisis and resources that are mobilized through the Movement. These global SOPs, processes and guidance should be matched for consistency and adherence to the Principles & Rules endorsed by the General Assembly (November 2013).

Equally important will be the need for an enforcement mechanism that can protect the integrity of the global IFRC disaster response system and the Principles & Rules. Without some type of enforcement[45] or repercussions for those entities that take actions contrary[46] to the Principles & Rules or the global SOPs, processes and guidance (still to be approved), fragmentation and disunity is likely to profligate.

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[45] The Principles and Rules are intended to be mandatory for all National Societies with the IFRC Secretary General reporting on compliance in relevant Movement statutory meetings.
[46] Includes specific actions such as the shipment of unsolicited goods during a humanitarian response.

For an organization of its size and responsibility, is not acceptable for IFRC global standard operating procedures, processes and guidance to be unclear. It is incumbent upon the IFRC Global Senior Management Team to directly address this issue in an expedited manner[47]. If the IFRC Global Senior Management Team cannot come to a resolution then the matter should be addressed or mediated by the IFRC Secretary General. If the IFRC Secretary General is not able to address this issue then the Federation Governing Board should be engaged until final resolution.

Critically, these SOPs, processes and guidance should enable a one IFRC team approach to humanitarian response. The "us versus them" culture, which was evident in this response operation, is perpetuated and enabled without clear direction and guidance. IFRC staff and its members should no longer tolerate this. The beneficiaries, national societies, IFRC staff, donors and global community expect and deserve even better from a IFRC global humanitarian response.

REC #S2	ESTABLISH A STANDARD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, WITH RELATED JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND REPORTING LINES, AND ADJUST THAT STRUCTURE TO MATCH FUTURE RESPONSE CONTEXTUAL REQUIREMENTS.

As a part of the global SOPs, processes and guidance, IFRC should establish a standard or typical organization structure for major global responses that require the mobilization of global resources. This would include the identification of a standard IFRC operations structure (including organogram and job descriptions) that can be used as a starting point in future responses. The Incident Command System structure used by many national societies that IFRC supports would a logical starting point in this process. Once the template is established, then it can more easily be adjusted and adapted when a disaster takes place. Having something in place prior to the disaster avoids the need to start from scratch each time and major catastrophe takes place, saves time and helps to prioritize the importance of establishing organizational roles and responsibilities from the very beginning of a response operation.

REC #S3	COMBINE FACT AND RDRT TO CREATE ONE GLOBAL RC/RC DISASTER RESPONSE TEAM. ENSURE THIS TEAM'S ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, AND HUMAN RESOURES FUNCTIONS ARE IMBEDDED OR FROM A NEW ERU.

FACT and RDRT can be combined to create one global RC/RC disaster response team. The regional differentiation would diminish, hopefully also diminishing the disparity between FACT and RDRT staff. Levels of competency could be established within the global pool of disaster response staff so as to differentiate experience levels, skill sets and abilities. The creation of this pool would incorporate existing FACT and RDRT members while also using this opportunity to reclassify those within the system.

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[47] Past IFRC RTEs have made recommendations to "update or establish global SOPs for disaster response that better connect global components with Zone, Regional and country-level disaster response system" (Pakistan RTE 2011). The Philippines 2010 RTE cited a need for greater knowledge of Global SOPs and the alignment of Asia Pacific Zone SOPs with global SOPs.

Additional resourcing would likely be needed to ensure that the pools of personnel is adequately maintained and appropriately utilized. A particular emphasis should be placed on having one IFRC response team that all levels of the organization are supporting.

A standard component of an IFRC response team responding to major catastrophic emergencies should be administration, finance and human resource functions[48] ideally with one delegate filling each of these positions. These functions should be included as a part of the first team global surge team deployment (either as a part of the FACT or as a new ERU[49] function). In a response situation such as the Philippines when wide geographic coverage is required, IFRC should establish operational coordination hub(s) with operational coordination set-up requirements as a component of the FACT mandate (in addition to assessments and coordination).

REC #S4	INCREASE INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL LEADERS TO FILL KEY IFRC OPERATIONAL FIELD FUNCTIONS.

IFRC needs to ensure that the IFRC global system can deploy multiple staff with team leader and coordinator capabilities at any given time. Strengthening of the IFRC team leader pool of personnel, in addition to HEOps, is needed with national society commitment to support with high-quality staff. It is important to specify that field leadership capacity is not solely about having team leaders. Indeed, what is always needed is a depth of leadership beyond the team leader or head of operations positions. Having leaders in Coordinator positions that can effectively coordinate large technical teams is equally important. Levels of staff development with the IFRC pool of personnel can also be established to assist with disaster response career development for those included within the IFRC pool of personnel. Training of this staff to support with upward progression through the IFRC disaster response pool levels should be combined with a mentoring and coaching program for even more robust leadership capacity development. There is also a significant investment that needs to be made in developing the soft or diplomatic skills of IFRC leadership needed to work with complex institutions, build coalitions and communicate effectively with a range of internal and external counterparts.

REC #S5	ENABLE, THROUGH SUSTAINED EFFORTS, ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL TOOLS BY EMERGING DONOR NATIONAL SOCIETIES. MAINTAIN THE CURRENT ERUS WHILE ENCOURAGING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND MODULAR CAPACITY FOR BETTER CONTEXUALIZATION. IDENTIFY AND SUSTAINABLY SUPPORT THROUGH POOLED IFRC RESOURCES ERU CAPABILITIES FROM EMERGING NATIONAL SOCIETIES.

The existing ERUs are a foundational resource that remains the bedrock of the IFRC global response system. There are existing processes and systems already in place that attempt to ensure that the

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[48] Additional support functions not currently provided through the global tools could also be included such as fleet management, procurement or legal support (particularly for large-scale IFRC responses to catastrophic emergencies).
[49] An Admin/Finance/HR ERU could be an ERU module that could also be linked or as a part of) the base camp ERU.

existing ERU system is responsive in terms of making needed adjustments to the tools over time. However, these tools and the ERU system could become more flexible and adaptable to the context[50]. Smaller and more modular ERU teams, equipment and ways of working could be provided by emerging national societies. An example of how this is already de facto being done is the creation of a cash surge capacity developed by the American Red Cross. While not a formal ERU it is a highly relevant surge function immediately deployable and quite flexible in terms of how it can be applied in an IFRC response. The focus should be on creating flexible, modular tools that can be adapted and scaled to the context.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

REC #T1	IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND UPDATE THE RDRT DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES TO OPTIMIZE FOR FUTURE UTILIZATION. INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL PRC STAFF FROM THIS OPERATION INTO THE ASIA PACIFIC ZONE RDRT.

The next disaster in the Asia Pacific region could occur at any moment. Given that the RDRT pool is used in a wide range of disaster contexts, it should be anticipated that the Asia-Pacific RDRT may be needed in the near future. Thus, IFRC should immediately review and update the Asia Pacific RDRT deployment capabilities as a matter of urgency so that this tool is immediately available for utilization. Potential PRC qualified disaster response staff not already included in the Asia-Pacific RDRT roster should be trained and incorporated as soon as possible. This provides PRC disaster response staff with career enhancement opportunities while further building trust, sharing and learning across the region.

REC #T2	DEDICATE ADDITIONAL EFFORT AND RESOURCING TO ADVANCE IFRC LEGAL STATUS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

IFRC leadership should prioritize the advancement of IFRC legal status in the Philippines and deploy one staff immediately to focus and finalize the IFRC legal status arrangements. This person would work with national counsel to advance the establishment of IFRC legal status in the most expeditious manner possible while also supporting with the management of existing IFRC legal risks related to the Typhoon Haiyan response and recovery operations.

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[50] The IFRC 2009 Real Time Evaluation of the Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines and the West Sumatra Earthquake in Indonesia also recommended the importance for the ERUs to be more flexible and modular.

REC #T3	**HARMONIZE IFRC AND PHILIPPINE RED CROSS WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON CONTRACTING AND SALARY LEVELS.**

IFRC should prioritize harmonizing pay scales and contracting with the PRC as a matter of some urgency to ensure compliance with local laws, competitiveness and staff retention. Failure to do so could result in significant challenges as IFRC seeks to scale up recovery operations.

REC #T4	**INTENTIONALLY LINK INFORMATION MANAGEMENT WITH IMPROVED OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING.**

Future efforts at continuing to strengthen the IM function, which will continue to be of operational importance, are needed that build upon the successes and lessons learned from the Haiyan response. Continuing to strengthen the IM function within IFRC operations should be a priority for the future. Particularly attention should be given to the production of quality information products for internal and external informational purposes, dissemination as well as having an in-depth analysis of existing data to guide effective decision-making. A Deputy Team Leader position, with a particular responsibility for analysis, should be considered as a part of future IFRC rapid response teams with the requisite experience and skills to translate complex and voluminous data into key decision points for more effective IFRC decision making. Having the right operational leadership will always be the critical component of effective operational decision-making but the IM function, with a direct link to team leadership via a Deputy Team Leader, can also play a key role by guiding and enabling better IFRC decision-making.

REC #T5	**IFRC MUST ALWAYS HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HAVE MULTIPLE OPERATIONAL COORDINATION HUBS WHERE THE KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION IS TAKING PLACE.**

IFRC should review the global tools paying particular consideration as to how the tools can be modular, flexible and adaptable enough to cover multiple geographic coverage requirements in a single operation. Ensure in future response operations that IFRC has a good operational coordination presence where the key humanitarian coordination is taking place and so that resources are available for both internal and external coordination.

REC #T6	**BUILD UPON CASH PROGRAMMING SUCCESS AND LEARNING IN THE PHILIPPINES.**

While the cash programming is highlighted as a success that can be built upon there is also recognition that this is a newly emerging technical and programming tool for IFRC. Continued investments and efforts are required to ensure that this important area of work continues evolving in a positive manner. It will be important that IFRC keeps pace and even helps to lead the humanitarian community in the application of cash programming in emergency responses globally.

REC #T7	**ESTABLISH TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PROTOCOLS FOR HIGH-LEVEL LEADERSHIP VISITS.**

High-level missions to support IFRC operations will likely never be eliminated. Nor should they be if they can demonstrate a clear value added and be timed appropriately. To ensure that is the case for future large-scale IFRC operations, IFRC should establish protocols that elaborate how IFRC determines when a high-level mission should be deployed, the components of a mission and desirable outcomes. Terms of Reference, as required for other IFRC delegates deployed on an operation, could be established in advance of the deployment of a high-level leadership visit to more clearly articulate the scope of each mission. The high-level mission serves political objectives within a political organization such as IFRC. To the greatest extent possible these political missions should seek to 'do no harm' to the IFRC field operations underway at that time.

REC #T8	**CLARIFY THE WAYS IN WHICH THE HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY FUNCTION WILL BE INTEGRATED AT THE FIELD LEVEL.**

Additional review is required to determine what the role of the HD function is at the field level and how it is either a separate new function within the operation or if it is an imbedded function of IFRC response management staff, HD delegates or a combination thereof. This additional clarity, defined in clear Terms of Reference and/or a job description for this delegate position would be the main output(s) from this review process. In doing so, the potential in this HD role can be better harnessed to the benefit of IFRC responses and vulnerable people.

REC #T9	**REVIEW THE IFRC SHELTER CLUSTER "FIREWALL" APPROACH TO DETERMINE ADJUSTMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE TO ENSURE IFRC DIRECT BENEFITS, ENGAGEMENT AND VISIBILITY.**

The "firewall" approach between the Shelter Cluster and IFRC response operations should be maintained but reviewed with a particular focus as to what adjustments could be made in future operations that would better highlight IFRC contributions and engagement in the shelter cluster. Particular attention should be paid to IFRC visibility, recognition and connectivity with the IFRC operations coordination programming. The end product from this brief review could be a guidance note to the Shelter Cluster and IFRC staff regarding how best to maximize interaction and benefits between the Shelter Cluster and IFRC response operations without compromising the successful aspects of IFRC's convenor role.

REC #T10	**CONDUCT AFTER ACTION REVIEWS AND A META EVALUATION OF PAST IFRC RTES AND RELATED RESPONSE REVIEWS CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS.**

IFRC should standardize the practice of conducting After Action Reviews (AAR) that bring together all of the components of the IFRC global team (national society, IFRC country level, IFRC Zone, IFRC Geneva Office, ICRC, and key PNS staff involved in the operation) to review Movement performance and make adjustments following the conclusion of major IFRC responses (such as the Philippines Haiyan response). An AAR would bring together all of these various involved Movement components in-person to the degree possible but with virtual participation possible as well. An RTE should be conducted in advance of the AAR to inform the AAR process.

Finally, IFRC should conduct a meta evaluation of all the RTEs and related response reviews conducted over the past 10 years to identify common themes, findings and recommendations (both those recommendations acted upon and those not yet acted upon). This meta evaluation would be used to guide future IFRC global response and recovery programming and make adjustments that address long standing issues that are repeatedly undermining an effective IFRC response.

These steps should be a part of a cultural shift within IFRC and National Societies towards embracing a culture of learning that enables better response programming and innovation to the benefit of those we serve.

4. ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY & APPROACH

Methodology

IFRC is committed to quality assurance, standards and a strong culture of learning in its disaster response. To fulfill this commitment, IFRC commissioned[51] a Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the Philippines Haiyan response operation given that this operation meets established RTE criteria related to scale, scope, complexity or risk for an international response. This RTE worked to improve service delivery and accountability to beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders while building lessons for the improvement of the IFRC disaster response system.

"A (RTE) is an evaluation in which the primary objective is to provide feedback in a participatory way in real time (i.e. during the evaluation fieldwork) to those executing and managing the humanitarian response.[52]" Thus, the IFRC Philippines RTE plays a critical role in providing real-time feedback to the IFRC response team, particularly at the field level. The RTE facilitates real-time learning so that key challenges can be met in a constructive manner and so that successes can be built upon. The RTE considers from an operational perspective what is working well and what requires improvement, at both strategic and tactical levels, while taking into consideration the context and capacities of Movement components.

This RTE is a utility driven exercise that neither passes judgment from a high level nor attempts to conduct a detailed technical assessment. Rather, it is a powerful and dynamic management tool that takes a wide-angle snapshot of the situation in the Philippines and allows IFRC response managers to assess and adjust the response as needed. The RTE uses a methodology and approach that allows for real-time and action-oriented deliverables. The primary audience for this RTE is the IFRC Philippines staff implementing and managing the emergency response at the field and national, regional, and global levels.

According to the Terms of Reference (see *Annex 5*), the objectives of this IFRC Philippines Haiyan RTE are to address:

- The **relevance and effectiveness of delivery** of the International Federation's support to the National Society response to date, with a focus on the overall performance of the response. Specific attention would be given to any particular successes or gaps in relation to the requirements of the National Society.
- The **quality and efficiency of the IFRC coordination** with its Movement partners and external actors aimed at optimizing the response.
- The **effectiveness and usefulness of the humanitarian diplomacy** tools used vis-a-vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc).

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[51] The RTE is formally commissioned by the IFRC Under Secretary General Programme Services Division and is managed by an Evaluation Management Team (EMT).
[52] Real-time Evaluations of Humanitarian Action - An ALNAP Guide (pilot version): Cosgrave John, Ramalingam Ben and Beck Tony, Overseas Development Institute, 2009.

Approach

Based on the objectives and methodology contained in the IFRC Terms of Reference, the RTE team proceeded with a rigorous participatory and utility-based approach to this work. The evaluation covered the period from when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines the IFRC initial response until the time the RTE finished its data collection work in the Philippines (or from November 8th 2013 until March 19th 2014).

This RTE was separated into three phases including: RTE Set-Up & Secondary Data Review; Field Study & Workshops; and Reporting.

Phase 1: RTE Set-Up & Secondary Data Review
As outlined in the work plan (see *Annex 4*), the RTE was conducted in three phases. Phase 1 involved:

- A kick-off meeting (virtual) between the RTE team and the Evaluation Management Team (EMT);
- Gathering key documents with the help of the EMT;
- Identifying potential stakeholders;
- Developing data collection tools;
- Preparation of an inception report.

During the RTE kick-off meeting, the RTE design and approach were discussed in detail, team members were introduced and key administrative and logistical arrangements addressed. Importance was given to understanding the terms of reference and ensuring maximum mutual understanding of the RTE's scope, objectives, timelines and allocation of roles and responsibilities. An IFRC RTE communications plan was established to ensure that IFRC is updated regularly on progress against the agreed project plan.

During this initial phase, the RTE team also designed the tools for use during the field work while also conducting a thorough review of reports, policies and procedures related to the IFRC response. RTE team members understand the constraints and challenges of a major humanitarian response and thus took a very empathetic approach to conducting the RTE ensuring that humanitarian operational response priorities were not unduly interrupted. In this regard, the analysis of secondary data in advance of the RTE field deployment was essential to maximize efficiencies and make the best use of stakeholder time. This secondary data and analysis was then cross-referenced at several different junctures throughout the RTE. The most pertinent elements of these documents are referenced throughout this final report (usually as footnotes) and they collectively serve to strengthen the evidence basis for the evaluation.

Also during this phase 1, the RTE solicited input and guidance from key IFRC staff regarding the key stakeholders listing (see *Annex 2* for the stakeholder listing) to ensure that the relevant and key stakeholders were included in the work (to the greatest extent possible). A 'snowball' approach to this stakeholder listing was applied for this RTE ensuring that the stakeholder list was adaptive to new key stakeholders suggested throughout the duration of the RTE. Thus, the team identified additional stakeholders both prior and during the evaluation to allow for the maximum range of perspectives and to minimize bias.

Phase 1 included the development of a detailed project plan (with a more detailed calendar of planned activities) and confirmation of needed logistical support with field offices prior to the field mission. The primary deliverable from phase 1 of the RTE was an inception report.

Phase 2: Field Study & Workshops

The IFRC Philippines RTE was designed and delivered as a rapid and participatory evaluation. This RTE deployed to three global locations: the Philippines (the team conducted interviews and workshops in Manila and Tacloban while only conducting interviews in Cebu and Iloilo), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur at the IFRC Zone offices) and Switzerland (Geneva at the IFRC Secretariat). More than 200 stakeholders participated in the RTE either through individual interviews, focus groups, the survey or the workshops. Stakeholder groups included:

- IFRC Field Staff (Current & Past)
- Philippine Red Cross
- IFRC Zone Office Staff (Kuala Lumpur)
- IFRC Secretariat Staff (Geneva)
- Participating National Societies (Particularly ERU and FACT leads)
- Peer Agencies (ICRC, OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, CRS, major INGOs etc.)

A detailed listing of those who participated in the RTE is included as an annex (*Annex 2*) to this final report.

Stakeholder groups included in the RTE intentionally did not include people from the affected communities. IFRC determined that this RTE would not seek to directly incorporate beneficiary feedback and instead will rely upon a more detailed household survey[53] to be conducted in the future that will ensure that this critical perspective and stakeholder group is incorporated. The RTE considered IFRC coordination activities with the ICRC but did not pronounce on them. To this extent ICRC were briefed on this RTE and encouraged to provide input as a key stakeholder.

This RTE utilized a mixed methods approach incorporating data collected from one-on-one semi-structured interviews, focus groups, workshops, a survey and direct observation. Once the stakeholder interviews were complete, data from the interviews was triangulated[54] and combined with field observations, providing trends to inform the RTE analysis. A substantive analysis and coding process collated this data so that it could be subsequently translated into findings. Findings were presented in real-time during the workshops to test their validity and to allow for real-time input from field staff. Updates to the findings were then made in real-time based on field input.

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[53] The RTE confirmed, per the request of IFRC, that the Philippines delegation welcomes an in-depth household level beneficiary survey and that there is utility in conducting this type of work. This should include a randomly selected survey of households based on a representative sampling strategy. Consideration should also be given as to how this beneficiary survey effort could be built in the proposed beneficiary communications program in the Philippines.

[54] The RTE used a specific coding process through which it could identify key findings. Each interview was typed up in a Word document and reviewed for the number of instances that key informant referenced a related finding (according to a specific code number). The total number of finding references were these tabulated in an analysis tool specifically designed for this RTE. As such qualitative data was converted to quantitative data for the purposes of data analysis.

Importantly, a key part of this RTE methodology was conducting workshops at key coordination hubs with IFRC field leadership as well as in the field operations locations. Well-managed and dynamic workshops were essential to this process. The RTE used a specific methodology to seek both critical feedback and provide direction to the RTE through the workshops, while also ensuring the creation of forward-looking action steps (primarily through an issue prioritization process and creation of Frameworks for Action). Feedback in the field through the workshops recognized the following[55]:

- That the RTE is unlikely to influence current practice unless those responsible for current practice and implementation are aware of what the RTE has found.
- That feedback from the IFRC country team clarified any errors of understanding by the evaluation team.
- That given the compressed timeframe of an RTE, an opportunity to discuss analysis with those directly involved is particularly useful.

The Framework for Future Action (FFA), as represented in *Figure 2* below, used during RTE workshops and was composed of four key components: Objective(s) in addressing the issue, Forum/Mechanism (existing, or to be created) through which the issue should be addressed, Responsible Party (or parties) who should take action on the issue, and the Timing parameters in which the issue should be addressed. FFAs (see *Annex 3*) were developed during workshops in the field locations (Tacloban) in addition to the main Philippines workshop conducted in Manila. Further, workshops were also held at other key IFRC locations (Kuala Lumpur and Geneva). This participatory approach enhanced field staff ownership and learning in the RTE, and contributed to team building.

Figure #2: *Framework for Action*

The results of the workshops at all levels (Tacloban, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva) guided the RTE final report, and served as the basis for proactively addressing many of the key topics identified by the RTE so that they can be advanced beyond the fixed timeframe of the RTE. *Figure 3* below illustrates process flow related to the field work and the workshops:

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[55] Real-time Evaluations of Humanitarian Action - An ALNAP Guide (pilot version): Cosgrave John, Ramalingam Ben and Beck Tony, Overseas Development Institute, 2009.

Figure #3: Field Work and Workshops Process Flow

Once collected the data from interviews, focus groups, the workshops, and the secondary data review was synthesized and summarized into a presentation of preliminary key findings. Recommendations to incorporate into the RTE were solicited at the field level through the workshops and the FFAs.

The final field workshop was intentionally convened in Manila at the conclusion of the field data collection process so that the members of the IFRC delegation could comment on the presentation and for discussion on any contentious issues. Based on the final Manila workshop, the IFRC operations team already started taking action based on the Frameworks for Action, without needing to wait for the written report and management response to be finalized.

Phase 3: Reporting

Upon completing the field work in the Philippines, the RTE reconciled findings and feedback received from the Philippine workshops and presentations with data collected at subsequent workshops in Kuala Lumpur and Geneva. Thus, IFRC leadership in both Kuala Lumpur and Geneva engaged with the RTE to provide feedback regarding the preliminary findings and frameworks for action. Once the workshops were completed at all levels (Philippines, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva), the RTE developed a draft final report for submission to the Evaluation Management Team.

This draft final report incorporates all the feedback from throughout the evaluation process. This final reporting format prioritizes accessibility and rapid dissemination with findings and recommendations disseminated in succinct written form. The final report is intended to be 'to the point', verbally tight and 'user-friendly' to enhance utility. RTE reports by their nature are concise, focused and practical.

Once feedback was received from IFRC regarding the 1st draft report, a revised draft was issued incorporating relevant input. A final report (along with an IFRC management response to the RTE) should then be produced based on IFRC input and disseminated by the EMT.

Once all final feedback is received, IFRC should engage in a process of creating a management response to the RTE. The final evaluation product (with the management response) should be translated into other languages as needed. Dissemination of the final product is to be handled by the IFRC Evaluation Management Team according to IFRC requirements.

Lines of Inquiry

On the basis of the key issues identified in the Terms of Reference under each objective and the team's assessment of what is feasible in the timeframe available, the team has developed the following RTE lines of inquiry and key RTE questions. These have been used to formulate the interview guide in *Annex 4*. These questions will derive the answers to as many of the questions listed in the ToR as possible. It is important to note that more than 65 questions were listed in the IFRC RTE ToR. The RTE team determined that it was not productive or feasible to directly ask all 65 questions of all stakeholders involved in the evaluation. Thus, the RTE has developed an interview guide that solicited responses, in a non-leading manner, so that the key questions were answered and as many of the sub questions as possible are also answered.

EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE IFRC RESPONSE

1. To what extent has the IFRC Secretariat support to the National Society response been effective? Includes consideration of the following areas of the IFRC response:
    o Planning
    o Appeal process
    o Resource mobilization
    o Timeliness
    o IFRC global tools: FACT/ERUs/RDRT
    o Operational structure, roles & responsibilities
    o Humanitarian diplomacy[56] tools
    o Information Management (including social media)
2. How is the Movement Coordination (including roles and responsibilities) performing in the Philippines? At the Zone or Regional level? Global Level?
3. What are the main successes and challenges to Movement coordination?
4. What is the perceived performance of the IFRC response?

RELEVANCE OF THE IFRC RESPONSE

5. To what extent has the IFRC Secretariat support to the National Society response been relevant in this operating environment?
6. To what extent are the services that IFRC is providing suited to meet the priority needs of its target groups?
7. Are there any gaps in the IFRC response?
8. What is the level of stakeholder buy-in to the IFRC response?

The focused, manageable and non-leading questions above will address each of the 65 questions listed below as specified from the ToR:

To what extent has the IFRC Secretariat support to the National Society response been relevant and effective in its overall performance and delivery in this operating environment?

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[56] Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. Humanitarian Diplomacy is about mobilizing public and governmental support and resources for humanitarian operations and programmed, and to facilitate effective partnerships for responding to the needs of vulnerable people. Humanitarian diplomacy includes advocacy, negotiation, communication, formal agreements, and other measures.

a.   How effectively has the IFRC's emergency appeals / plans responded to the needs and to the requirements of the PRC. How was the response time vis-a-vis other operational actors? What flexibility has been needed and how have these tools been able to respond to these demands? Were they used in a timely and appropriate manner?

b.   What successes and gaps can be identified in the response and are there ways these gaps could have been addressed or could be addressed in future? What steps have been taken to ensure the quality of the response and the support to the National Society?

c.   How relevant was the use of IFRC's global response tools in this context and how well have they contributed to the operations? Have there been any gaps or concerns regarding their use? And are there any recommendations for future deployments? Review as well the organizational structure of operation, both at Manila and field level and the country operation and the zone. Was the deployment and use of global tools in line with SOP's.

d.   What challenges were faced by the IFRC's resource mobilization, finance, HR and logistics systems? Has resourcing been adequate and what could be done differently to improve visibility and resource mobilization in this operation?

e.   What systems have been used for monitoring, reporting, informational management and evaluation in this context and what can both the National Society and the IFRC do to address issues or improve these systems?

f.   Were the roles, responsibilities and expectations at each level (Geneva, Zone, and country) clear?

How effectively and efficiently has the IFRC managed to coordinate and optimize its response to this disaster and how could Movement coordination channels and platforms, in this context, be improved for the future response and recovery operations?

g.   Has there been clarity around the division of roles and responsibilities between the National Society, the IFRC, PNSs and the ICRC?

h.   How well has Movement coordination and cooperation functioned in-country and also at zonal and global levels?

i.   What challenges have arisen and how could these be addressed to improve future coordination / cooperation?

j.   How has information management and sharing worked in this context and at an overarching zonal level? What challenges and issues presented themselves and how could the IFRC Secretariat address these challenges and improve communication with partners?

k.   How relevance and useful has the use of social media been in managing and coordinating the emergency response.

l.   How efficient and effective was the coordination of the Movement's global tools, particularly the large scale mobilization of FACT, ERUs and RDRTs, and other surge capacity tools? Organizational structure of operation, both at Manila and field level and the country operation and the zone. Deployment and use of global tools in line with SOP's

m.   What has been the impact of regional cooperation to the operation, including the contributions of Movement regional assets (RDRT, etc) and NS from the region acting internationally .

n.   What recovery actions have or are being considered (as contingency measures) and how could planning for these be strengthened in engagement with IFRC partners and their expertise?

o.   Would better adherence to the recently approved Principles and Rules for RCRC Humanitarian Assistance have been beneficial in terms of i) reducing uncoordinated activities, such as unilateral action and sending of unsolicited items; ii) improving the quality of assistance and support to the PRC; and iii) preserving RCRC identity and ensuring respect for the FP through external relations and partnerships?

The effectiveness and usefulness of the humanitarian diplomacy tools used vis-a-vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc).

> p.   What role has humanitarian diplomacy taken in this operation and what key messages have been identified / advocated? How could this role be strengthened in future and what should the IFRC look to as its HD priorities for the coming months?

> q.   How effective were IFRC humanitarian diplomacy tools in the context of Movement relations with external actors for a "level 3" emergency – in particular, relations with the Government of the Philippines, IASC partners, militaries and civil protection actors.

Constraints and Limitations

The RTE was mainly limited by the following key factors:

- The timing of the RTE (almost 4 months after the operation started) did not enable a real-time relief operational evaluation. Instead the IFRC response was in the middle of transitioning from the relief to recovery phase of the operation. Thus, the RTE sought to retroactively identify those issues that were relevant to the IFRC response while providing real-time input to the IFRC field team regarding the transition from the relief to recovery phase of the operation.
- Given the timing of the RTE, all three rotations of the IFRC surge capacity staff (including FACT, ERUs) had already departed by the time the RTE reached the Philippines. Though some staff who had participated in the initial response phase were still in the Philippines (or had rotated back into the response operation), most IFRC surge staff were no longer available to meet in person. Thus, data was collected from these staff using a survey and phone interviews which do not always provide the same depth and richness of data as compared to in-person interviews or participation in the workshops. This limitation was mitigated by the fact that many of the staff interviewed and who participated in the workshops in Kuala Lumpur and Geneva also participated in the IFRC initial response phase.
- The RTE team was composed of one external evaluator and three Red Cross and Red Crescent national society members. While this brought in highly relevant internal Red Cross perspective to the RTE, this also introduced an element of bias to the evaluation and limited the independent perspective of the evaluation team. The fact that the three Red Cross and Red Crescent national society members had not been involved in the Haiyan response limited some of this bias.
- The participation of all the desired stakeholders in the workshops or for interviews due to scheduling conflicts.

Data Collection Strategy

The RTE team used a tailored set of tools, templates, and matrices to gather, vet, clean, and transform data from its rough form into a useful information product for analysis. These tools also included rigorous project management functions that guided all phases of the methodology development and evaluation rollout.

A total of more than 200 key stakeholders (see *Annex 2*) from throughout the world participated in this RTE. The following specific data collection methods and tools were used during the RTE:

Desktop Analysis – A detailed document review was undertaken and reviewed documents included:
- Operational Situation Reports
- Annual Reports
- Emergency Appeals
- Past Real Time Evaluations of other IFRC responses
- Relevant Reviews, Evaluations, Reports and Studies
- Plans of Action and Strategies
- Assessments
- Case Studies
- End of Mission Reports
- Standard Operating Procedures
- Surveys
- Staffing Charts
- Relevant Email Correspondence

Direct Observation – During the field visits, direct observation was used to gather data that assisted in the final analysis.

Interviews – Collection of qualitative data was based primarily on individual and group interviews of many key stakeholders in the Philippines (Manila, Tacloban, Cebu & Iloilo), Kuala Lumpur and Geneva using questions derived from a tailored questionnaire. The review team worked closely with IFRC and PRC to develop and refine the list of interviewees to ensure a nuanced understanding of the subject matter. Additional interviews were conducted with stakeholders not originally included in the stakeholder listing as suggestions were provided throughout the RTE process. Using this "snowball" approach, the stakeholder listing expanded from the original iteration be more expansive and comprehensive. Interviews were conducted via face-to-face and telephone conference and primarily focused on qualitative data collection. Below is a breakdown of the stakeholders included in this RTE:

IFRC Field Operations (Current)	21
IFRC Field Operations (Past)	13
Philippines Red Cross	18
IFRC Zone (Kuala Lumpur)	12
IFRC Secretariat (Geneva)	6
Participating National Societies & ICRC	11
Peer Agencies	8
Key Informant Interviews Sub-Total	***89***
Workshop Tacloban March 2	18
Workshop Manila March 7	21
Workshop Kuala Lumpur March 11	23
Workshop Geneva March 19	21
Workshops Sub-Total	***83***
RTE Survey	55
Grand Total	***227***

RTE Key Informant Interviews

- Peer Agencies 9%
- Participating National Societies & ICRC 12%
- IFRC Field Operations (Current) 24%
- IFRC Field Operations (Past) 15%
- Philippines Red Cross 20%
- IFRC Zone (Kuala Lumpur) 13%
- IFRC Secretariat (Geneva) 7%

Focus Group Discussions – On a limited number of occasions, group discussions were facilitated to solicit feedback from a small group of stakeholders. This was especially useful during the field visits where the interactions took place under time pressure. Information from each focus group was recorded including observations about context, group dynamics, intonation, and participation to aid in analysing qualitative responses. As needed, focus groups were followed by one-on-one interviews to further explore sensitive or detailed issues raised in the group setting.

Workshops – RTE workshops were conducted in Tacloban, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva. At each workshop preliminary findings were presented for feedback from the respective group of IFRC staff participating. Then the participants voted on which issues identified through the RTE process should be prioritized for future action. Once 3-4 priorities were identified, the participants created a Framework for Action (please see *Annex 3* for the Frameworks for Action from each of the four workshops).

Survey – A survey was used to collect data from those who participated in the IFRC response but who were no longer in the field. A total of 55 respondents participated in the RTE survey. The result from the survey helped to inform the findings and recommendations included in the final report.

Data Analysis – Data from all of these data collection points was analysed using a tailored data analysis tool which enabled the RTE to identify those issues of priority and common themes.

Deliverables

For the Philippines RTE, there were three relevant deliverables listed in the TOR.

1. Inception Report (Final Product Delievered on February 27th)
2. Presentation of Preliminary Findings (Final Product Delivered on March 19th)
3. Final Report (Final Product Delivered on April 9th)

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS MET/INTERVIEWED & WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

IFRC Field Operations (Current)	
Marcel Fortier	Head of Delegation
Donna McSkinning	Movement Coordination
Letty Sparrow	Human Resources
Neils	Disaster Risk Reduction
Hajime Matsunaga	Relief
Helena Loh	PMER
Kate Marshall	Communications
Daniel Joseph	Informaitno Management
David Macharashvili	Logistics
John Mwangi	Logistics
Arifur Rahman	RDRT Logs/Procurement Bangladesh
John Cunningham	Cebu Logs Hub Coordinator
Akbar Prasetya	PMI RDRT, Wastan
Jacquie Dixon	Security
Steve McAndrew	Head of Operations
Mads	Basecamp Manager
Jesper	Basecamp Manager
Mahfujur Rahman	Finance
Ricco Asssamaki	Team Leader Logs Finnish/Danish
Robin Younger	Team LeaderCash Surge
Yvette Spero	Staff Health, Basecamp

IFRC Field Operations (Past)	
Birte Hald	HeOps
Bernd Schell	Country Representative
Amanda McCleland	Deputy Team Leader
Tracy Reines	CASH Team Leader
Necephore Meghendi	Operations Manager
Chris Staines	Recovery Framework
Nina de Rochefort	Movement Coordination
Andreas von Weissenberg	Operations Coordinator
Nelson Castano	Head of Disaster Management Unit
Patrick Elliott	Shelter Coordinator
Patrick Fuller	Communications
Sumant Kumar	Human Resoruces
Isabelle Sechaud	Logistics Coordinator
Ela Serdaroglu	Shelter Coordinator
Marta Pena	Shelter Coordinator

Philippines Red Cross	
Richard Gordon	Chairman
Gwendolyn Peng	Secretary General
Jeanie Curiano	Budget/PMER Manager
Eric Matnog	OIC Senior Cooperation Office, International Relationsions and Strategic Parnerships Office
Edwin Pamonag	Chapter Administrator
Jenny Chicko	Chapter Coordinator
Val Aguilar	Operations Manager, Tacloban
Gilbert Paul Valderrala/ ruben	Chapter Administrator
Luben Villarino	Volunteer Manager, DM
Aida Beltejar	Social Services Manager
Brian Enriquez	Watsan Head, Haiyan Operations
Rusty Talamayan	Operations Manager, Haiyan Task Force
Nowena Eclarinal	Movement Coordination, Hiayan Task Force
Rommel Soto	Shelter Lead Haiyan Operations
Marco Abrazado	Cebu Field Operations
Albert	Logistics Coordinator
Ryan Jopia	Manager, Health Services
Eric Salve	Manager, DM Services

IFRC Zone (Kuala Lumpur)	
Tehri Heinasmaki	Zoen Health Coordinator
Jim Catampongan	Emergency Health Coordiantor
Alka Kapoor	Acting head of Logistics
Karen Koon	Operations Coordinator
Peter Ophoff	Head of PMER
Kit Roche	Planning and reporting officer
Nathan Rabe	Coordinator, Humanitarian Diplomacy
David Silvaraja	Project Manager Finance
Christine Strater	Oeprations Coordinator
Tessa	Disater Law
David Fisher	Disaster Law, Geneva
Anne LeClerc	SEARD Head of Delegation, PRCS as part of region, initial engagement, long term planning

IFRC Secretariat (Geneva)	
Simon Eccleshall	Head, DCM
Dorothy Francis	Surge, DCM
Pieter de Rijke	Surge, DCM
Pablo Medina	Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination
Christine South	Disaster Crisis Management
Birgitte Olsen	Head, Logsitics

Participating National Societies & ICRC	
Aziz Syed	Cooperation Coordination, ICRC
Benjamin William	Secretary General, Singapore
Charis Chan	International Services, Signapor
Bob McKerrow	Head of Delegation, Swiss
Roger Alsonso	Head of Delegation Spanish
Emilio Teijeira	Head of Office German
Yohanna Klinge	Country Representative Finnish
Jose Garcia-Lozano	Director, Canadian Red Cross
Pete Garrett	
Luc Humblé	Coo Emerg Relief
Lisbet Elvekjaer	Relief ERU & PSS
Iñigo Vila	DM Unit Coordinator

Peer Agencies	
MauricioBurtet	WFP
Masanobu Horie	WFP
Kasper Engborg	Head of OCHA
Joe Curry	CRS
Aquino	ECHO
Tim Grieve	UNICEF
Steve Barton	Shelter Technical Advisor
Care International	Maria Theresa Bayombong

Workshop Tacloban March 2	
Arifor Ramman	RDRD Logistics, Procurement Delegate
Riku Assamaki	Team Leader ERU Logistics
M Fana	Finance Delegate
Khaivil Hasman	Sr. Fleet Officer
Yhen Kai Javier	Project Assistant Cash Based Program HQ
Edwin A. Pamonaq	Officer in Charge, Leyte Chapter
Ria Rivera	Reporting Officer/Admin
Rogelio M. Mejia	Logistics Head, Leyte
Mosqueda, E. Allan	Task Force Yolanada Shelter Head Leyte
Frances Experanailla	Task Force Yolanada, Finance
Val R Aguilar	Task Force Yolanada, Head of Operations
Robin Younger	Cash Surge Team Leader
Steve McAndrew	HEOPS Tacloban
Brian Kae Enriquez	Watsan Sector Head, NHQ
Karen Ann S. Hallazgo	Task Force Yolanda Watsan
Rommel Sotto	Head Shelter & Settlement, NHQ
Steve Davis	IT&T ERU Team Leader
Charles Ranby	IT&T Delegate

Workshop Kuala Lumpur March 11	
Patrick Eliott	Shelter Coordinator
Jim Catampongan	Helter Coordinator
Chris Lee	PMER
Jasmine Chong	PMER
Clarence Sim	PMER
Munira Hamsah	Risk Management/Audit
Will Rogers	Global Beneficiary Communications
Tessa Kelly	Disaster Law Programe Coordinator
Lucia Cipullo	Disaster Law Delegate
David Ras Silvaraja	Zone Finance Manager
Piwi Ophoff	Head, PMER
Kit Roche	PMER
Nelson Castano	Head of DM Unit
Jay Matta	WatSan Coordinator
Terhi Heinasmali	Health Coordinator
Chew Chee Keong	PMER
Leif Jonsson	DMU DM Coordinator
Anouk Beauvais	Ops Coordinator - DMU
Christine Strater	Ops Coordinator - DMU
Florent Chane	Zone Logistics Coordinator
Alka apeer Sharma	Zone Procurement Coordinator
Telk Mun Ooi	RMS Officer
Lourdes Perez	Relationship Managers -HD

Workshop Geneva March 19	
Chevally Sylvie	Strategic Partnership
Christine South	Disaster & Crisis Management
Hannele Haggman	Health Officer (Staff)
Elizabeth Soulie	DREF, DCM
Pierre de Rochefort	IM/Training, DCM
Hakan Karay	Relief
Paula Uski	DCM/ Principles & Rules/ DM Policy
David Fisher	Coordinator - Disaster Law Programme
Chris Staines	DRR
Clara Setiawan	DCM-Cash
Marta Pena	Shelter & Settlements Department
Ela Serdaroglu	Shelter & Settlements Department
Isabelle Sechaud	Global Logistics Service
Stephen Wainwright	Senior M&E Officer
Pieter de Rijke	Surge/DCM
Emma Delo	SO Recovery, DCM
Christina Estrada	Operations Quality Assurance
Dorothy Francis	Surge/DCM
Pablo Medina	SO, Shelter Coordination
Josse Gillijns	Head, Planning & Evaluation
Yvonne Klynman	Global Food Security Cluster

ANNEX 3: FRAMEWORKS FOR ACTION RTE TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following information is a listing and description of the Frameworks for Action created in Tacloban, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Geneva by IFRC staff and others. The FFAs are listed as the workshop participants described them at the conclusion of each workshop session.

Framework for Future Action #1 (**Tacloban**): **Livelihoods**

Objective: Federation will identify livelihood program through PRC capacity and mobilize technical, human and financial resource to support them.

Forum Technical Work Group: Sub group under shelter because shelter has leadership which can build up livelihood and leverage shelter strength as well as connect well with other sectors (WASH, Health, etc.)

Responsible – Shelter Coordinator and Shelter delegate coordinated with PRC livelihoods person with Federation technical livelihoods delegate.

Timing: Shelter is fully up and running so Livelihoods could be initiated immediately as PRC has human resources , has money and technical experience. Federation can provide more funds, as well as technical/human resources to augment this.

According to teams opinion, this has the most weight because an immediate program priority and the others objectives are process. The window of opportunity is now, because other organizations are engaging on this already.

Framework for Future Action #2 (**Tacloban**): **Key Support Functions Understaffed**

KSF	OBJECTIVE	FORUMS	RESPONSIBILITY	TIMING
Human resource	✓ Getting the right person for the position • (experience and background) • Compensation and benefit to be competitive versus other humanitarian organization	• Philippine Red Cross Executive Leadership (Board of Governors) • Chairman , Secretary general and Human resource dept. • Support (renumeration /allowances) from IFRC • Participating National Societies	Adopt a separate compensation and hiring/ recruitment program that responds to the needs of the: o Disaster/Emer gency o Project Support funding	As soon as possible
finance	✓ Adapting a streamline/ relaxed financial system that will enable greater flexibility and	• PRC Finance and Office of the Secretary General	• Craft/ roll out an appropriate financial systems that	For Operations taskforce: within 30

	expedited actions by the operations Vis-à-vis thru NHQ Finance Department	• IFRC	suits on the ground operations • Help conduct seminars where past learning and financial systems can be utilized	days For IFRC: guidance during preparation and monitoring after
ADMIN	✓ Standardization of policies on the ground, rationalize with chapter and common understanding /coordinated approach with other PNS.	• HR and Finance • Finance • PNS • IFRC • volunteers	• Same with finance	Same as above
Admin/ finance /HR	✓ Address the chronic problem of leaving out support unit such as ADMIN, HR and FINANCE when rolling out operations team on the ground.	• PRC Executive Leadership • Secretary General • Admin • Finance • HR • Disaster management Services (NHQ)	• Ensure that appropriate support personnel and systems are rolled out on the ground with the technical personnel on the ground.	Ready for roll out by the next disaster and already pilot tested for Yolanda operations.

Framework for Future Action #1 (**Manila**): **Existing IFRC planning processes and reporting likely too convoluted and cumbersome for emergency operations.**

Objective: Clarify the audience, use, purpose, frequency of planning and reporting document. Develop of a catalogue of products (prevents reinventing the wheel and allows for consistency) and guidelines on use (that can be contextualized for NS or PNS).

Forum: IFRC Working Group on Surge Information Management System. In Philippines operations working group consisting of PRC PMER and IM, Federation PMER and IM, PNS representative, Chapter/branch rep.

Responsible: Working group elects a chair for Philippines. Helena to connect with Federation SIMS and PED.

Timeline: Already starting but will formalize by next month.

Framework for Future Action #2 (**Manila**): **Emerging regional PNS are not fully incorporated into the IFRC response. Often resulted in unsolicited goods and services sometimes below IFRC standards.**

Coord	OBJECTIVE	FORUMS	RESPONSIBLE	TIMING
Emerging Members (members new to global response system)	System needs to be more inclusive of emerging member. Ensure participatory role. Greater acceptability. Greater recognistion and specific targeting of human resources from these players. Integration. Dialogue required with members to understand their aspirations and resources available	Regional statutory meetings then taken to General Assembly level Regional meetings Regional Response Unit System	National Societies and the IFRC Secretariat have a responsibility to invest in the resources and capacities of emerging partners	Process should be initiated immediately. Framework needs to be developed to support process
Unsolicited Goods	Why has this not been addressed earlier at General Assemblies? Dissemination of the significance of this in terms of value needs to happen. Quantification will strengthen the message. Is this part of HD? Start with 18 month internal campaign that includes a cost-benefit element that concludes with leadership messaging at GA	Leadership Forums Internal campaign focusing on GA Commission a report on impact and cost of unsolicited goods for Haiyan Operation alone.	Governing Boards of National Societies are the problem here. They don't realize the impact and need to be specifically targeted with the messages. Problem is that the system is a non-consequential system. IFRC and PRC (we need to create awareness for our own members)	Messaging campaign over the next 18 months. Within 12 months

Framework for Future Action #3 (**Manila**): **Lack of approved and functional internal SOPs for IFRC global disaster response.**

Objective: Approved Global SOPs.

Forum(s): Secretary General, Governing Board, Neutral party mediation, DM working group

Responsible: Global Task Force: NS (mix of champions), SG, GVA Intl directors, Head of Zones. DMWG to define a roadmap and timeframe

Timing: Present as an issue to the DMWG at next meeting. Give DMWG mandate to push forward task force.

Framework for Future Action #4 **(Manila): IFRC roles, responsibilities, structures and decision-making are convoluted.**

Objective: To ensure greater predictability in the response by clarifying the IFRC response role in the Philippines.

Forum(s): Country level Movement Coordination Platform (in Manila) – base analysis on existing agreements and SOPs.

Responsible: HoDs for IFRC/ICRC, PRC representation and PNS.

Timing: Before next typhoon season.

Framework for Future Action #1 **(Kuala Lumpur): Organizational structure convoluted.**

Objective: Pre-agreed/pre-designed operational structure that is flexible and adaptable to the context and national society. Used as temporary support function (not a parallel structure). Based on Incident Command System model that is used by many NS.

Forum(s): EMM; Leaders Forum (NS); DM Reference group

Responsible: SMT (led by Head of Operations)

Timing: ASAP.

Framework for Future Action #2 **(Kuala Lumpur): Information Management mixed reviews. Analysis for decision-making missing.**

Objective: Clarify the role and objective of IM to improve the use of information as a decision-making tool.

Forum: Zone level working group (DMU led); PSD; PED; Global Tools; PNS; Comms/BenComms;

Responsible: DMU Head of Operations

Timing: May 1st, 2014

Framework for Future Action #3 **(Kuala Lumpur): RDRT tool is marginalized and underutilized.**

Objective: Better recognition for RDRTs/SOPs/process of deployment.

Forum(s): NS DM Committees; Zone Office Senior Management; RDRT Working Group (Zone); Global RDRT working group; Pre-Disaster Meeting (National); NS Leadership

Responsible: RD's/NSs; DMU (Coordinator) AP Zone; Technical Functions; ZSM; HR

Timing: Now

Framework for Future Action #4 (Kuala Lumpur): Emerging regional PNS are not fully incorporated into the IFRC response. Often resulted in unsolicited goods and services sometimes below IFRC standards.

Objective: IFRC adapts global response tools to be more flexible in meeting the needs of the affected NS in the regional context.

- Recognizes the evolving capacities of NS
- Regionalize global tools
- Considering emerging PNS priorities

Forum(s): DM Reference Group; AP Conference (Beijing); RDRT meeting; ERU working group; FACT working group

Responsible: AP Zone DMU (Leif)

Timing: Now!

Framework for Future Action #1 (Geneva): Roles, responsibilities, structure and decision making was convoluted in the initial response.

Objective: Rationalize/streamline/simplify structure to clarify and redesign roles and responsibilities.

Option A: Decentralize and act like a decentralized organization (e.g. country lead, zone and global provide surge support, checks and balances etc.

Option B: Centralize and act like a centralized organization.

Implement SOPs etc. for all operations globally

Forum(s): GSMT and up; NS working groups and advocacy role

Responsible: USG PSD and Zone Directors

Timing: a) RTE management response recognizes the need to address these issues; b) Review process from Q3 2015.

Framework for Future Action #2 (Geneva): Information management

Objectives:

a) To get a better idea of what information we need and when to inform decision-making.
b) IM staff should have deeper understanding of operations so they know what to look for.
c) Ensuring that we have "valid" data.

d) IM is not the only tool for decision-making. Does not replace experience and management skills.
e) People to need to be able to make decisions without detailed information.
f) To ge more standards, responsibilities and agreed practice around IM.

Forum(s): Global DM team; Global tools; Zone Head of Ops; USG PSD; HoD-DCM; PMER; SIMS

Responsible: PSD (lead) – DCM; PMER (support). Should be informed by the success of shelter cluster IM.

Timing: 20% currently in process. 80% by last quarter 2014.

Framework for Future Action #3 **(Geneva): Global SOPs**

Objective: To have more clarity on the roles played by different people involved in response and to be more efficient in our response.

Forum(s): Global DM team (DM Zones + DCM) + Surge Capacity Tools

Responsible: GSMT; USG & DZO; SG

ANNEX 4: RTE PROJECT PLAN

	Task	Responsibility	Start Date	End Date	Task Completion
Overview			25-Jan-14	9-Apr-14	
0	**Start-Up**		**25-Jan-14**	**18-Feb-14**	100%
0.1	Contracting Complete	IFRC	25-Jan-14	7-Feb-14	100%
0.2	Team Composition Complete	IFRC	25-Jan-14	7-Feb-14	100%
0.3	Kick-Off Meeting (Virtual)	All	12-Feb-14	12-Feb-14	100%
0.4	Administrative Arrangements	Admin	8-Feb-14	18-Feb-14	100%
1	**Phase I: Inception and Secondary Data Review**		**13-Feb-14**	**27-Feb-14**	100%
2.1	Design Methodology and Tools	Eval Team	13-Feb-14	23-Feb-14	100%
2.2	Identify Key Stakeholders	Eval Team & EMT	13-Feb-14	23-Feb-14	100%
2.3	Secondary Data Review	Eval Team	13-Feb-14	23-Feb-14	100%
2.4	Finalize All Administrative Arrangements	Admin	13-Feb-14	23-Feb-14	100%
2.5	Submit Draft Inception Report	Eval Team	21-Feb-14	21-Feb-14	100%
2.6	EMT Review of Inception Report	EMT	22-Feb-14	26-Feb-14	100%
2.7	**M1: Final Inception Report Complete**	**Eval Team**	**27-Feb-14**	**27-Feb-14**	100%
2	**Phase II: Field Data Collection & Analysis**		**24-Feb-14**	**20-Mar-14**	100%
2.1	Travel to Kuala Lumpur	Langdon	24-Feb-14	25-Feb-14	100%
2.2	Kuala Lumpur Interviews & Meetings	Langdon	26-Feb-14	27-Feb-14	100%
2.3	Travel to Manila	Eval Team	27-Feb-14	27-Feb-14	100%
2.4	Manila Interviews & Meetings	Eval Team	28-Feb-14	2-Mar-14	100%
2.5	Travel to Field Operations	Eval Team	3-Mar-14	3-Mar-14	100%
2.6	Field Interviews & Workshop(s)	Eval Team	3-Mar-14	7-Mar-14	100%
2.7	Return to Manila	Eval Team	7-Mar-14	7-Mar-14	100%
2.8	Develop Draft RTE Presentation	Eval Team	8-Mar-14	8-Mar-14	100%
2.9	Travel to Kuala Lumpur	Langdon	9-Mar-14	9-Mar-14	100%
2.10	Kuala Lumpur Presentation & Workshop	Langdon	10-Mar-14	11-Mar-14	100%
2.11	Travel to Geneva	Langdon	18-Mar-14	18-Mar-14	100%
2.12	Geneva Presentation & Workshop	Langdon	18-Mar-14	19-Mar-14	100%
2.13	Return Travel	Langdon	20-Mar-14	20-Mar-14	100%
2.14	**M2: Final RTE Presentation**	**Eval Team**	**19-Mar-14**	**19-Mar-14**	100%
3	**Phase III: Final Report**		**20-Mar-14**	**9-Apr-14**	100%
3.1	Input Analysis & Findings feedback from Kuala Lumpur & Geneva	Eval Team	20-Mar-14	26-Mar-14	100%
3.2	Preparation of Final Report	Eval Team	20-Mar-14	26-Mar-14	100%
3.3	**M3: Deliver Draft #1 of Final Report for IFRC Feedback**	**Eval Team**	**26-Mar-14**	**26-Mar-14**	100%
3.4	IFRC Review and Provision of Feedback	EMT	26-Mar-14	4-Apr-14	100%
3.5	Incorporate Feedback into Final Report	Eval Team	5-Apr-14	8-Apr-14	100%
3.6	**M4: Delivery of Final Report with IFRC Input Incorporated**	**Eval Team**	**9-Apr-14**	**9-Apr-14**	100%

IFRC PHILIPPINES REAL TIME EVALUATION

INTERVIEW GUIDE

RESPONDENT'S NAME:

RESPONDENT'S TITLE & FUNCTION:

INTERVIEWER'S NAME(S):

DATE:

LOCATION:

Thank you for talking with me OR us today. I OR We am part of a team conducting the IFRC Philippines Real Time Evaluation (RTE). We greatly value the chance to talk with you about your work relevant to this RTE. We will keep all of your remarks anonymous. In doing our work, the team will not use your name or any of your comments in such a way that it is clear that these views have come from you or your organization. In an RTE of this type, we find that this promotes the most open sharing of information. We now have a series of questions to ask to about your work and the IFRC Philippines response.

Question	*Notes*
Background	
1. **What is your function/position/job?** (Get full name and formal position)	
2. **What is the role of your organization or entity relative to the IFRC Philippines response?**	
Effectiveness & Performance	
3. **What aspects of the IFRC Philippines response do/did you find to be the *most effective*? What aspects of the IFRC Philippines response do/did you find to be the *least effective*?** (As needed, prompt comments regarding planning, appeal process, resource mobilization, timeliness, IFRC global tools: FACT/ERUs/RDRT, operational structure, roles & responsibilities, Movement coordination, humanitarian diplomacy tools, Principles &	

	Rules etc.)	
4.	What are/were the main challenges to the effective implementation of the IFRC response?	
5.	How do you think colleagues perceive/d IFRC's response performance?	
6.	How do you think IFRC is performing (or was performing) as compared to other peer humanitarian agencies?	
7.	How is/did the Movement coordination (including structure, roles & responsibilities) performing in the Philippines? At the Zone or Regional level? Global level? What are the main successes and challenges in this regard?	
8.	To what extent does information management (including social media) enable or hinder the IFRC response?	
Relevance		
9.	To what extent are the services that IFRC is providing suited to meet the priority needs of its target groups? Why or why not?	

10. Are there any critical gaps in the IFRC response/early recovery at this time? If so, what are they?	
11. What do you think are the main successes and limitations of the IFRC programme design?	
12. What is the level of key stakeholder (e.g. PRC, Shelter Cluster Agency, PNS) buy-in to the IFRC response?	
13. In what way, if any, has IFRC humanitarian diplomacy and related tools been utilized for the Philippines response?	
Solutions & Closing	
14. What are the current or future threats to a well-functioning IFRC Philippines response?	
15. What possible solutions can you offer towards optimizing the current IFRC Philippines response?	

16. **What suggestions do you have for optimizing future IFRC responses based on your experience with this IFRC Philippines response?**	
17. **Are there any questions we should have asked you but have not yet asked? If so, what is your response to that question?**	
18. **Who else should we talk to regarding this RTE? Do you have any written material to share that is relevant to this work?**	
19. **Is there any other information related to this work that you would like to provide?**	

Thank you again for your openness and candor in talking with us OR me today, and for all your work. Here is my contact information if you would like to provide any additional information relevant to this interview.

<u>Terms of Reference</u>

<u>Real Time Evaluation</u>

<u>IFRC support to the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan response operation</u>

Version 17 Dec 2013

1. Summary

1.1. Purpose: This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess aspects of the IFRC's support to the Philippines Red Cross (PRC) Typhoon Haiyan response operation, to inform the ongoing support to the PRC and partner operations at country, regional, and global levels. Emphasis will be placed on looking at the successes and challenges in the size, scope, and range of the operation. It will look at how the IFRC has designed and implemented Movement coordination / cooperation methods and approaches amongst all partners involved in the operation. The RTE will also be used to inform future and ongoing IFRC disaster management systems and processes.

1.2. Commissioner: This RTE has been commissioned by the USG of the Programme Services Division, IFRC, Geneva.

1.3. Audience: This RTE will be used by the IFRC country office in Manila, the Asia and Pacific Zone In Kuala Lumpur, and the headquarters in Geneva to improve delivery in the Philippine-related operations and to help plan future strategies and interventions. It will also inform Movement partners both involved in the operation, and those having a particular interest in international disaster response.

1.4. Review team: An independent evaluation Team Leader (consultant) will be supported by 2-3 NS evaluation team members (seconded from different NS) with the option for a PRC staff members to join the team and for an IFRC support person (if required)

1.5. Duration of consultancy: up to 30 days (with approximately 15 days in the field)

1.6. Estimated dates of consultancy: end February-March 2014

1.7. Location of consultancy: The Philippines (Manila and relevant field locations), Kuala Lumpur, and Geneva.

2. Background

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda), the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines, made landfall in Central Philippines on Friday, 8 November 2013, with winds of up to 235 kph and gusts reaching 275 kph. It made initial landfall in Guiuan (Eastern Samar), cutting across Visayas, Leyte, Cebu, Bantayan, Panay and northern Palawan, before heading out to sea, west of the Philippines.

Affected areas include the hardest-hit Tacloban City in Leyte province; Guiuan (Eastern Samar) where the storm first made landfall; the northern tip of Cebu and Bantayan Island; Negros Occidental and Oriental; Panay, and Palawan. Other affected areas include, but are not limited to, the provinces of Northern Samar, Samar, Southern Leyte, Bohol, Guimaras, Masbate, Biliran, Romblon and Mindoro.

The humanitarian impact of the typhoon has been massive, due to the deadly combination of powerful winds, heavy rain and tsunami-like storm surges which wiped out a number of coastal towns and cities, most notably Tacloban and communities along the coast south of Tacloban on Eastern Leyte. Although the actual impact of the typhoon varies from one affected area to another, the overall effect has been the same: families torn apart, buildings and infrastructure destroyed, livelihoods and crops ruined, and whole communities disrupted. The massive storm surge (up to 7m) caused damage in the eastern seaboard, while in others areas there is widespread wind damage.

Access to the worst-affected communities proved near impossible in the first week following the disaster. Debris and infrastructure damage made roads impassable and many of the airports and ports unusable. This delayed both emergency relief provision and assessments for some days, although the situation has improved considerably since then. However, some of the more remote small islands and mountainous inland communities could only be reached some two weeks after the disaster.

According to Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) reports of 13 December 2013, a total of 3.4 million families (16 million people) have been directly affected by Typhoon Haiyan in 12,122 barangays (villages) across 44 provinces in 591 municipalities and 57 cities.

Given the scope of the disaster and the corresponding intervention required, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Proclamation No 682 on 11 November 2013, declaring a state of national calamity, and indicated that the country would accept international assistance.

As a result, a massive emergency operation by the authorities and in-country partners is underway, focusing initially on relief, health and shelter, as well as the provision of clean water where needed. Longer-term recovery plans are also being developed to support livelihoods (including cash programming), and transitional as well as more permanent shelter needs.

It is important to underline the resilience of the Philippine population who have already begun clearing debris and rebuilding their homes and lives with any available means at hand. From an operational perspective, this reality is being taken into account in the planning of recovery activities and in tandem with emergency response activities, where feasible.

This is essentially a story of two disasters: the first: typhoon-related, with extensive wind damage; the other, a tsunami-like storm surge, along coastal areas mainly on the eastern coast of Leyte which led to widespread destruction, with concomitantly greater recovery needs, and likely longer-term involvement, particularly for shelter. The plan of action presented below reflects these considerations.

The main IFRC support actions undertaken in the first month were:

- Allocated CHF 475,495 from DREF (on 8 November 2013) to support the National Society in undertaking needs assessments and delivering immediate assistance to affected people.
- Launched an Emergency Appeal on a preliminary basis (on 12 November 2013) for CHF 72,323,259 to assist 100,000 families (500,000 people) within 18 months. This includes CHF 761,688 to support IFRC's role in shelter cluster coordination.
- Deployed surge capacity in the form of FACT and ERU's (see details from respective sources).
- Issued 3 Operations Updates based on numerous (11-12) FACT updates and info graphics.

- Developed an Emergency Plan of Action

The Haiyan is the fourth typhoon to hit the Philippines in 2013, and the country was hit by an earthquake just a few weeks before the Haiyan made landfall. The PRC was already in full operation with the other disasters in the country.

Of relevant background to the RTE will also be the report of the review of Movement Coordination in the Philippines, conducted in September 2013, and the case study of the revised Principles and Rules for RCRC Humanitarian Assistance conducted in October 2013.

The resolutions adopted by the Council of Delegates in November 2013 (Sydney) relating to "strengthening Movement coordination and cooperation" are also directly relevant to the scope of this RTE.

3. Evaluation purpose and scope

The IFRC is committed to quality assurance, standards and a strong culture of lesson learning in its disaster response and, as such, is committed to carrying out RTEs during all major disasters requiring an international response and meeting certain criteria of scale, scope, complexity or risk. These RTEs aim to improve service delivery and accountability to beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders and to build lessons for the improvement of the International Federation disaster response system. The Philippines Typhoon Haiyan response, falls within these criteria.

The coordination context in relation to this operation is particularly complex and challenging to the humanitarian system and to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. It will evaluate the following areas:

   i)   the **relevance and effectiveness of delivery** of the International Federation's support to the National Society response to date, with a focus on the overall performance of the response. Specific attention would be given to any particular successes or gaps in relation to the requirements of the National Society.
   ii) the **quality and efficiency of the IFRC coordination** with its Movement partners and external actors aimed at optimizing the response.
   iii) the **effectiveness and usefulness of the humanitarian diplomacy** tools used vis a vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc).

The RTE will review what is working well, what requires improvement, taking into consideration the context and capacities of Movement components. The RTE will look at IFRC coordination activities with the ICRC but will not pronounce on them. To this extent ICRC will be fully briefed on this RTE and will be encouraged to input into its findings.

The RTE team will meet with and interview key Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders in the PRC, partner National Societies, and the relevant IFRC Secretariat and ICRC offices. The team will also consult with other partners and organizations such as governments, the UN, INGOs / NGOs as appropriate to the evaluation's objectives. The focus will not be specifically on discussions with beneficiaries however, where opportunities present the RTE team should take advantage of this in appropriate contexts.

The team will also be briefed in Geneva, Kula Lumpur, and Manila.

The evaluation will cover the period from when the typhoon hit and the IFRC's initial response until the time the evaluators collect the data, taking into account the earlier existing management planning and coordination for the ongoing operation, and verify the impact on those.

4. Evaluation objectives and key questions

The specific objectives and possible key questions to be addressed in this RTE are listed below. Particular emphasis should be placed on considering the performance and delivery of the IFRC Secretariat support to the PRC and partner National Societies. The RTE is also required to consider possible future scenarios, options and directions for ongoing IFRC disaster management systems and processes.

The questions below provide an initial guidance and are expected to be further elaborated by the RTE team.

2. **To what extent has the IFRC Secretariat support to the National Society response been relevant and effective in its overall performance and delivery in this operating environment?**

    a. How effectively has the IFRC's emergency appeals / plans responded to the needs and to the requirements of the PRC. How was the response time vis-a-vis other operational actors? What flexibility has been needed and how have these tools been able to respond to these demands? Were they used in a timely and appropriate manner?

    b. What successes and gaps can be identified in the response and are there ways these gaps could have been addressed or could be addressed in future? What steps have been taken to ensure the quality of the response and the support to the National Society?

    c. How relevant was the use of IFRC's global response tools in this context and how well have they contributed to the operations? Have there been any gaps or concerns regarding their use? And are there any recommendations for future deployments? Review as well the organizational structure of operation, both at Manila and field level and the country operation and the zone. Was the deployment and use of global tools in line with SOP's.

    d. What challenges were faced by the IFRC's resource mobilization, finance, HR and logistics systems? Has resourcing been adequate and what could be done differently to improve visibility and resource mobilization in this operation?

    e. What systems have been used for monitoring, reporting, informational management and evaluation in this context and what can both the National Society and the IFRC do to address issues or improve these systems?

    f. Were the roles, responsibilities and expectations at each level (Geneva, Zone, and country) clear?

3. **How effectively and efficiently has the IFRC managed to coordinate and optimize its response to this disaster and how could Movement coordination channels and platforms, in this context, be improved for the future response and recovery operations?**

    a. Has there been clarity around the division of roles and responsibilities between the National Society, the IFRC, PNSs and the ICRC?

    b. How well has Movement coordination and cooperation functioned in-country and also at zonal and global levels?

    c. What challenges have arisen and how could these be addressed to improve future coordination / cooperation?

d. How has information management and sharing worked in this context and at an overarching zonal level? What challenges and issues presented themselves and how could the IFRC Secretariat address these challenges and improve communication with partners?

e. How relevance and useful has the use of social media been in managing and coordinating the emergency response.

f. How efficient and effective was the coordination of the Movement's global tools, particularly the large scale mobilization of FACT, ERUs and RDRTs, and other surge capacity tools? Organizational structure of operation, both at Manila and field level and the country operation and the zone. Deployment and use of global tools in line with SOP's

g. What has been the impact of regional cooperation to the operation, including the contributions of Movement regional assets (RDRT, etc) and NS from the region acting internationally .

h. What recovery actions have or are being considered (as contingency measures) and how could planning for these be strengthened in engagement with IFRC partners and their expertise?

i. Would better adherence to the recently approved Principles and Rules for RCRC Humanitarian Assistance have been beneficial in terms of i) reducing uncoordinated activities, such as unilateral action and sending of unsolicited items; ii) improving the quality of assistance and support to the PRC; and iii) preserving RCRC identity and ensuring respect for the FP through external relations and partnerships?

4. The **effectiveness and usefulness of the humanitarian diplomacy** tools used vis a vis other stakeholders (partner organisations, governmental, etc).

a. What role has humanitarian diplomacy taken in this operation and what key messages have been identified / advocated? How could this role be strengthened in future and what should the IFRC look to as its HD priorities for the coming months?

b. How effective were IFRC humanitarian diplomacy tools in the context of Movement relations with external actors for a "level 3" emergency – in particular, relations with the Government of the Philippines, IASC partners, militaries and civil protection actors.

5. Evaluation methodology & process

The methodology will adhere to the draft IFRC Framework for Evaluations[57], with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will manage and oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people not directly involved with the operation; one of which is from the Secretariat Planning and Evaluation Department, the other two who have direct experience in emergency operations and assessments – one from the Asia-Pacific Zone and one from Programme Services Division in Geneva.

The **evaluation team** will consist of up to five people: one external evaluator and team leader, two or three representatives from PNS, with the option of an IFRC Secretariat and PRC staff member, who will

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[57] http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf

also provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in country and will help to clarify internal processes and approaches for the team. Ideally the team leader or one or two of the PNS representatives should have regional knowledge / experience and ideally all candidates will have some experience with evaluation practices and the IFRC disaster response systems.

The external evaluator will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he will not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation.

The NS evaluators will assist the external evaluator in the evaluation process, and will be able to provide perspectives on the RCRC actors and interactions in the operation. It is expected that this four or five-person team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the emergency operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

The specific **evaluation methodology** will be detailed in close consultation between the RTE team and IFRC, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including prior IFRC RTE evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such exist surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites and to the Country / Regional offices.
3. **Key informant interviews** (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).
4. **Focus group discussions**, (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate) as time and capacity allow.

The RTE will not include extensive consultation with the people affected by the disaster. However, it is foreseen that a separate household survey exercise will be carried out during the 1st quarter of 2014 in the areas where the IFRC is operating.

A draft report will be prepared for **review**. This review process should occur within 4 weeks of submitting the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

- **Week 1-2 post review:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with this TOR and IFRC evaluation standards.   Stakeholders who participated in the evaluation to provide feedback on any inaccuracies or clarifications (differences of opinion should not be put forward here but outlined in the management response). Following this, a final draft is prepared.
- **Week 3-4 post review**: an evaluation management response team from within the IFRC) will review the report and compile a management response to be included as an appendix to the final published RTE report.

The IFRC Real-time Evaluation Management Guide will be used for this RTE made available to the evaluation team.

6. Evaluation deliverables

Inception Report – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team.

Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels: The team will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC in Kuala Lumpur (Zone Office) and the team or team leader will debrief in Geneva, in a timely manner and will adhere to the above mentioned review process.

Draft report: A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two weeks of the evaluation team's return from the field.

Final report: The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his / her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

The RTE has been commissioned by the USG PSD and will be managed by a management group (see section 5). The management group will oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The team leader will report on progress or challenges to the management group. The preliminary and final reports will be submitted through the management group, who will ensure the quality of the report providing input if necessary. The management group will submit the report to the USG PSD, who will oversee a management response and will ensure subsequent follow up.

7. Evaluation quality and ethical standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility**: Evaluations must be useful and used.

2. **Feasibility**: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.

3. **Ethics & Legality**: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.

4. **Impartiality & Independence**; Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.

5. **Transparency**: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.

6. **Accuracy**: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.

7. **Participation**: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.

8. **Collaboration**: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at:

www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

8. Qualifications

Selection of the external evaluation consultant will be based on the qualifications outlined below. The IFRC would also look for the two or three NS team members to have a level of evaluation and disaster response experience, with at least one having ICRC experience:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters, with specific experience in RTEs preferred;

2. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;

3. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;

4. Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations;

5. Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and knowledge of the IFRC's disaster management systems;

6. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team;

7. Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English, with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.

8. Knowledge of the Asia and Pacific region would be an advantage.

9. Minimum qualification of a master's degree or equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience.

10. Immediate availability for the period indicated.

9. Application procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by 20 January 2014 to the following email: misgana.ghebreberhan@ifrc.org. Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curriculum Vitae** (CV)
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this RTE, your daily rate, and three professional references.
3. At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.